LEBANON: NEW UNIIIC COMMISSIONER SAYS FAILURE IS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000166 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: NEW UNIIIC COMMISSIONER SAYS FAILURE IS NOT AN OPTION REF: A. BEIRUT 120 ¶B. 2007 BEIRUT 1734 BEIRUT 00000166 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: CDA William Grant for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) New UNIIIC Commissioner and Prosecutor-Designate Daniel Bellemare believes time is running out for the Special Tribunal and "failure is not an option." UNIIIC was "clearly making process," but needs member states' urgent assistance in putting together the pieces of the puzzle and increasing UNIIIC's "operational tempo." UNIIIC is investigating the January 25 assassination of Internal Security Forces (ISF) official Wissam Eid, who had been working with UNIIIC on the Hariri and other investigations, bringing its total workload to 20 cases. ¶2. (C) Bellemare stressed that the process that began with the 2005 Hariri assassination leading up to the transition to the Special Tribunal is irreversible. However, legal and security considerations mandated that he not name names until the Tribunal is operational and, as Prosecutor, he issues substantiated indictments. He conveyed several requests for USG assistance, which post will transmit separately. End summary. TIME IS RUNNING OUT -------------- ¶3. (C) The Charge, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met with new UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) Commissioner and Prosecutor-Designate Daniel Bellemare and UNIIIC investigator Stacy de la Torre at UNIIIC headquarters on January 31. Bellemare said time was running out for the Special Tribunal, and he is increasing UNIIIC's "tempo of operations" in response. In particular, he is seeking ways to remove bureaucratic and other obstacles delaying responses to UNIIIC's request for resources and assistance from member states. ¶4. (C) Rather than spending time drafting detailed requests for information relating to specific events, he planned to send out generic "menus" of broad categories of assistance from which member states, via their embassies in Beirut, would indicate where they would help. Only then would UNIIIC prepare formal requests, customized according to each country's abilities and interests. This way, he explained, no one could say they hadn't provided information because �00A;UNIIIC had never asked. Furthermore, this would result in UNIIIC receiving information it might not otherwise have thought to request, information that could help it "connect the dots." "We're trying to find ways to help you say yes," he explained. ¶5. (C) Low profile member states could assist in interviewing witnesses, Bellemare uggested. UNIIIC also needed countries to provie experts on the ground, especially for communictions analysis. By working in Lebanon, these experts would benefit from interaction with UNIIIC colleagues and be able to "immerse" themselves in the investigation, which would help them to understand better the big picture. (Note: Post will send Bellemare's generic request for assistance and job descriptions for experts to NEA/ELA. End note.) ...AND THEN THERE WERE 20 -------------- ¶6. (S) Bellemare confirmed that UNIIIC was providing the GOL with technical assistance in the investigation into the January 25 assassination of Internal Security Forces (ISF) Officer Wissam Eid (Ref A),who had been working on the Hariri and other assassinations. However, the GOL's request for UNIIIC assistance had not been as immediate as in prior assassinations (probably because the ISF was heavily involved in the initial investigation, he commented),delaying the arrival of UNIIIC's forensics team until February 4, ten days after the attack. ¶7. (S) Noting that Eid had been involved in telecom analysis relating to the Hariri and other assassinations (and had visited UNIIIC a week earlier to provide an update),as well as to Hizballah's activities, Bellemare said the attack suggested two theories: an attempt to block progress on the Tribunal or to prevent the GOL from investigating Hizballah. Either way, he said, Eid's assassination showed the assassins were circling in, and UNIIIC had to adapt its modus operandi in response. ¶8. (C) UNIIIC is now involved in 20 investigations, stretching its already limited resources even further. De la Torre noted that UNIIIC's tendency is to focus on earlier (especially the Hariri) investigations before addressing recent attacks, but admitted that the prospects for fresh evidence require UNIIIC to shift its resources, at least temporarily. (Note: The GOL did not/not request UNIIIC assistance in the investigation of the January 15 attack against a U.S. Embassy vehicle that injured two local employees. Embassy Legatt's assessment is that GOL determined they did not need UNIIIC assistance because USG provided assistance of an FBI/DS joint team for several days early in the investigation of that attack. End note.) NO NAMES IN NEXT REPORT -------------- ¶9. (C) Bellemare stated clearly that UNIIIC's next report to the UN (due late March) would not, consistent with previous reports, name names, for the same legal and security reasons cited by his predecessor, Serge Brammertz. Because of international legal standards protecting the rights of the accused, names could only be used in the indictments themselves, along with evidence substantiating the accusations. And, Bellemare noted grimly, as the Eid assassination demonstrated, security considerations mandated confidentiality, especially to protect witnesses and investigators until the Tribunal was ready. ¶10. (C) Bellemare cautioned against expectations, once the Tribunal was operational, that names would be forthcoming immediately, stressing that indictments would take some time. However, as Prosecutor-Designate for the Tribunal, he was viewing the investigations through the eyes of a prosecutor, building a case with the standards of international justice in mind. Unfortunately, he said, former UNIIIC Commissioner Mehlis' recent attack in the press on Brammertz (which he deemed "unethical" and the result of a personal grudge) raised expectations for the first Bellemare report. However, he stressed, "I did not come out of retirement to be a failure." SHAKING THE TREE -------------- ¶11. (C) A former Canadian magistrate, retired only two months when he was appointed to replace Serge Brammertz as UNIIIC Commissioner, Bellemare admitted to being a stranger to the UN system and surprised at the number of administrative issues requiring his attention (Ref B). However, his Chief of Staff has 18 years of experience within the UN structure, he said, which is "half the battle" in working with UN bureaucracy. Moreover, people are bending over backwards to help and showing a lot of good will, although he did not know how long this "honeymoon" period would last. Unfortunately, he added, recent assassinations only reconfirm the importance of his mission. ¶12. (C) Bellemare also said he intended to provide a "lessons learned" package for future UN commissioners, addressing investigative, recruitment, and other issues. UN policies did not make it suited for operational investigations, he said, and this package could help future UN tribunals, e.g., on the Bhutto assassination. COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) Bellemare's lack of UN credentials may work to his advantage. He struck us as someone who will have little tolerance for obstructionist UN bureaucracy; on the contrary, he made it clear that he has communicated UNIIIC's sense of urgency to New York. Not beholden to the UN (i.e., not motivated by personal ambitions for future UN appointments), he will not be afraid to shake the system to get what he needs to move the process forward. ¶14. (C) In addition, his role as Prosecutor-Designate is clearly shaping his approach to the investigtions. We give him a preliminary "A" for effort nd determination, and urge Washington to make evry effort to comply with UNIIIC's requests for information and assistance. End comment. GRANT