LEBANON: UNSCOL DISCUSSES HIZBALLAH, TIGHT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001745

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR AMBRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: UNSCOL DISCUSSES HIZBALLAH, TIGHT
ELECTION AND LAF WITH CENTCOM ASSESSMENT TEAM

REF: A. BEIRUT 01722

B. BEIRUT 01677

C. BEIRUT 01663

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a December 9 meeting with visiting CENTCOM
Assessment Team members and the Ambassador, UN Special
Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) Chief of Staff Jack
Christofides, PolChief Diego Zorrilla, and Poloff Rami
Shehadeh provided a broad assessment of Lebanese politics
after the Doha Accord. Zorrilla described electoral
alliances as "fixed" but noted the importance of the 50
percent of Christians who were still undecided in determining
the outcome of the 2009 elections. Zorrilla called Hizballah
"confident" because of overt Western overtures to Syria, the
absence of a U.S. attack against Iran, and the strength of
the group's regional alliances. It is not certain that
victory in upcoming elections is the group's goal, he said.


2. (C) On Ghajar, Shehadeh described Israeli hesitations on a
proposed deal. He noted the opposing views of the Lebanese
Armed Forces; he said some Lebanese see the force as purely
Christian and important in protecting the Christian minority
while others judge the group is confessionally balanced and
thus incapable of intervening in domestic issues. End
Summary.

ELECTION OUTCOME UNCERTAIN
--------------


3. (C) Meeting December 9 with the Ambassador and visiting
CENTCOM Assessment Team (CAT),UNSCOL staff assessed that
Lebanon, six months after the Doha Accords, had implemented
all requirements of Doha -- including election of a
president, establishment of a national unity government, and
formation of a new electoral law -- but the country's core
problems remained unchanged. They described reconciliation
efforts as superficial and limited to Lebanon's upper
political echelons. Zorrilla attributed the generally stable
stagnation to a "wait and see" mentality of regional actors.


4. (C) Despite the fact that the new electoral law does not
include needed reforms such as uniform ballots, Zorrilla
opined the law would provide a good basis for 2009
parliamentary elections. He noted that the law was adopted
by consensus and far in advance of elections; arguing that
this basis of legitimacy would make election results less
contentious.


5. (C) Overall results in the 2009 parliamentary elections
are uncertain, the UNSCOL team agreed. Zorrilla assessed
that electoral alliances within March 14 and the opposition
seem to be holding strong and the separation between the
opposing blocs is as wide as ever. He expected neither side
would win a sweeping majority and the elections would be
decided by the swing Christian vote.


6. (C) Lebanese politics are currently defined by the actions
of Christian leader Michel Aoun, Zorrilla said. He asserted
that 25 percent of the Christian population support Aoun, 25
percent support Kataeb head Amine Gemayel and Lebanese Forces
leader Samir Geagea, and the remaining 50 percent are
undecided. Aoun's recent actions -- including trips to Iran
and Syria -- would fail to attract the undecided voters.
This could indicate that either Aoun views his alliance with
Hizballah as more important than an electoral victory or that
he is relying on the Shia vote to win the elections.

HIZBALLAH'S THOUGHT PROCESS
--------------


7. (C) Hizballah, whose members meet with Zorrilla and UNSCOL
Coordinator Michael Williams regularly, exudes confidence,
Zorrilla said. He thought that their confidence stems from
overt Western overtures to Syria, the absence of a U.S.

BEIRUT 00001745 002 OF 003


attack against Iran, and the strength of the group's regional
alliances. Zorrilla differentiated between what he called
Hizballah's tactical alliance with Syria -- which he assessed
as expendable -- and its more fundamental alliance with Iran.
Zorrilla acknowledged Iranian goals in the region could
eventually threaten Hizballah's domestic support. He also
cited Israeli-Syrian negotiations as a possible concern for
the group.


8. (C) Domestically, Hizballah argues the May violence it
triggered helped "unblock" the political situation and ensure
the election of a president and the establishment of a
national unity government. Zorrilla assessed the alliance
between Hizballah and Aoun was strong; he noted decreasing
references to the Memorandum of Understanding between the
parties and a new rhetoric emphasizing the fundamental
alliance of minorities to oppose Sunni domination. He
described former Prime Minister Omar Karame and Druze
Minister of Youth and Sports Talal Arslan as strong Hizballah
allies as well.


9. (C) The "liberation" of Shebaa Farms has also diminished
as a justification for Hizballah's bearing arms, Zorrilla
said. SYG Hassan Nasrallah has instead focused on the
defense of Lebanon in general as a reason to maintain the
resistance. Zorrilla said he had information on Hizballah
rearmament but said hints from his contacts suggest
improvements in the quantity and quality of Hizballah's arms,
specifically ground-to-air missiles, following the summer
2006 war with Israel.


