LEBANON: OPPOSITION MARADA LEADER CALLS FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001538

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER/GERMAIN
NSC FOR ABRAMS/YERGER/MCDERMOTT/RAMCHAND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: OPPOSITION MARADA LEADER CALLS FOR
DIRECT TALKS WITH ISRAEL

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Christian opposition Marada leader Suleiman Franjieh
suggested on October 27 that direct talks between Lebanon
(partnered with Syria) and Israel would lead to resolution of
the issue of Hizballah arms, and that Lebanese-Syrian
collaboration was necessary for border security. Stressing
the need for Christian unity, Franjieh opposed the formation
of a third Christian bloc under President Michel Sleiman, and
blamed Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea for failed
reconciliation efforts between his party and Marada.
Franjieh defended his opposition Christian ally Michel Aoun's
recent trip to Iran, as well as Hizballah's actions in May,
and claimed his alliance with Hizballah and Aoun's Free
Patriotic Movement was the result of Sunni failure to allow
real Christian representation. At a dinner the same evening,
March 14 members debated the pros and cons of Sleiman forming
a third Christian bloc. Neither Franjieh nor the March 14
members were in favor of expanding the National Dialogue.
End summary.


2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief and
Senior LES Political Advisor, met with opposition Marada
leader Suleiman Franjieh at his home in Bneshay on October

27. Franjieh advisors Raymond Araygi and Richard Haykal
(AmCit) also attended the one and a half hour meeting.

FRANJIEH ADVOCATES
DIRECT TALKS WITH ISRAEL
--------------


3. (C) Franjieh, who freely admits to his friendship with the
Asad family in Syria (and strongly denies any
connection to Syrian intelligence),claimed President Asad
had asked President Sleiman to open direct negotiations with
Israel during the latter's August 13-14 visit to Damascus.
Syria and Lebanon shared the same interests in reaching a
peace agreement with Israel, he argued, adding that this
would get rid of the Hizballah problem. Now that the
Lebanese prisoners held in Israel have been released, once
Shebaa Farms and Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty
were resolved, Lebanon would have no more issues with Syria.
Instead, he complained, March 14 refuses direct negotiations
because, blinded by their hatred of Syria, they prefer "no
peace, no war" status quo.

...AND BORDER SECURITY
COLLABORATION WITH SYRIA
--------------


4. (C) Franjieh welcomed recent steps between Syria and
Lebanon to establish diplomatic relations, claiming this
was something President Asad had advocated even as Syrian
troops were pulling out of Lebanon in 2005. However, Asad
was insulted so much by the Lebanese and others that he
quickly abandoned the idea.


5. (C) The U.S. and Europe had miscalculated Bashar, he
continued, believing that he was weak and his regime would
easily crumble under pressure. A better approach would be to
befriend the Syrians, he suggested, claiming they would give
"almost everything" to their friends, but nothing under
pressure.


6. (C) Franjieh dismissed the Syrian troop deployment on
Lebanon's northern border as "nothing special." Joking
that if the Syrians wanted to invade Lebanon, they would ask
the U.S. and not Lebanon for permission, Franjieh noted that
Asad knew he would create big problems with his friends if he
did. On the other hand, Franjieh believed that Salafists in
northern Lebanon did present a threat to Syria, and "his own
personal opinion" was that the Syrian troop presence could
intimidate these groups. Ambassador reiterated U.S.
insistence that Syria respect Lebanon's independence and

BEIRUT 00001538 002 OF 004


sovereignty.


7. (C) While agreeing that the Salafist threat in Tripoli
probably was exaggerated, Franjieh nevertheless warned that
the area was "fertile ground" for terrorists, including
Al-Qaeda and everyone else. These groups did not present a
military threat to Syria, but they did represent a security
threat, even more to Syria than to Lebanon, he said. Because
of the difficulties in policing 250 km of common borders,
Lebanon needed to collaborate with Syria under some sort of
security arrangement.


8. (C) According to Franjieh, Defense Minister Elias Murr
wanted to go do Damascus to meet with Asad's brother Maher,
but had been refused by the Syrians, who told him he could
only meet with his Syrian Defense Minister counterpart.
Franjieh claimed the Syrians then asked Hizballah to ask Aoun
whether he would mind if Michel Murr, Elias' father, made the
trip instead. Aoun himself had no relationship with the
Syrians, Franjieh insisted, although they respected him
because he had never treated them badly, even after they
ousted him from power.


