LEBANON: OPPORTUNITIES TO INFLUENCE THE 2009

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BEIRUT 001638 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/ELA ALSO FOR IO A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER/GERMAIN NSC FOR ABRAMS/YERGER/MCDERMOTT/RAMCHAND E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR SY LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: OPPORTUNITIES TO INFLUENCE THE 2009 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS REF: A. 11/7/08 ROSE-SHAMPAINE EMAIL ¶B. BEIRUT 1615 ¶C. BEIRUT 1612 ¶D. BEIRUT 1582 ¶E. BEIRUT 1320 ¶F. BEIRUT 491 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Although March 14 is working to fine-tune its campaign messaging and tactics, a March 14 victory in the spring 2009 parliamentary elections is, by the moderate coalition's own admission, by no means guaranteed. March 14 contacts tell us their hope is to win an absolute majority (65 out of 128 MPs). To win, it is paramount that March 14 present a united front and cultivate relationships with independent candidates in key swing districts. March 14 unity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for electoral success; ultimately, victory will be determined in a handful of predominantly Christian districts where independent candidates can tip the balance. ¶2. (C) The most useful role the U.S. can play is to help March 14 help itself, by continuing to encourage the coalition to speak with one voice, present a unified list of candidates, and develop a positive, proactive political platform that resonates with voters. March 14's campaign message will be simple: Voters have a choice between a Lebanon based on the concept of a civil, democratic state with one army, or an opposition vision of a country constantly at war with its neighbor to the south, Israel. We also should continue to stress the need to reach out to the Tashnaq Armenian party and independent Shia, and encourage pro-March 14 leaning independent Christian candidates to run, especially in districts where Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement is strong. Our public message should be strong support for the forces of moderation and parties that share our values of democracy, independence, state sovereignty and peace. ¶3. (C) Even if March 14 wins, it still will have to contend with the reality of Hizballah's arms -- an issue unlikely to be resolved in the ongoing National Dialogue. As it demonstrated in May, Hizballah will not hesitate to use its weapons to challenge any governmental decisions it views as a threat to its existence. Therefore, we should continue to use every opportunity to stress the need to implement the Doha Agreement, especially regarding Hizballah's arms, and UNSCRs 1559 and 1701, and encourage the international community to do the same. We need to stress progress on the Special Tribunal. We should also continue our military, USAID, and other assistance programs to demonstrate the enduring U.S. commitment to Lebanon and to strengthening state institutions, and to convince the Lebanese electorate that voting for moderate forces pays dividends in terms of U.S. support for the country. END summary. STRENGTH IN UNITY -------------- ¶4. (C) March 14 is by no means guaranteed a victory in the 2009 parliamentary elections, despite the confidence we continue to hear from March 14 leaders. With significant financial backing from Iran, a highly effective media machine, party discipline, its own militia, and a Christian ally who wields the support of a significant percentage of Lebanon's Christian population, Hizballah's position remains strong. Faced with these challenges, March 14's first order of business must be to present a united front; internal divisions play directly into the opposition's hands. While it should be obvious that the only way to confront the unified and disciplined Hizballah-led opposition is through March 14's own strength in numbers, the unfortunate reality is that overcoming inter-coalition squabbling, especially BEIRUT 00001638 002 OF 007 among March 14 Christians, continues to be a daunting task. ¶5. (C) Even March 14 non-Christian leaders such as Hariri and Jumblatt are not immune to striking their own path, i.e., by opening up to Hizballah if deemed necessary to ensure their own political -- and in some cases even physical -- survival, as they demonstrated when they joined Amal and Hizballah in the Quadripartite agreement that led them to electoral victory in 2005. At Doha, Hariri, with Jumblatt's blessing, forged an agreement with Hizballah, Amal, and Tashnaq to split the two Armenian seats in Beirut 2 between March 14 and the opposition. To win the election, March 14 must ensure that any back room deals -- part and parcel of Lebanon's political system -- benefit the coalition as a whole rather than individual parties. March 14 also must work to ensure the loyalties of members such as Boutros Harb and Mosbah Adhab, whose "independence" from the major coalition blocs gives them flexibility to attract a wider spectrum of voters. PRIORITY ONE: NEED FOR A UNIFIED ELECTORAL LIST -------------- --- ¶6. (C) First, March 