LEBANON: HARIRI TELLS DAS HALE RUSSIAN MIGS ARE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001783

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS MCAP LE SY RU
SUBJECT: LEBANON: HARIRI TELLS DAS HALE RUSSIAN MIGS ARE
GOOD FOR MARCH 14

REF: A. BEIRUT 1729

B. BEIRUT 1761

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a December 17 dinner with visiting NEA Deputy
Assistant Secretary David Hale and the Ambassador,
Parliamentary Majority Leader Saad Hariri said the Russian
deal to provide ten MiG-29 aircraft to the Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF),provided with no strings attached, threatened
Hizballah and would be good for March 14. He argued the
planes would be a great tool for fighting terrorism in the
Palestinian refugee camps, as well as for border security,
and that their provision was compatible with continued U.S.
assistance to the LAF. He claimed that with the deal, the
Russians were sending a message to Iran and Syria that
"Lebanon exists." Hariri repeated his comments from his
December 13 meeting with Codel Ackerman (Ref B),in some
cases verbatim, saying the new U.S. Administration should
engage its friends (Arab allies) before it engages its foes
(Iran and Syria). He also echoed his own words to Ackerman
in stressing how crucial a solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is to peace and stability across
the region. He felt confident about March 14's chances in
the 2009 parliamentary elections, saying the alliance would
run candidates in all districts.


2. (C) DAS Hale noted the U.S. commitment to building a
long-term relationship between the U.S. military and the LAF,
and pointed out that the Russian deal, and Defense Minister
Elias Murr's disparaging comments about American assistance
following it, could be viewed as an assault on that
burgeoning relationship, and make it difficult for U.S.
policymakers to justify it before Congress. In a December 18
follow-up meeting, Hariri ally MP Ghattas Khoury provided
that the deal would not be allowed to undermine the
U.S.-Lebanon military relationship. End summary.

RUSSIAN MIGS
--------------


3. (C) On December 17, DAS Hale and the Ambassador,
accompanied by NEA/ELA Lebanon Desk Officer Matt Irwin and
PolEconOff, called on MP Saad Hariri at his residence in
Qoreitem. Hariri advisors MP Ghattas Khoury and Nader
Hariri, as well as press advisor Hani Hammoud, also attended
the meeting and dinner. Hariri began with the newly
announced deal for Russian provision of ten MiG-29 aircraft
to Lebanon, saying he hoped the deal would be viewed
positively. He noted he had spoken with Vice President
Cheney during the day and raved about the capabilities the
aircraft could provide Lebanon. He said the planes would
come as a grant, with no political strings attached --
specifically none related to South Ossetia and Abkhazia.


4. (C) Ghattas Khoury explained that the deal includes ten
MiG-29s for $300 million and $60-70 million for weapons,
including air-to-air missiles, unguided bombs, guided
air-to-ground missiles, and 30mm cannons. Khoury was unaware
of any discussions of maintenance and sustainment costs. He
said there is a possibility for Lebanon to receive artillery,
and that tanks were discussed in Moscow, though he doubted
they would materialize. He added that no surface-to-air
systems were on the table.


4. (C) Hariri commented that the Russian deal would be good
for March 14. He claimed that Hizballah was threatened by
the deal and Hizballah television al-Manar had already made
negative comments about it. He said the concept of a strong
LAF makes Hizballah nervous, and also suggested LAF MiGs
could complicate Israeli overflights in southern Lebanon,
potentially depriving Hizballah of another justification for
its arms. (Note: The Embassy found no particularly negative
reaction from Hizballah in the press, including al-Manar. In

BEIRUT 00001783 002.2 OF 003


an official statement on December 19, a Hizballah
representative said his party "supports arming the LAF with
all possible equipment from anywhere to confront Israel."
End note.)


5. (C) Hariri enthused about how the MiGs could be used to
fight terrorists in the Palestinian camps. He claimed that
if the LAF had had such weapons during its battle with
extremists in the Nahr al-Barid camp in 2007, it would have
suffered far fewer casualties. He also believed the planes
would be useful in enforcing the security of Lebanon's
borders. "The MiGs will make Hizballah and Syria think twice
about another May 7," he said, referring to Hizballah's use
of arms against fellow Lebanese in May 2008.


6. (C) Hariri said the deal was a Russian message to Iran and
Syria that "Lebanon exists" as a sovereign state. He
believed it was an opportunity for Russia and the U.S. to
come together and corner Syria. He pointed to U.S.-French
cooperation following the assassination of his father in 2005
as a precedent. Irwin noted that many of the weapons
Hizballah acquires from Iran and Syria are of Russian origin,
as the Israelis found during the 2006 war.


