Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BEIRUT161
2008-02-01 16:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: SAAD WAKES UP TO 2009 PARLIAMENTARY

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000161 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SAAD WAKES UP TO 2009 PARLIAMENTARY
ELECTIONS

REF: BEIRUT 140

BEIRUT 00000161 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: CDA William Grant for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000161 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: SAAD WAKES UP TO 2009 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS REF: BEIRUT 140 BEIRUT 00000161 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: CDA William Grant for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) March 14 majority leader Saad Hariri blamed Libya and Qatar for undermining Lebanon at the January 27 Arab League meeting, with the preservation of Lebanese Armed Forces Commander Michel Sleiman's presidential candidacy the only positive result, in his view. He predicted that, without tougher international pressure on Syria, there would be no presidential election in 2008. The real game now, he said, is winning the 2009 legislative elections, which he felt confident March 14 could win. To that end, March 14 was organizing its strategy and "redirecting" the battle to put the opposition back on the defensive. In the meantime, international support for the Siniora government remained critical. End summary. ¶2. (C) The Charge, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met with majority leader Saad Hariri at his office in Qoreitem on January 30. Nader Hariri, Saad's cousin and advisor, and Hariri's notetaker also attended the meeting. DOWN ON ARAB LEAGUE MEETING -------------- ¶3. (C) Saad complained that Libya ("What's up with your friends?" he asked rhetorically) and Qatar ("Don't you have a military base there?") had undermined Lebanon at the January 27 Arab League meeting. Recalling Arab League SYG Amr Moussa's January 19 meeting with Syrian President Asad, which he claimed focused primarily on the Special Tribunal, Saad protested that the whole world was talking to Syria. Only the Saudis are holding firm, he said. While acknowledging that the Egyptians had supported Lebanon at the January 27 meeting, Saad claimed Intelligence Chief Omar Sleiman's motivation was to break the Syria-Iran axis more than anything else. ¶4. (C) The only positive result from the meeting was that the Lebanese had managed to keep Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman's candidacy alive, Saad continued. The opposition's insistence on agreement on the whole "package" of the presidency, cabinet formation, and the electoral law was only a delay tactic; the opposition's real goal, as the January 27 riots demonstrated (reftel),was to undermine Sleiman's prospec
ts for the presidency. As long as Sleiman is the consensus candidate, Saad explained, Syria will be blamed for the election not going forward. ¶5. (C) Saad did not know when Arab League SYG Amr Moussa would return to Lebanon, but said he did not expect any progress between the majority and opposition in resolving the crisis before the next parliamentary election session (scheduled for February 11) absent Moussa's intervention. Furthermore, he warned, there will be no president in 2008 unless more international pressure is put on Syria. FOCUS ON 2009 -------------- ¶6. (C) Hizballah realizes that the "new game" is securing the majority in parliament in the 2009 elections, Saad said. However, he expressed confidence that March 14, with or without a new electoral law, would win the elections (though he chuckled that his aunt, MP Bahia Hariri, probably will lose her seat in Hizballah-dominated southern Lebanon). ¶7. (C) If, however, the current scenario of assassinations and violent protests continues, he warned, the opposition will win and Lebanon will head into a "Hamas" scenario: control of the government obtained through an election victory. This is Iran's ultimate goal, to establish an advanced base in Lebanon, he said; ten years from now Lebanon will be the new Cuba. MARCH 14 BACK ON THE OFFENSIVE? -------------- BEIRUT 00000161 002.2 OF 002 ¶8. (C) March 14's strategy, meanwhile, was to "redirect the battle." The majority needed to force the opposition to declare whether it still supported Sleiman, while at the same time publicly praising both Sleiman and the LAF for their efforts to keep the country stable, building on the momentum gained from the LAF's victory against Fatah al-Islam militants in the Nahr al-Barid Palestinian camp last summer. Saad said March 14 would launch a new campaign in the next few days, and was preparing for a "big commemoration" on February 14 for the third anniversary of the assassination of his father, former PM Rafiq Hariri. ¶9. (C) At the same time, it was necessary to preserve the Siniora government, both politically and economically, he stressed. PM Siniora had secured financial support from Saudi Arabia during his recent trip there, but, to combat Hizballah, the government needed more money, oil for electricity, and help in fixing its power plants. The Charge noted that the U.S. was actively working to support the Siniora government and encouraging others to do so as well, especially on the Special Tribunal. COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) Saad, refraining from making his usual plea of "bombs" over Damascus, seemed more rooted in reality in this meeting than in some others we've had, and appears to be thinking more strategically and long-term. March 14 has finally organized itself, appointing former MP Fares Suaid as Secretary General of the bloc, and seems to have woken up to SIPDIS the fact that the real prize in the ongoing political battle is the 2009 legislative elections. That is something we believe Hizballah has had its eyes focused on all along, with no incentives to rush into a hasty solution on the presidency (septel). ¶11. (C) Saad's confidence regarding March 14's ability to win the elections strikes us optimistic, especially if the Siniora government is unable to address the country's ongoing economic problems. Even if it does, it will be imperative that March 14 also win the public relations battle, an area where the more disciplined and experienced Hizballah has a clear advantage. We hope to see more proactive March 14 efforts in the coming days to refute the opposition's arguments and promote its own positions; its seven-point communique to the Arab League was a good start. Better late than never, March 14's newly found unity, if it holds, is definitely a step in the right direction. GRANT

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