LEBANON: HARIRI ON OPPOSITION ATTACKS ON SUNNIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001729 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER LE SY QA SUBJECT: LEBANON: HARIRI ON OPPOSITION ATTACKS ON SUNNIS Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Ambassador and DCM met December 4 with Parliamentary Majority Leader Saad Hariri, who said opposition March 8's fanning of anti-Sunni sentiment was not succeeding politically. He claimed that Michel Aoun's trip to Syria would backfire on Aoun, and said it was a "fact" that Aoun was receiving funding from the Qataris. He believed the Saudis were unconcerned about March 8 verbal attacks on them, despite the Saudi Ambassador's recent complaints about the statements. He was upset by Lebanese Armed Forces Commander General Jean Kahwagi's recent trip to Damascus, but said he would stand against attacks on Defense Minister Elias Murr, who will travel to Syria soon at the request of President Sleiman. ¶2. (C) Hariri noted he had met previously with Tripoli leaders Najib Mikati and Mohammed Safadi about potential alliances, but was not sure where they now stood and was waiting to hear back from them. He had problems with Michel Murr's insistence on including Armenian Tashnaq in any potential alliance with March 14. He said he was still meeting regularly with Hizballah representatives to resolve issues of common concern, and he inquired about the deliverables of General Petraeus's December 2 visit to Beirut. End summary. "INDEPENDENT" CANDIDATE AT QOREITEM DAILY -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador and DCM, accompanied by PolEconOff, called on Saad Hariri December 4 at Qoreitem. Hariri advisors Nader Hariri and Nadine Chehab also attended the meeting. "Independent" politician from Keserwan Mansour Bon was in the hallway as the Ambassador entered Hariri's office, and she commented on his presence to Nader Hariri. Nader reported that Bon visits Qoreitem daily and is in "constant consultation" with Saad. Nader said Bon was "on board" with Hariri, though he insisted Bon would not take specific March 14 candidates on his list, particularly those from Samir Geagea's Lebanese Forces. He said Geagea understood he could not run candidates in Keserwan, though Amine Gemayel planned to run a Kataeb candidate, Sejean Azzi, in that heavily Christian district. (Note: Mansour Bon is among the most prominent of the "independent" Keserwan politicians expected to run in the spring parliamentary elections and to form a bloc in support of President Sleiman. End Note.) MARCH 8 PAINTING SUNNIS AS TERRORISTS -------------- ¶4. (C) The Ambassador began the meeting with Saad Hariri by expressing concern about pro-Syrian politicians' fanning of anti-Sunni sentiment, among Christians in particular, by casting the upcoming elections as a choice between fanatical Sunni Salafists and Wahabi extremists on one hand, and a Shia Hizballah working within the system on the other. Hariri said it was clear the March 8 strategy was not working. He pointed to March 14 successes in recent university and syndicate elections, and said accusations that he had funded Salafist groups would lead to nothing. He called March 8 tactics portraying law-abiding Sunnis as terrorists as "racist." ¶5. (C) The Ambassador continued on the theme, asking what March 14 or Hariri's Future Movement could do to counter the impact of these March 8 tactics, particularly among Christians. Hariri said he refused to go on the defensive. He explained that he would simply demonstrate his moderation and tell people what he stands for. He was unconvinced footage on March 8 television stations of Fatah al-Islam members detained in Syria, pictures he claimed were intended to paint all Sunnis as terrorists, would have much of an impact in Lebanon. The DCM expressed concern that after this opposition campaign, any security incident in Tripoli or elsewhere involving Sunnis would leave Hariri open to political attack. "Yes," said Hariri. "That is what Lebanon BEIRUT 00001729 002 OF 003 is all about." AOUN'S FOREIGN BACKERS; ANTI-SAUDI ATTACKS -------------- ¶6. (C) Hariri said March 8 leader Michel Aoun's current trip to Syria would backfire on him. He pointed to Aoun's foreign supporters as Aoun's key weakness, saying that in addition to support from Iran and Syria, it was "a fact" that Aoun was receiving money from Qatar as well. He noted that pro-March 8 television station OTV was partially owned by the Emir of Qatar. He downplayed the need for Saudi Ambassador Abdel-Aziz Khoja's recent protest of March 8 attacks on the Kingdom. He said the Saudi regime was "bigger than that," and viewed the criticism of KSA in a regional context, understanding they originated with Iran, Syria, and Hizballah. MORE VISITS TO SYRIA -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador solicited Hariri's reaction to Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander General Jean Kahwagi's recent trip to Syria. Hariri said he had known about the visit, but had not known Kahwagi would meet with Bashar Asad and issue a joint statement with him. Hariri called the trip "ridiculous." Nonetheless, he said, he would stand behind Defense Minister Elias Murr when he goes to Damascus, since he was going at the request of President Sleiman to deal with specific issues. "He won't get anything done there, on (UNSCR) 1701 or anything, but he will go," stated Hariri. ELECTORAL ALLIANCES -------------- ¶8. (C) The Ambassador asked Hariri how his negotiations with political leaders over electoral alliances were proceeding. Hariri said he had held discussions with leaders from Tripoli and with independent Christian Michel Murr, but that nothing solid had emerged from them yet. He noted he had met with Tripolitan leader Najib Mikati a month and a half before, but had not touched base with him since. He stated they were due to meet again later in December or in January. With regard to Tripoli heavyweight and current March 14 minister Mohammed Safadi, Hariri said, "I have no clue where he is (politically)." He expected both leaders would come to him soon, though he claimed the Syrians were attempting to bring Mikati, Safadi, and former president Omar Karame together into an alliance at the expense of Hariri. ¶9. (C) Hariri said he had had good discussions with Michel Murr about putting together an alliance of independents with March 14, but believed, Murr's insistence on including Armenian Tashnaq was a problem. According to Hariri, Murr presented him with a proposal for seat allocation which would give the Armenian Tashnaq party an unacceptable number of seats. Hariri made a counter offer, with fewer seats for Tashnaq, but giving them two ministries inthe new government. He noted he did not trust Tshnaq, which had just sent a delegation to Damasus to meet with Syrian President Bashar Asad, to keep its MPs with March 14 following the elections. He believed it likely the party would take its seats to Michel Aoun's side once the electoral campaign was over to eat into March 14's bloc. "(Tashnaq leader Hagop Pakradounian did not go see Bashar Asad to tell him he will ally with Saad Hariri. Bashar told them what to do," said Hariri. The Ambassador pointed out that Pakradounian had seemed open to the idea of an alliance with March 14 in a meeting with DCM the day before. "I don't believe it at all," insisted Hariri. STILL TALKING TO HIZBALLAH -------------- ¶10. (C) In response to Ambassador's question about his continuing dealings with Hizballah, Hariri said he had had another meeting with Hizballah Political Advisor Ali Hassan Khalil, his fourth such meeting in six weeks, two days before. He stated that their discussions centered on finding a solution to Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri's refusal to let parliament take up 73 draft laws the previous government had submitted after the March 8 ministers left the cabinet. BEIRUT 00001729 003 OF 003 The two sides also discussed pushing forward with political appointments requiring parliamentary approval, said Hariri. He noted that Hizballah had agreed to remove its political posters from the road leading to Beirut airport. U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE, STL -------------- ¶11. (C) Hariri asked the Ambassador how General Petraeus' December 2 visit to Beirut had gone. The Ambassador noted that the General's visit had been very productive, with General Petraeus outlining the U.S. commitment to continue to train and equip the LAF. The U.S. was working to provide the LAF with M60 main battle tanks, and had already provided Humvees, rifles, body armor, and grenade launchers. The U.S. was also working to respond to the LAF's request for the Cessna Caravan, which will require Congressional notification. Nader counseled that the best way to counter press misinformation on U.S. military assistance was to continue to deliver the equipment. The Ambassador also asked for Hariri's reaction to the UN report noting that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon was on track to commence functioning on March 1, 2009. "It's great!" Hariri responded enthusiastically. COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) We believe Hariri may be underestimating the possible resonance among Christians in key swing districts of Aoun's accusations that Hariri's Future Movement participated in the funding of Sunni extremist groups. The current efforts to denounce Saudi Arabia by pro-Syrian politicans Michel Aoun and Wi'am Wihab divert attention away from the March 8 alliance with Hizballah and emphasize a Sunni "threat" to Lebanon. Meanwhile, though Hariri has said previously March 14 would have unified lists prepared by January, March 14 contacts tell us there was no discussion of electoral lists at the December 4 meeting of the March 14 leadership, which occurred a few hours after Ambassador's call on Hariri. Hariri seems to be slow in forcing alliances with those currently outside March 14, something that potential allies continually point out to us. The Embassy will continue to engage the March 14 leadership and potential allies to encourage movement, but Hariri himself will have to spearhead efforts to forge these alliances and assemble strong lists. End comment. SISON