10. (C) UNSCOL staff said it is not certain that victory in
upcoming elections was Hizballah's goal. On the one hand,
Hizballah's winning the elections would show it enjoyed
majority support by the population. However, Hizballah has
said that if it were part of a majority, it would form a
national unity government with its political opponents,
suggesting the group does not want the challenges inherent in
ruling authority, Zorrilla said. He said the opposition bloc
received $1.2 billion from Iran for elections, $800 million
of which was earmarked for Hizballah and Amal. Zorrilla said
Saudi Arabia sent $1.5 billion to March 14.


11. (C) Hizballah seeks to give voice to the Shia and it
requires state cover to accomplish its goals. Hizballah has
a measure of respect for the institutions of the state,
demonstrated by its serious stance on elections, but does not
use participation in the state to protect its existence,
Zorrilla argued.


12. (C) Zorrilla said Michael Williams and he meet with Head
of Security Wafiq Safa on security issues, Head of External
Relations Nawaf Musawi, President of Consultation Center for
Studies and Documentation Ali Fayad, and Minister of Labor
Mohammed Fneish. Former Special Coordinator Geir Pedersen
met with MP Mohammed Raad, but Williams has not yet seen
Raad. Zorrilla said Williams does not meet Hizballah
contacts as frequently as Pedersen (at least every two
weeks),but events during Pedersen's tenure were more
tumultuous than now.

NO GHAJAR SOLUTION SOON
--------------


13. (C) UNSCOL Poloff Rami Shehadeh, who covers Lebanon's
regional relationships through the lens of UNSCR 1701 and
border delineation, said February 2009 Israeli elections made
movement on the Lebanon-Israel, Syria-Israel, and
Israel-Palestinian Territories tracks unlikely before August

2009. He cited the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which is
expected to start operating in March 2009, as an event that
could affect the domestic situation. However, Shehadeh noted
the court was unlikely to issue indictments quickly, so any
effect would be delayed.


14. (C) On Ghajar, Shehadeh said Lebanon had verbally agreed
to extend for a few weeks its November 22 deadline for
Israeli acceptance of the UN proposal and stressed the need
for patience on the Lebanese side. Shehadeh assessed that

BEIRUT 00001745 003 OF 003


all Israeli policy and security concerns regarding Ghajar
could be addressed in an agreement and said the main sticking
point on the Israeli side was the legal rights of Israeli
citizens in northern Ghajar. He said Israel fears legal
action against the government if a hasty agreement fails to
protect the rights of those citizens.


15. (C) Additionally, Shehadeh described Israeli uncertainty
that any agreement on Ghajar with the current Lebanese
Government would be respected by the next Lebanese
Government. Describing Ghajar from an internal Israeli
political viewpoint, Shehadeh said current Israeli Defense
Minister Ehud Barak probably did not want to open the Ghajar
file as it could show his previous mistakes as prime
minister. Alternatively, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, who
has championed Ghajar and UNSCR 1701, would support progress
on Ghajar before Israeli elections. Shehadeh said he will
travel with Michael Williams to Israel next month, but UNSCOL
Chief of Staff Jack Christofides said the UN's agenda for the
meetings is to be in listening mode. He predicted the UN
will "be in the business" of Ghajar a while longer.


16. (C) Shebaa Farms is trickier, according to Shehadeh, as
both withdrawal of forces and establishment of sovereignty
are required. He reaffirmed the UN stance that the land is
Syrian but said more work by the UN cartographer is
necessary. However, Syria and Israel still refuse to engage
with the cartographer on the issue of sovereignty. Shehadeh
hopes the UN can build on the future work of the joint
Lebanon-Syria committee established to delineate shared
borders.

DRAB VIEW OF LAF POTENTIAL
--------------


17. (C) There are two views of the LAF, the UNSCOL staff
said. Some Lebanese view the LAF as a Christian force and see
the need to protect it. Others see the LAF as a true
reflection of the country's confessional breakdown and, as
such, incapable of intervening domestically without political
consensus. Shehadeh noted the only decision involving the
LAF likely to gain political consensus would be action
against Palestinian extremists in the existing camps. He
called "frightening" the idea of a battle between the LAF and
Palestinian militias.

COMMENT
--------------

18. (C) UNSCOL's description of Hizballah as "confident"
tracks with what we are hearing from several of our contacts.
While we assess that Hizballah will work hard to achieve a
majority for itself and its allies in the 2009 election, it
is plausible that if it succeeds, it might seek less of a
direct role in the government than that to which it would be
entitled. Hizballah followed that logic during the July 2008
cabinet formation, taking only one cabinet seat (Labor) for a
Hizballah member and giving two others to allies. End
Comment.


SISON