9. (C) Note: The Ambassador asked Elias Murr the following
day about rumors that he might visit Damascus. Murr
downplayed the possibility, while noting that border security
talks between the two countries could at some point involve
the two Ministers of Defense. Elias blames Syria for the
2005 assassination attempt against him, thereby making him
persona non grata in Syria. His father, on the other hand,
is more acceptable to the Asad regime, but the Syrians
presumably would not want to risk alienating Aoun by giving
the impression that they were supporting the Murr family,
given the Murr-Aoun electoral confrontation in the Metn. End
note.

"WE MUST UNIFY THE CHRISTIANS"
--------------


10. (C) Franjieh, commenting that everything is Lebanon was
already focused on the Spring 2009 elections, said that the
only real contests would be in the Christian areas. Franjieh
denied any differences between his Marada party and Aoun's
Free Patriotic Movement, explaining that, at the end of the
day, his goal was to work for his community. Because Aoun
represented the majority of Lebanon's Christians, he needed
to work with him as well, since together the opposition
Christians held 22 seats in parliament. (Note: Marada holds
none of those seats. End note.)


11. (C) Franjieh opposed the formation of a third Christian
party under President Sleiman, stating that two to three
Christian groups would be a "disaster" for the Christians.
Sleiman would be unable to play the role of mediator, and, if
his group lost, he would lose Christian support, while if it
won, he would create adversaries within the Christian
community. "We must unify the Christians," he said.

DEFENSIVE OF AOUN
--------------


12. (C) Franjieh downplayed Aoun's recent trip to Tehran,
which occurred at the same time Sleiman was visiting Saudi
Arabia, saying the President's trip was in his capacity as
the Christian president of Lebanon, while Aoun was traveling
in his capacity as a Christian leader. Each has his own role
to play, he said; there's enough work for both. He denied
that Aoun's trip had caused him to lose Christian support,
explaining that opposition Christians were "either with us or
they're not," and that in any case, Geagea's trip to Egypt
during the same period had provided Aoun any political cover
he needed for Christian leaders visiting Muslim countries in
the region. Furthermore, any supporters Aoun might have lost
by going to Iran had probably already deserted him when he
signed the 2006 MOU with Hizballah.


13. (C) Franjieh did not agree with those who interpreted
Deputy PM Abou Jamra's demands for powers as an attempt to
win support for Aoun or distract from Aoun's Iran trip.

BEIRUT 00001538 003 OF 004


Instead, he attributed the antics to Abou Jamra's
personality, noting that even Aoun had warned that the Deputy
PM would be a trouble-maker. Nevertheless, Franjieh said, PM
Siniora did not have the right to deny Abou Jamra an office
at the Grand Serail. He predicted that the Cabinet would
somehow find a way to deal with the issue, but without
actually resolving it.


14. (C) The Ambassador asked what Zghorta Christians had in
common with Aoun's ally, Hizballah, especially after
Hizballah killed fellow Lebanese during the May crisis.
Franjieh, claiming he opposed any use of Hizballah's arms
within the country, nevertheless justified its actions in
May, arguing that its existence was threatened by the
government's attempt to close down its telecommunications
network. The government was testing the waters, he
explained, to see how Hizballah would react. Moreover, he
claimed outrageously, someone had convinced Saad that this
would provoke a short civil war that would result in
international intervention that would bring the international
community back on board with March 14.


15. (C) The opposition Christians, including Aoun, had tried
to ally with the Sunnis in the past, he continued, but were
frustrated by Saad's efforts to impose his own Christian
candidates (e.g., Ghattas Khoury). Furthermore, the Sunnis
accused Marada and others of killing former PM Hariri and of
being Syrians and Iranians, which ultimately pushed them
toward Hizballah. Franjieh claimed he had not even met
Hizballah SYG Nasrallah until one month before the 2005
elections, but noted that both sides were united in their
support to create a new electoral law along the lines of the
1960 law, which was based on smaller "qada" that would
benefit Marada by removing the ability of Sunni voters to
decide candidates in Christian areas.

GEAGEA NOT SINCERE
ABOUT RECONCILIATION
--------------


16. (C) Franjieh said Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea
(whom Franjieh blames for his role in the 1978 Ehden massacre
that killed Franjieh's parents and sister and some 26 others)
lacked the "good will" to conclude a real reconciliation. He
believed Geagea's apparent change of heart, after 30 years of
denying his involvement and repeatedly refusing Franjieh's
overtures, was for political gain, to earn favor with his
voters. Geagea needed reconciliation, Franjieh argued, "and
I'm not offering him any gifts." Franjieh claimed he was
ready to close the file on the issue, but only if there were
"sincere" and "personal" efforts by Geagea, rather than the
"artificial" and "political" reconciliation Geagea was
offering to date. Haykal criticized what he viewed as U.S.
hypocrisy in condemning Samir Qantar's murder of a four year
old Israeli girl, but supporting Geagea, who was responsible
for the death of Franjieh's toddler sister.


