LEBANON: FORMER LEBANESE AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001633

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSEL AND RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER/GERMAIN
NSC FOR ABRAMS/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: FORMER LEBANESE AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. ON
THE LEBANESE POLITICAL SCENE

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Former Lebanese Ambassador to the U.S. Simon Karam
discussed Lebanon's upcoming elections, political reforms,
and Hizballah's role in both on November 11. Expressing
resignation over the current majority's lack of unity, Karam
said Hizballah would not tolerate election results not in its
favor, and advocated stronger action on the Syrian border,
even if that meant expanding the current UN Interim Force in
Lebanon (UNIFIL) mandate. End summary.

ELECTION OUTLOOK
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2. (C) Ambassador Lincoln Bloomfield Jr., Special Envoy for
MANPADS, and the Ambassador, accompanied by PM/WRA Sho
Morimoto and PolMilOff, met former Ambassador to the U.S.
Simon Karam at his residence on November 11. Karam, a
Maronite Christian, focused on the Christians' inability to
form a united coalition. Michel Aoun was losing Christian
support, he said, but the March 14 majority had not been
successful in demonstrating to disaffected Aoun voters that
there is an alternative. When asked about the viability of a
more centrist bloc of independents, Karam agreed that it was
"doable in the short term," suggesting the U.S. support such
an effort. All agreed the desired outcome of a potential
third bloc would be to weaken the March 8 opposition.
However, Karam did not believe Hizballah would allow the
elections to go against it, adding, "they will revert to arms
as they did in May."


3. (C) Karam noted that electoral compromise and change
comes incrementally in Lebanon. There have been several
attempts by political blocs to negotiate parliamentary seats,
he said, citing Beirut's second district, where March 14 and
the opposition agreed at Doha to divide the four seats among
themselves. Karam added that in the western Bekaa district,
where six seats are divided among five confessional
communities (two Sunni, one Shia, one Druze, and two
Christian),there is an effort by Hizballah to secure a seat.
He warned that a seat going to Hizballah would give it a
foothold where none was previously, and would allow it to
foster development of communication lines between its
stronghold in the south and supporters in the northern Bekaa.

SECURITY POLICY PART OF
OVERALL POLITICAL REFORM
--------------


4. (C) Karam, speaking on political reform, said the
"system is locked." There needed to be a security plan for
the country that incorporated Hizballah's militia into the
national defense forces, he said. Local communities in south
Lebanon trusted Hizballah because it knows the local
population and had performed well during the 2006 war with
Israel. Karam claimed Hizballah, since the end of the 2006
war, had been able to prevail "internally" i.e., politically,
and that the UNIFIL mission in the south had provided
Hizballah cover so that it could allocate more effort to its
political strategies. Karam expressed comments from
acquaintances in the south who complained that the March 14
majority missed opportunities to capitalize on international
support after the departure of the Syrian armed forces and
the 2006 war. He said the majority feared antagonizing
Hizballah, but Hizballah had no reciprocal fear. The
majority lost the momentum of 2005 and now risks losing its
parliamentary majority.


5. (C) Hizballah realized it had gone too far in the 2006
ar, Karam noted, but the unsecured border with Syri gave
Hizballah room to operate. He believed boder security must
be addressed with strong action even if it meant expanding
UNIFIL's mandate. He suggested that Japan could be a
potential contributor to an expanded UNIFIL mandate, with
specific responsibility for supporting security on the Syrian
border.

BEIRUT 00001633 002 OF 002


SISON