14 needs to present a unified electoral list as its leaders agreed during their November 3 coalition meeting. The scars from the intra-coalition battle over 16 cabinet seats in the run-up to the July 11 cabinet formation still linger. The jockeying for parliamentary candidates is gearing up to be an even bigger fight, as each party strives to ensure that, when the music stops, it is not left without a seat. ¶7. (C) While March 14 contacts assure us they are working on a unified list, which they will unveil in January, it already is obvious this will not be an easy task. For example, following the assassinations of two MPs, Pierre Gemayel and Antoine Ghanem -- Kataeb leader Amine Gemayel currently has no MPs in parliament. He has already broken ranks with the concept of a March 14 unified list by announcing five candidates for his party (Sejaan Kazzi in Kswaran, Sami Gemayel in Metn, Nadim Gemayel in Beirut 1, Edmond Rizk in Jezzine, and Elie Marouni in Zahle) and alluding to others. ¶8. (C) Although perhaps an attempt to strengthen his own bargaining position, the move is yet another example of March 14's difficulties in maintaining a unified front. Moreover, if Kataeb pursues a seat in Batroun, March 14 voters probably would split between the incumbent Lebanese Forces candidate Antoine Zahra and the Kataeb candidate, paving the way for Christian opposition leader Aoun's son-in-law Gebran Bassil to win the seat. Meanwhile, National Liberal Party leader Dory Chamoun also recently announced his party will run four candidates (Elias Abi Assi in Baabda, Philippe Maalouf in Metn, Maroun Hilou in Kswaran, and Chamoun himself, backed by Jumblatt, in the Chouf),pitting them against other March 14 candidates. PRIORITY TWO: GETTING THE COMMON MESSAGE OUT -------------- ¶9. (C) Unity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for ensuring electoral success. March 14's second priority must be to present a positive, proactive message to attract votes. Unlike in 2005, when March 14 was able to capitalize on the Cedar Revolution and the wide public support for ousting the Syrians from Lebanon, it no longer enjoys a common cause around which it can rally supporters. While many March 14 contacts admit privately that the coalition has lost touch with its voters, the coalition has yet to develop a new platform capable of reinvigorating a disillusioned constituency, despite the efforts of its recently organized Secretariat team. ¶10. (C) The March 14, 2008 Biel Convention was a good first attempt to recapture lost ground, but the initial gains quickly evaporated due to March 14's failure to sustain the momentum, and vanished altogether following Hizballah's takeover of much of downtown Beirut in May. The March 14 Secretariat is preparing for a second convention in January, BEIRUT 00001638 003 OF 007 2009 for the official launch of the coalition's electoral campaign and presentation of its unified electoral. Only months before the elections, this will be the last chance to mount an aggressive campaign, and this time the momentum must be sustained up until election day, with no room left for backsliding. March 14 SYG Fares Souaid has told us that the campaign message will focus on a peaceful vision for Lebanon based on the concept of a civil, democratic state with one army, in contrast to the opposition's vision of a country constantly at war with Israel. PRIORITY THREE: STEALING AOUN'S THUNDER BY FIELDING INDEPENDENTS -------------- ¶11. (C) March 14's next step should be to recruit "independent" Christian candidates who can play a decisive role in key swing districts where Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) currently dominates. While polls -- notoriously unreliable in Lebanon -- show a decline in Aoun's popularity, especially following his October 12 trip to Iran, courting uneasy Aoun supporters remains March 14's biggest challenge in the divided Christian areas. March 14 is handicapped by the intense dislike of many Christians of Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, many of whom view Aoun as the lesser of two evils. ¶12. (C) To combat Aoun's stranglehold over key swing districts, March 14's best hope is to promote independent yet pro-March 14 leaning candidates. In districts where Aoun dominates, such as Kswaran (where all five seats are currently held by the FPM),Jbeil (where the FPM holds all three),and Metn (where the FPM holds six plus one in alliance with Tashnaq leader Hagop Pakradunian, and independent Orthodox Michel Murr also holds a seat), independent Christians will find it difficult to compete on their own; tying them to a third, credible Christian bloc, i.e., under the auspices of President Sleiman, would go a long way in boosting both their willingness to stand up to Aoun and their electoral prospects. ¶13. (C) Mansour Ilbon is a key player in Kswaran; while pro-March 14, he would prefer to run as an independent and as such would be more palatable to Aoun supporters. Both Ilbon and Neemat Frem, another potential independent, are close to President Sleiman. March 14 contacts across the board have urged us to encourage Frem, who has extensive business interests in the U.S., to run. However, Frem dislikes local politics, setting his sights on a ministry instead; in addition, he is reluctant to run without a list and not eager to ally with Ilbon. Jbeil is Sleiman's home district, making his candidates potentially popular there; Presidential Advisor Nazem Khoury, an independent, albeit not close to March 14, is expected to run here. ¶14. (C) Most March 14 contacts argue that the coalition would benefit from a third Christian bloc under the auspices of President Sleiman. However, Sleiman professes no interest in forming his own political bloc, preferring to stay above the fray of partisan politics. With a six year mandate, he has no need to rush; moreover, forming his own bloc runs the risk of diminishing his own stature should his candidates lose the elections. He would also risk alienating other Christian leaders and exacerbating tensions within the Christian community, as well as sectarian tensions if he is seen as representing the Christian minority rather than the Lebanese at large. ¶15. (C) Nevertheless, Sleiman has advocated the creation of a third, independent bloc, although he has refrained from lending his name to it. With many Christians unhappy with the current choice between Aoun and Geagea, there is room for a "third way" Christian bloc. Such a bloc could take votes away from March 14, but overall likely would be more harmful to the opposition by providing an outlet for disillusioned Aoun supporters in districts like Jezzine, a Christian enclave in the Shia south, where at least one candidate (Samir Azar) has told us he would run as an independent if provided a list to run on. Potential candidates for such a BEIRUT 00001638 004 OF 007 bloc include Mansour Ilbon, Neemat Frem, advisor Nazem Khoury, Michel Murr, Edmond Gharios (Michel Murr's son-in-law),and Salah Honein. The latter two would run in Baabda, where the Christian vote will tip the balance. Other possible candidates include Richard Jereissati and Paul Charbel (both in Zahle),Pierre Abu Charaf (another Murr son-in-law, in Kswaran),Nabil Hokayem (Batroun),and former Ambassador to the U.S. Simon Karam (Jezzine). PRIORITY FOUR: UNDERMINING AOUN'S CREDIBILITY -------------- - ¶16. (C) March 14 has thus far failed to capitalize on several golden opportunities to discredit Aoun, most notably for his alliance with Hizballah, which in May used its arms against fellow Lebanese citizens and in August downed an Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) helicopter, killing one of the pilots (who was from Batroun, giving March 14 ample ammunition to attack Aoun there). The March 14 Secretariat tends to use attacks against Hizballah as a rallying cry, whereas targeting Aoun would have greater impact given the key swing Christian districts (March 14 is unlikely to make inroads against Hizballah in Hizballah strongholds such as the Beka'a, Dahiyeh, or South Lebanon). ¶17. (C) March 14 should tell Aoun supporters they are being used by Hizballah as political cover for its plans to, at best, create a state within a state, and, at worst, gradually impose an Islamic state on Lebanon. To combat Aoun's accusations of March 14 corruption, March 14 should question Aoun's own financial backing, widely expected to stem from Iran and possibly even Syria. March 14 should exploit rumored rifts within Aoun's bloc to peel away tenuous members such as Alain Aoun, Farid el-Khazen, Ghassan Moukheiber, Walid Khoury, and Selim Salhab. ¶18. (C) March 14 also could be more aggressive in depriving Aoun of excuses for attacking the majority's alleged anti-Christian actions. PM Siniora should take another look at placating Deputy PM and FPM member Abou Jamra's calls for more powers and an office with a symbolic/token offer. The government should take concrete steps to resolve the remaining issues of the Christians displaced during the civil war, which Aoun contrasts with the more rapid assistance given to Shia following the 2006 war to again accuse the GOL of being biased against Christians. ¶19. (C) March 14 also should be more vocal on the issue of "tawteen" (permanent Palestinian resettlement in Lebanon),to avoid the appearance that Aoun is the only party leading the battle on this highly charged issue. (Note: In a step in this direction, March 14 parliamentarians recently signed a petition to amend the constitution to require an unanimous vote in parliament to change a constitutional provision outlawing the settlement of non-Lebanese in Lebanon. END note.) ¶20. (C) March 14's recent loss in elections to the Tripoli Bar Association should be a wake up call to Saad and other non-Christian March 14 leaders that imposing their choice of Christian candidates undermines the credibility of their Christian allies and the coalition as a whole in the eyes of Christian voters. Saad's coalition partners blame his insistence on running his own candidate for the loss. ¶21. (C) March 14 should also improve its outreach to independent Shia. Although unlikely to have significant impact on the election results (we estimate as many as 90 percent of Shia are pro-Hizballah),March 