Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BEIRUT1682
2008-11-25 14:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: AOUN EXPLAINS HIS DEFENSE STRATEGY,

Tags:  PGOV PREL LE SY IS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9199
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHLB #1682/01 3301412
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251412Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3653
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3203
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3413
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001682 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL LE SY IS
SUBJECT: LEBANON: AOUN EXPLAINS HIS DEFENSE STRATEGY,
BEMOANS POLITICAL SNIPING

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001682 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR IO A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL LE SY IS SUBJECT: LEBANON: AOUN EXPLAINS HIS DEFENSE STRATEGY, BEMOANS POLITICAL SNIPING Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a November 20 meeting with the Ambassador and visiting NEA/ELA Office Director Nicole Shampaine, Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) Leader Michel Aoun talked briefly about his upcoming trip to Syria, which he confirmed would take place before the end of the 2008. He said the recent wave of political "reconciliations" is actual merely a return to normal political life, without fear of violence. He expressed frustration that the National Dialogue was not really a dialogue, because, he argued, March 14 opponents took their arguments to the media before discussing them around the dialogue table. He complained about a recent March 14 attack on his son-in-law, Minister of Telecommunications Gebran Bassil, and railed on March 14 corruption. ¶2. (C) Aoun explained his idea for a national defense strategy, saying he proposed a "regular army" to deal with internal issues, such as terrorism, internal subversion, the Palestinian refugee camps, and assisting the Internal Security Force (ISF) with keeping public order. In addition, he said, there would be a "national resistance," with members from across confessions and regions, which woulQonly be activated by the Lebanese government in case of invasion by outside forces. Responding to Ambassador's criticism of his approach, Aoun stressed that he wanted to see the arms of the resistance in the hands of the state, but said it would take time for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to be trained appropriately and trust built between Hizballah and the LAF so the arms could be handed over. Finally, Aoun expressed confidence in his party's chances in the 2009 parliamentary elections, but complained about Gulf money coming in to support his opponents. In a separate November 21 lunch with Shampaine and DCM, other senior FPM figures described their approach to dealing with Hizballah. End summary. VISIT TO SYRIA -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by visiting NEA/ELA Office Director Nicole Shampaine and PolOffs, met with Free Patriotic
Movement leader General Michel Aoun at his home in Rabieh on November 20. The Ambassador asked Aoun about his regional travel plans. He said he would travel to Syria by the end of the year, and looked forward to meeting with Syrian officials as well as touring the "cradle of Christianity." He dismissed press speculation about possible deliverables of his trip (i.e., the return of Lebanese detainees in Syria),saying, "According to the papers, I have already returned from Damascus. They do not know what they are talking about." POLITICAL BICKERING INSTEAD OF DIALOGUE ACCUSATIONS OF CORRUPTION -------------- ¶4. (C) Aoun said he thought the wave of political "reconcilations" among political leaders was positive, primarily because it would be impossible to hold successful elections in 2009 without a relaxation of tensions and a return to "regular political life," with less chance of violence. He said that Lebanon needs a "political discourse, not a polemical discourse," the latter of which he claimed was his opponents' approach to politics. He used the example of the National Dialogue, which he opined was not a dialogue at all. The Dialogue should be an opportunity for everyone to put their ideas on the table and discuss them, believed Aoun. Instead, all the Dialogue participants were coming with pre-conceived ideas, he said, and instead of discussing others' ideas at the table, they have immediately made their disagreements public, running to the media with disparaging comments. ¶5. (C) In that vein, Aoun was angry about public accusations from Future Movement MP Ghazi Youssef against Aoun's BEIRUT 00001682 002 OF 003 son-in-law, Telecom Minister Gebran Bassil, accusing Bassil of corruption in the negotiation of a management contract for one of the state mobile phone companies. Aoun was highly offended that Youssef would accuse his family or party of corruption given, he claimed, Youssef and other Future party politicians' history of