7. (C) DAS Hale explained that one of the goals of the U.S.
Foreign Military Financing program in Lebanon was to build a
lasting relationship, with training and assistance to ensure
effective usage of U.S. military equipment. He pointed out
that the Russian deal raised many questions, not only about
the LAF capability to use, maintain, and finance the
long-term costs of the Russian equipment, but also about
Lebanon's intentions, particularly toward Israel. He said
the U.S. Administration would face many challenges to its
policy of assisting the LAF after this agreement. He also
noted that Defense Minister Elias Murr had made negative
comments in Moscow about American assistance, which reflected
badly on the nature of the relationship. Hariri assured Hale
that Murr would clarify his Moscow statements and reaffirm
his commitment to working with the U.S.


8. (C) In a December 18 follow-up meeting with Ghattas
Khoury, DAS Hale explained in more explicit terms U.S.
concerns with the Russian MiG deal, and received assurances
that Khoury would work with Hariri toward three measures to
ease American concerns. First, the LAF would undertake an
assessment of the deal, to determine the utility of the MiGs
as well as the LAF's capacity to use and maintain them.
Second, if after that assessment the GOL decided to take the
planes, the GOL would divert no money identified to support
U.S. cooperation with the LAF to the MiGs. Finally, Khoury
said Hariri would ensure that Defense Minister Murr took
action to repair the damage done by his comments about U.S.
assistance in Moscow.

ADVICE FOR NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION
--------------


9. (C) Hariri said he hoped the new U.S. Administration "will
not make the same mistakes the last one made," and will take
advantage of the good will it enjoys to make a difference.
He felt it crucial that the new team in Washington seek a
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the
beginning of its term. He also reiterated comments made with
Codel Ackerman December 13 (Ref B),stressing the importance
of U.S. engagement with its Arab allies as a prerequisite to
engagement with Syria or Iran. "You need your allies in
order to counter Iran," he said. "If you use the same
tactics as the French have with Syria, it leaves a bad taste
in the mouths of the Egyptians, Saudis, Emiratis, and
Jordanians. You don't want to leave them demoralized."

CONFIDENT FOR THE ELECTIONS
WORKING WITH INDEPENDENTS
--------------


10. (C) DAS Hale asked Hariri about March 14's preparations
for the parliamentary elections. Hariri said he felt
confident that public opinion is with March 14. He said the

BEIRUT 00001783 003 OF 003


alliance would run candidates in all electoral districts, but
admitted that in some districts, March 14 parties might not
be able to win seats. In those places, he said, March 14 was
looking for good independent candidates to run in their
place. He stressed that even in districts where they could
not win, it was important for March 14 candidates to run, in
order to build recognition in anticipation of the 2010
municipal elections. Still, his focus was on the 2009
elections: "If we lose, I will pack my bags and leave. I
will not see Syria and Iran take Lebanon hostage," he said.


11. (C) Hariri said independent Michel Murr was on board with
March 14, but Hariri was worried about Murr's insistence on
bringing the Armenian Tashnaq party along with him (Ref A).
Nonetheless, Hariri said it would be easier to negotiate with
Tashnaq with Murr in the March 14 fold. "We can ask them
what the hell they are doing with Iran and Syria," he said.
On Tripoli alliances, Hariri stated he was particularly open
to an alliance with former PM Najib Mikati, and that he had
spoken with him two days before. Hariri had heard Mikati was
still talking to Syria about possible alliances, and that he
believed it was too early to cast his lot with either side.


12. (C) Comment: It was apparent in subsequent meetings with
President Suleiman and LAF Commander Kahwaji that there had
been no prior consultation with either the LAF or other
government officials on accepting the Russian offer of MiG
aircraft. Hariri, Khoury, and other March 14 leaders seemed
to view the deal largely through the prism of internal
politics, seeing in it a way to give a major morale boost to
the Lebanese and put March 8 on the defensive. Lebanon,s
experience with a French Mirage deal in the 1980s was cited
positively by Hariri and others, as the Mirages were used
briefly against militants in Palestinian refugee camps, and
gave the Lebanese a temporary sense of international support
for their security needs. In fact, the Mirage deal was a
considerable scandal even by Lebanese standards.
International outrage quickly put an end to their use in
camps. The jets were acquired in a secretive way that
sparked charges of corruption and decades of litigation. For
political, financial and logistical reasons the aircraft were
never used again, deteriorated, and eventually were traded
away at discount prices. Should the MiG deal ever be
consummated (and the President, LAF Commander, and more
thoughtful March 14 leaders privately doubted it would) the
MiGs would be another Mirage-like burden on the LAF.


13. (C) The MiG offer has undoubted political benefits for
March 14, which would be undercut were the U.S. to express
public reservations about the proposal. We have registered
opposition clearly in private, and will continue to work
behind-the-scenes to ensure that the LAF,s assessment
concludes (probably after the Spring elections) that the the
LAF neither needs the MiGs, nor can afford the maintenance
costs, giving the GOL a graceful way to decline the Russian
offer. End comment.


14. (U) DAS Hale has cleared this cable.

SISON