14 can undermine Aoun's alliance with Hizballah by demonstrating to Aoun's Shia supporters that March 14 takes Shia interests seriously, offering them a credible alternative to Hizballah. THE KINGMAKERS -------------- ¶22. (C) Independent Orthodox MP Michel Murr will play a pivotal role in the 2009 elections. The wily godfather of Lebanese politics, Murr successfully wooed Tashnaq to his BEIRUT 00001638 005 OF 007 side in the 2007 Metn by-election, held to replace assassinated MP Pierre Gemayel, leading Aoun's candidate to narrow victory. Contacts tell us Murr, who since the Metn election has distanced himself from Aoun, already is negotiating back room deals with Gemayel in Metn that would give Kataeb and Nassib Lahoud each a seat in exchange for a seat for his granddaughter, Neyla Tueni, in Beirut 1 (Ref B). Murr has a history of forging close relationships with the President. Murr's son, Defense Minister Elias Murr, is one of President Sleiman's three cabinet picks, leading many to believe both Murrs would be strong supporters of a Sleiman bloc, along with Murr's granddaughter, Neyla Tueni. Elias Murr also confirmed recently that the Murr's alliance and friendship with the Tashnaq party would continue. ¶23. (C) As the Metn by-election demonstrates, the Armenian party, Tashnaq, also can play the role of kingmaker, especially in Metn, but also in Beirut 1, the predominantly Christian Beirut district, and Zahle, where Tashnaq's alliance with Aoun and Zahle bloc leader Elie Skaff paved the way for the opposition to win seven out of eight seats in ¶2005. Geagea, Jumblatt, Harb, and even Hariri (who Nader Hariri tells us has begun indirect negotiations with Tashnaq) recently have recognized in Tashnaq an opportunity to recruit a key electorate, but so far have failed to bring Tashnaq to March 14. Tashnaq leader Hagop Pakradunian told us November 14 that his party, allied with Michel Murr, was discussing potential electoral alliances with both Aoun and Kataeb. While he admitted that relations with Saad might be improving (having recently received his first invitation in eight years to Qoreitem),he dismissed any chances of an alliance with Lebanese Forces, citing the bitter history between the two parties. TRIPOLI: RECONCILIATION MAY COST SEATS -------------- ¶24. (C) While the Christian areas will be the main battleground in the elections, March 14 cannot take the Sunni north for granted. March 14's current stronghold in Tripoli (where it holds all eight seats) could be weakened following months of sporadic violence, chronic economic problems, and fickleness of key leaders more prone to seek individual gain and disenchanted with what they view as Saad's unwillingness to listen to their views. Moreover, the recent agreement between Saad and the Tripoli leaders (Ref E),including Alawite leader and former MP Ali Eid and former pro-Syrian PM Omar Karame to put an END to the violence in Tripoli could be used to pressure March 14 to accept opposition candidates on its list. Saad's recent, albeit infrequent, trips to Tripoli helped rally supporters, but more sustained efforts are needed. ¶25. (C) While Saad's advisor Nader Hariri claims the parties all agreed that the reconciliation did not include political alliances, he admits that Saad must secure at least one other Sunni leader in Tripoli on his list. Former pro-Syrian PM Omar Karame is a lost cause, but getting Safadi and/or former PM Mikati on board is key to March 14's success in Tripoli. Safadi, ostensibly March 8, broke ranks in the fall of 2007 by siding with the opposition's call for a two-thirds majority to elect the president, and supported the March 8 candidate in the recent Tripoli bar association elections. Saad recently has made overtures to Mikati, commonly believed to be pro-Syrian but, with strong business and academic ties to the U.S. and a firm Sunni stance vis-a-vis Aoun, a potential ally. STEMMING THE TIDE -------------- ¶26. (C) As the elections approach, independent and swing candidates increasingly will calculate their alliances based on which direction they see the tide turning. Approximately 20 percent of the electorate is unaligned, and could swing either way. In Lebanon, where politics is viewed as a zero sum game, no one wants to be on the losing side. The danger here -- which applies to President Sleiman and independent candidates associated with him in particular -- is that if BEIRUT 00001638 006 OF 007 the opposition appears to be gaining ground, many may shift their allegiance in this direction. Public perception of where U.S. policy toward Syria is headed will be a factor here as well; if the U.S. is seen as adopting a friendlier stance toward Syria that is perceived as threatening Lebanon's sovereignty or the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, even the most committed March 14 members may panic and reevaluate their options. ¶27. (C) Although both Hariri and Jumblatt have repeatedly denied that recent reconciliation initiatives preclude any possibility of forming a political alliance with Hizballah, history suggests otherwise. In 2005 both the Future Movement and the Progressive