corruption. He referred to PM Siniora's time as Finance Minister, noting Aoun had demanded a forensic accounting report on the Finance Ministry's accounts, which Siniora refused. Aoun said he would personally apologize and give up his parliamentary immunity if such a report were to find no wrong-doing on Siniora's part. He noted that after years of accusations, he was found not guilty on charges of corruption filed against him when he fled to exile in France. "NATIONAL RESISTANCE" -------------- ¶6. (C) Aoun outlined his national defense strategy plan, saying that he proposes having the army take on internal issues, while a multi-confessional resistance would be trained to stand in waiting in case of invasion from Israel or any other country that might pose a threat. He said the LAF should be reinforced and better trained, but that the GOL would never have enough money to train and equip the LAF to fight foreign invaders. He insisted the resistance was the only force capable of that kind of fighting. The LAF, he said, should focus on protecting the Lebanese from internal subversion, terrorism, and help maintain public order around the Palestinian camps, as well as across the country in concert with the ISF. ¶7. (C) The national resistance, said Aoun, would be something like a national guard. While it would be stationed all over Lebanon, Aoun stressed that his plan was not for Hizballah to be deployed everywhere, rather for natives of the different regions from different confessions to become part of the resistance. They would be a discreet presence, only active when attacked, he said. The Ambassador and Shampaine both pointed out that a regular national guard does not have its own weapons and heavy armaments; traditionally heavy weapons would be kept by the central government. The Ambassador pointed to the danger inherent in sending such weapons all over the country, and noted that in 2006, Hizballah had behaved irresponsibly, provoking the summer 2006 violence. ¶8. (C) Aoun said his plan was not dangerous, but "original." He stated that the problem in 2006 was that the state "could not do its job." He said his plan was an "adaptation" to what was already on the ground, meant to build up trust so that eventually the state could take on its role. Of course the resistance should not be walking around with weapons, he said. Only the regular army should have weapons, and the resistance should be issued weapons only when Lebanon is attacked. Nonetheless, he said, it will take time to train the LAF and build the necessary trust between the LAF and Hizballah so that Hizballah will be willing to give its arms to the state. Meanwhile, making the resistance multi-confessional would dilute Hizballah's power, believed Aoun. CONFIDENT ABOUT ELECTIONS -------------- ¶9. (C) Aoun said he and his party are confident about their prospects in the upcoming parliamentary elections. He said they had yet to do the candidate selections and form lists, though they were working through the many possible candidates. He asserted that, "The petrodollars are coming in," i.e. money from the Gulf, to support March 14 politicians, particularly Saad Hariri. Responding to reports that politicians were resurfacing roads in many neighborhoods to garner votes, Aoun said, "I don't do asphalted elections." He claimed that he had no money for such projects or for Hariri-style cash hand-outs." FPM LEADERS WANT TO SEPARATE HIZBALLAH'S ARMS FROM OTHER DOMESTIC ISSUES -------------- BEIRUT 00001682 003 OF 003 ¶10. (C) In a November 21 luncheon with Shampaine and DCM, FPM leaders or allies Alain Aoun, Walid Khoury, Farid Khazen, and Ghassan Mukheiber said FPM's alliance with Hizballah had developed in an effort to rebalance power and diffuse conflict with Hizballah within Lebanon. Khazen said there are three ways of dealing with Hizballah: ignoring it, disarming it by force, or working with it through dialogue and inclusion in the political process. FPM chose the last of these options, he said. The four leaders stressed the importance of using internal mechanisms such as the National Dialogue to work through the issues of Hizballah's arms and national defense. Meanwhile, they believed Israel's overflights of Lebanon and intransigence over Lebanese territorial claims in Ghajar and the Sheba'a Farms merely serve to strengthen Hizballah. ¶11. (C) Khoury predicted that regardless of the outcome of the 2009 parliamentary elections, the result would be a national unity government. Khoury and Alain Aoun both opined that under the current confessional system in Lebanon, the only path to good governance is through such a consensus approach to governing. The FPM figures said FPM's strategy in the new government would be to disassociate the issue of Hizballah's arms from other internal issues. Khoury said Hizballah's arms are an issue for international actors, such as the U.S., Syria, and the UN, to deal with, while the process of governing Lebanon would need to be taken up by a unified government. SISON

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -