LEBANON: JUMBLATT PLEASED WITH HIS U.S. VISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001699 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR IO A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS LE SY IS SA, IR SUBJECT: LEBANON: JUMBLATT PLEASED WITH HIS U.S. VISIT Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a November 25 meeting, Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) leader Walid Jumblatt told the Ambassador that his trip to the United States had been a success, and he was pleased to hear that the U.S. continued to support the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. He worried that Kataeb Party leader Amine Gemayel's divisive campaign tactics might cause rifts in March 14. He speculated about possible electoral alliances among Sunni leaders in Tripoli, and did not believe Syria would allow President Sleiman to back an independent parliamentary bloc. ¶2. (C) Jumblatt was unsurprised by the lack of progress on an Israeli withdrawal from Ghajar village. He bemoaned the number of official delegations Lebanon is sending to Syria, but noted that it is because of Syrian cooperation with Lebanon that Fatah al-Islam is a "dead issue." He believed Saudi funds might be able to help Lebanon confront Iranian influence, but said the combination of Iranian money and Hizballah's sophisticated infrastructure is difficult to overcome. End summary. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by PolEconOff, called on PSP leader Walid Jumblatt November 25 at his residence in Clemenceau. PSP MP Marwan Hamadeh also attended the meeting. Jumblatt briefed the Ambassador on his visit to the United States, from which he returned November 20. He said he had an excellent fundraising event in Los Angeles with 600 people in attendance, and he was looking into ways to fly Lebanese voters back for the 2009 parliamentary elections, either commercially or by charter flights. He believed it would make sense for March 14 to work centrally to bring in all its voters, rather than leaving it to each March 14 political leader to organize. PLEASED WITH PROVISION OF M-60 TANKS -------------- ¶4. (C) Jumblatt said he had stressed with policymakers in Washington the need to announce support to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) before President Sleiman's visit to Tehran, and he was happy to see the U.S. announcement that it would work to supply M60 tanks to the LAF. Nonetheless, he wondered what Iran would offer Lebanon in terms of military assistance. Jumblatt said he understood from his meetings in Washington that the new U.S. administration would seek to engage Syria to pull it away from Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas. Jumblatt doubted the approach would be successful, but he accepted that the administration would try. ¶5. (C) Hamadeh was pleased U.S. officials had stressed the importance of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. The Ambassador highlighted the U.S. commitment to seeking justice for former PM Rafiq Hariri's assassination. Repeating his oft-stated view, Jumblatt said that despite UNIIIC Coordinator Daniel Bellemare's need for more time to complete his investigation into the assassination, he hoped the Tribunal would at least be up and running soon, as this would provide a political and psychological boost to March 14. KATAEB'S DIVISIVE TACTICS -------------- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador noted the positive coverage of Jumblatt,s visit in the Lebanese press, particularly the focus on U.S. support for Lebanon,s sovereignty and democracy. She mentioned that the March 14 leadership seemed confident about its prospects for the 2009 parliamentary elections. Jumblatt said March 14,s victory in the elections would reinforce U.S. support for the coalition. He stressed the need for all March 14 leaders to work together for the alliance to win, rather than insisting on contesting and winning more seats for their individual parties, at the expense of the group. He particularly worried about disputes BEIRUT 00001699 002 OF 003 over seats within March 14 between Samir Geagea,s Lebanese Forces and Amine Gemayel's Kataeb. Nevertheless, he was confident there would be unified March 14 lists ready for the March 14 convention in January. ¶7. (C) Hamadeh complained that the Gemayel's Kataeb Party rally on November 23 was damaging to March 14. He said Amine Gemayel was portraying Kataeb as the "father of the Christian parties," a characterization meant to eat into the base of opposition Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun, but which ultimately also is damaging to Gemayel,s Christian allies, particularly Samir Geagea. In addition, Hamadeh was concerned that Gemayel's rhetoric was breeding tension on university campuses. Jumblatt was also worried, saying he hoped the tension would not lead to violence on the streets. ELECTORAL ALLIANCES -------------- ¶8. (C) The Ambassador asked Jumblatt's thoughts on how political alliances among Sunni leaders in Tripoli were shaping up. Hamadeh noted that Mohammed Safadi had recently made positive comments about Saad Hariri's leadership, which Hamadeh hoped was an indication that Safadi would remain in March 14. Jumblatt agreed, saying, "I don't think Safadi will leave Saad." Jumblatt said Tripoli heavyweight and former prime minister Najib Mikati was looking into an alliance with March 8 Druze leader Talal Arslan, but Hamadeh believed Mikati was more likely to position himself for a return to the Prime Minister's office by remaining independent during this election cycle. ¶9. (C) The Ambassador asked if Jumblatt thought an independent parliamentary bloc might succeed in drawing some Christian MPs away from March 8. Jumblatt said he thought this was a moot point, since he believed the Syrians would not allow President Sleiman to form a separate independent bloc. He stated that Michel Aoun is Syria's candidate, and the Syrians will object to any move that might weaken him, as the independent Christian list might. ¶10. (C) Jumblatt was pessimistic about the National Dialogue, saying it could last for years, but nothing will come out of it. Moreover, he said, if March 8 wins the parliamentary elections, they will end the Dialogue, "absorb" the LAF, and let Hizballah continue its "resistance." In response to the Ambassador's question about how confident Jumblatt felt about March 14's chances in the elections, Jumblatt replied, "There is much work to do." LEBANON'S NEIGHBORS AND OTHER REGIONAL PLAYERS -------------- ¶11. (C) Jumblatt stated that the Fatah al-Islam insurgent group is a "dead issue," largely because the Syrian regime decided the time had come to get rid of it. Pro-Syrian Palestinian groups' sudden cooperation with the Lebanese army was proof of this, he said. Nonetheless, Jumblatt believed Fatah al-Islam leader Abdul Rahman Awad would not be captured, because "he is a big shot," and the Syrians will not allow it. Both Jumblatt and Hamadeh noted that Fatah al-Islam's demise was part of Syria's normal strategy of using people or groups for their own political interests, and then disposing of them once they have served their purpose. ¶12. (C) On Ghajar, Jumblatt was not surprised by the lack of progress, saying Israel would never withdraw while Hizballah is rearming in direct violation of UNSCR 1701. Furthermore, he said, the GOI has already proven many times that it does not care about Lebanon or boosting the legitimacy of the moderate Lebanese government. ¶13. (C) Jumblatt worried that the recent wave of Lebanese officials visiting Syria would continue indefinitely. Hamadeh noted that President Sleiman asked Defense Minister Elias Murr to visit his counterpart in Damascus, but wondered why Culture Minister Tammam Salam needed to go now as well. "We should not send too many at one time," said Hamadeh. BEIRUT 00001699 003 OF 003 ¶14. (C) Jumblatt bemoaned the continuing flows of Iranian money and weapons to Hizballah. He said Saudi King Abdullah had recently awakened to the dangers of Iranian influence in Lebanon, and the Saudis were now trying to be helpful. Nonetheless, said Jumblatt, given Hizballah's long experience and sophisticated military and social infrastructure, it will be hard for Saudi funding to make any quick impact in terms of strengthening moderates or weakening Hizballah. COMMENT -------------- ¶15. (C) Jumblatt's positive reaction to his trip to Washington is in marked contrast to his fall 2007 visit. Then, he felt that U.S. leaders did not agree with him on the need for regime change in Syria, and he told us he had lost faith in the U.S. commitment to Lebanon. That sent him into a prolonged funk that ultimately led him to accept Saad's initiative to elect Michel Sleiman as the consensus candidate for president. Jumblatt approached this visit with more realistic expectations, i.e., that a new U.S. administration may portend a new approach to Syrian and Iran, but the U.S. commitment would not change. The assurances he received in this regard from his interlocutors, along with the tangible signs of support (i.e., M60 tanks and progress on the Special Tribunal) were invaluable in stiffening Walid's resolve. As a result, we expect he will be a key player in herding the straying cats that make up the March 14 coalition. With a March 14 convention planned in January to unveil a common program and electoral list, time is getting short. End comment. SISON