Socialist Party joined Hizballah and Amal in the now defunct Quadripartite alliance to win the elections, and we cannot discount the possibility that either or both leaders would pursue a similar agreement to ensure their political survival. Jumblatt in particular, adamantly anti-Syrian in recent years but whose political orientation is known to shift with prevailing winds, is susceptible to such realpolitik if he viewed it as the only way to safeguard his small Druze constituency. He recently suggested that March 14 "flirt" with Berri based on his assessment that Berri may face difficulties of his own in the elections (Ref B). ¶28. (C) Perception often overrides reality in Lebanese politics, and Hizballah has the upper hand when it comes to public messaging. Hariri's Future TV is no match for Hizballah's Al-Manar and Aoun's OTV stations. Furthermore, March 14 Christians do not watch Future, and the only alternative to OTV is LBC, nominally a neutral station but recently leaning more towards the opposition. March 14 has been unsuccessful in encouraging LBC to provide more neutral coverage, in part because of the ongoing dispute between LBC head Pierre Daher and Samir Geagea over ownership and in part due to the acrimonious relationship between LBC's largest shareholder, Walid bin Talal, and Saad. While the U.S. has been funding IRI efforts for more than one year to improve March 14's own messaging via a MEPI grant, it is an uphill battle. ¶29. (C) Ultimately, Hizballah may not want to bear the accountability of being in the majority. As the May events demonstrated, it does not need to be in power to have its way, finding it easier to exercise its growing influence from outside the state. Even if March 14 wins, it still will have to contend with the reality of Hizballah's weapons and its expanding state within a state web. THE U.S. ROLE -------------- ¶30. (C) Despite significant challenges, we believe March 14 can emerge the winner in the 2009 elections. U.S. influence, applied with discretion, can play a useful role, especially on the critical margins. For some months, the Embassy and Washington visitors have been focusing on the themes below; we should continue to do so regularly in the approach to the spring 2009 parliamentary elections. -- Level the playing field: By encouraging independent domestic and international election observers, including a U.S. observer team; ensuring that voters are not intimidated by security concerns; helping March 14 get its own message out and win the public relations battle by supporting MEPI-funded IRI, which is working hard to help March 14 formulate a common policy platform and message. -- Help March 14 help itself: Continue to stress the need for unity with March 14 contacts, especially sometimes errant members such as Boutros Harb, Mosbah Ahdab, Mohammed Safadi; encourage more internal coordination and regular March 14 meetings to give an optic of unity; encourage outreach to independent Christians candidates, as well as Tashnaq and independent Shia; stress the need to boost March 14's Christian credentials to avoid feeding Aoun's accusations that March 14 is a Sunni-dominated coalition and discourage Saad from imposing his Christian candidates in areas where BEIRUT 00001638 007 OF 007 his allies are stronger. -- "Recruit" Sleiman and encourage independent Christians to run: Although Sleiman will never be overtly March 14, we should continue to woo him so that, even if he doesn't form his own bloc, his supporters lean towards March 14. -- Continue U.S. assistance: USAID projects in key districts: Projects targeted to key swing districts can help boost the prospects of moderate candidates who can point to the benefits of a good relationship with the United States, and counter the considerable amounts of cash already reportedly flowing in from Iran. USAID recently has provided assistance to public schools under the LEAD program, as well as municipal assistance, in key swing districts such as Koura, Zgharta, Batroun, Kswaran, Metn, Beirut 1, Zahle, Jezzine, Jbeil, Baabda and West Bekaa USAID recently also donated $770,000 to the Armenian Haigazian University in Beirut, following $700,000 and $50,000 grants in 2007 and 2006. We are highlighting this assistance. For example, Ambassador and USAID Mission Director have traveled in the past two weeks to Jbeil, Zgharta and the Metn for USAID project launch events and have attracted good media coverage. Two similar events are planned for Kswaran in the near future. Military assistance: As part of our overall message that the U.S. goal is to strengthen Lebanese state institutions and help Lebanon fight terrorism, continue to provide and publicize our assistance with each delivery of equipment (the delivery schedule has allowed us to highlight at least one "deliverable" per month). -- U.S. public messaging: Support the forces of moderation and those who share our values of democracy, sovereignty, and peace; continue to stress the need to implement UNSCRs 1701 and 1559, as well as the Doha agreement; encourage Israeli progress on Sheba'a Farms; and stress progress on the Special Tribunal. SISON