17. (C) Franjieh said polls showed over 60 percent of the
Christian community did not really want reconciliation. He
also noted that Patriarch Sfeir had sent Bishop Boulos Matar
to him to convince him not to seek reconciliation under the
auspices of President Sleiman. (Note: Franjieh, who has
been publicly critical of the Patriarch over the past year,
has been trying to sideline his role in Christian
reconciliation efforts. End note.)

2009 ELECTIONS
--------------


18. (C) Franjieh predicted that, for technical reasons, the
2009 parliamentary elections would be held over two days
rather than one. The army cannot deploy all of its troops at
once, he said, as this would leave security vacuums that
people would take advantage of. He appeared to welcome the
presence of international observers, claiming that one such
observer during the 2005 elections had told him Saad Hariri's
Future Movement had falsified results. Noting that his
political adversaries claimed to be spending $50 - 100,000 a
month in his Zghorta district, Franjieh said there was no

BEIRUT 00001538 004 OF 004


evidence of any of this money coming in, adding that in any
case, Saudi money cancels Iranian money.

NATIONAL DIALOGUE:
BICKERING OVER NUMBERS
--------------


19. (C) The Ambassador, noting that some in the opposition
were demanding that the National Dialogue be expanded to
include two more each from the majority and opposition,
presumably giving Franjieh a seat at the table, asked his
views on enlargement. Franjieh said that the criteria for
the current formula of 14 representatives had changed since
the 2006 Dialogue; both Safadi and Gemayel had lost MPs
(Note: The latter due to two assassinations. End note),
while Michel Murr had switched sides in the interim. The
numbers should be changed in principle because the criteria
for selecting the original 14 representatives had changed, he
argued. But he labeled talk of increasing or decreasing the
numbers "political bickering" that signaled that the parties
in reality were not interested in dialogue. He advocated a
7/7 split between the majority and opposition, but noted
that, since decisions were made by unanimity, one vote was
all that was needed for a veto. All that said, Franjieh
claimed to be satisfied with Marada's representation through
Michel Aoun.

MARCH 14 ON THIRD CHRISTIAN BLOC,
NATIONAL DIALOGUE
--------------


20. (C) At a dinner later that day with members of the March
14 Secretariat (SYG Fares Suaid, Hariri advisor Ghattas
Khoury, Michel Mecattaf, Samir Franjieh, and independent
Christian MP Mansour Ilbon),Suaid told Ambassador, DCM, and
PolCouns that March 14 would welcome President Sleiman's
formation of a third Christian bloc. Such an initiative
would provide the means to confront Aoun, especially in the
Christian districts of Jbeil, Ksrawan, Metn, and Baabda.
However, he believed Sleiman was not yet ready to confront
Aoun, and that he would only do so if he had the backing of
Hizballah and Syria. Furthermore, Suaid acknowledged that
March 14 Christian candidates could lose votes to Sleiman.
(Note: Ilbon, a pro-Sleiman candidate from Kswaran, where
Aoun now holds all five seats, is a key figure in this
debate. Ilbon has been reluctant to ally with March 14
because of his constituency's deep dislike for Samir Geagea.
His presence at the dinner, however, suggests that, while his
preference would be to run on a Sleiman-backed ticket, he
leanings are more pro-March 14 than pro-Aoun. End note.)


21. (C) For his part, Ghattas Khoury said Sleiman should be
encouraged to form his own parliamentary bloc, which would
attract Christian voters who were not ready to vote for March
14 but were opposed to Aoun. Khoury said Aoun's popularity
was declining, and he viewed Aoun's statement that he was
ready to share some of his FPM seats with Sleiman as a sign
of weakness. Khoury believed Sleiman was more pro-March 14
than pro-opposition, as demonstrated by his strong public
statements of support for the Special Tribunal, which could
make him a target for assassination. March 14's strategy, he
said, should be to win a simple majority in the next
parliament (65 out of 128 MPs leaving Sleiman, whom he
expected would win seven or eight seats, no choice but to
side with March 14.


22. (C) Khoury also said March 14 was "firm" in its
opposition to expanding the dialogue. The criteria for
selecting the participants had not changed, he said, and was
confirmed at Doha. Any changes would have to come after the
parliamentary elections. Khoury was skeptical that the
Dialogue would make any progress on the defense strategy
before the elections.

SISON