LEBANON: GEAGEA STRUGGLING WITH MARCH 14 ALLIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001526 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR IO A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER/GERMAIN NSC FOR AMBRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC LE SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: GEAGEA STRUGGLING WITH MARCH 14 ALLIES OVER CHRISTIAN CANDIDATES REF: A. BEIRUT 1516 ¶B. BEIRUT 1513 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea told the Ambassador October 24 that he and his March 14 allies were still negotiating their candidate lists for the 2009 parliamentary elections. Geagea said he was having the most difficulty convincing Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt that the Christian parties needed to select the Christian candidates in Muslim areas. Geagea also denied any possibility of reconciliation with his rival, pro-opposition Marada leader Suleiman Franjieh. He also believed the opposition, especially Michel Aoun, was planning to exploit the Deputy Prime Minister's threat to boycott cabinet meetings to incite Christian-Sunni conflict from now until the elections. Geagea welcomed the idea of having international election observers in Lebanon to deter intimidation and violence, especially in the months leading up to the elections. However, he expressed a strong preference for a European Union delegation rather than an American body, citing security concerns. ¶2. (C) Geagea envisioned a new dimension to the Middle East Peace Process if Israel was serious about recent reports that it was considering a "non-belligerence" pact with Lebanon, but said this would require the U.S. to play an aggressive role. Geagea was not pleased by recent European overtures to Syria and said the Syrians were getting recognition "for nothing in return." He characterized his recent visit to Egypt as "very successful," and said he plans to make visits to several Gulf countries in the near future. End summary. SQUABBLES CONTINUE AMONG MARCH 14 LEADERSHIP -------------- ¶3. (C) In a ninety-minute meeting, Lebanese Forces (LF) leader Samir Geagea explained to the Ambassador on October 24 that he and his March 14 coalition allies, especially Sunni majority leader Saad Hariri, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, and Kataeb leader Amine Gemayel, are still working out differences over the unified March 14 candidate lists for the spring 2009 parliamentary elections. However, Geagea claimed that the lists would be finalized by the end of year. Geagea, accompanied by advisors Elie Khoury and Joseph Nehmeh, confided that Hariri and Jumblatt were the biggest obstacles because they have not yet accepted that Christian candidates in Sunni or Druze areas should be decided by Christians, rather than selected by Hariri or Jumblatt. Geagea also accused Hariri of not paying enough attention to the Christian areas that could determine the election. He appeared annoyed with Christian ally Gemayel, saying Gemayel was "playing a dirty game" to gain more candidates seats for his own Kataeb party over and above the numbers in line with Kataeb supporters. ¶4. (C) By contrast, LF was looking at the electoral landscape realistically, Geagea said. LF's strategy to win the elections is to reach out to more independent candidates (non-allied and those supportive of March 14) to run as candidates, especially in swing Christian districts, such as Zahle and Baabda, he said. Geagea said that he was not frustrated yet, and assured the Ambassador that the "big dinosaurs" would come to an agreement among themselves. ¶5. (C) Geagea admitted that March 14 had not yet defined a unified message, but said the coalition was studying the issue. He was quick to add, however, that while there will be common denominators in the campaigns of March 14 partners, specific and distinct messages were needed for the "Christian street, the Sunni street, etc." LF, he said, had completed one trial of "successful" test messages, and was planning to begin another test round. He was proud to say that LF "would not be short of slogans." BEIRUT 00001526 002 OF 003 ¶6. (C) Geagea flatly denied the possibility of reconciliation between himself and his rival, pro-opposition Marada leader Suleiman Franjieh. He said that while the Christian community would welcome reconciliation, Franjieh, he believed, was not really serious because he was always creating new conditions. LF did "all it could do," he said. AOUN'S ELECTION STRATEGY IS TO CREATE PROBLEMS, GEAGEA SAYS -------------- ¶7. (C) Deputy Prime Minister Issam Abou Jamra's threats to boycott future cabinet meetings has turned a small problem into a "small issue with big impact," Geagea said. (Note: Abou Jamra, an Orthodox opposition minister appointed by Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) Christian leader Michel Aoun, created a stir October 22 when he walked out of a cabinet meeting after repeated refusals by Prime Minister Siniora (Sunni) to discuss the powers of the Deputy PM on the cabinet's agenda (reftels). Siniora and March 14 called this a constitutional, not a political, issue. Deputy Speaker of Parliament Farid Mekkari, also Orthodox, publicly criticized Abou Jamra, while Orthodox Bishop Audi told March 14 contacts he would raise his discontent with Abou Jamra and Siniora. End note.) Aoun, Geagea theorized, planned to exploit the Abou Jamra issue to verbally attack the Sunnis from now until the elections, and surmised that perhaps Siniora could have handled the issue differently before. Now, Geagea says, the only solution seemed to be a counterattack directed against the Shia. ¶8. (C) Geagea believed the Doha agreement emboldened and empowered the opposition parties, rather than holding them accountable for the May 2007 crisis that led to Doha. Doha, he said, did not adequately address security concerns. He expected that once "the opposition realizes it will not win the elections," it will turn to its "preferred way of doing things, through intimidation and violence." EU ELECTION OBSERVERS PREFERRED OVER AMERICANS -------------- ¶9. (C) Geagea told the Ambassador he was very much in favor of having international election observers in Lebanon, especially in the months before the parliamentary elections. International observers, he said, would provide a deterrent to the use of harassment, intimidation or violence. However, he expressed a strong preference for a European Union delegation over American organizations. Geagea argued that having U.S. organizations or citizens as election observers could make electoral issues "more complex" should anything happen to the observers. Geagea specifically suggested observers from Sweden, Norway, and Poland because he viewed them as "courageous" and neutral. Other European Union countries, as well as Canada and Australia would be acceptable, he said. Geagea's advisor, Nehmeh, suggested it would also be wise to have observers from EU countries that are not also contributing forces to UNIFIL to ensure that the observers felt free to monitor without other policy constraints. REGIONAL ISSUES: PROGRESS ON SHEBA'A HELPFUL, EU OVERTURES TO SYRIA ARE NOT -------------- ¶10. (C) On regional issues, Geagea assessed that while making progress on Ghajar would be a small step forward, progress on resolving Sheba'a Farms would be decisive. However, he admitted that the March 14 leadership had not seriously discussed the issue yet. Geagea said he was more intrigued by recent press reports that Israel was considering some sort of "non-belligerence" pact with Lebanon. If the Israelis are serious, Geagea said the new U.S. administration would have to play an aggressive role with the Israelis to convince them to move all 350,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon to the West Bank and Gaza and to place Palestinian "military bases" under international authority. If this were to occur, Geagea envisioned a Lebanon that "would return to normal." BEIRUT 00001526 003 OF 003 ¶11. (C) However, Geagea was bewildered by what he called "additional western openings" to Syria. He was disturbed by reports that Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Moallem might travel to the United Kingdom and that British Prime Minister Gordon Brown was considering visiting Damascus. Geagea said it was "sufficient" that French President Nicolas Sarkozy went to Syria; any additional overtures to Syria are "exaggerated." The Ambassador stressed that the U.S. positions towards Lebanon and Syria had not changed. Geagea agreed and said that the U.S. position was clear. However, the Europeans were creating additional problems by giving Syria recognition for nothing in return, he said. Furthermore, this type of continued engagement with Syria, would also hurt Egypt and Saudi Arabia, he commented. VISIT TO EGYPT SUCCESSFUL, OTHER TRIPS PLANNED -------------- ¶12. (C) Geagea characterized his October 19-21 visit to Egypt as "very successful." He said he was received by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Foreign Minister Ahmed AbulGheit, and Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa. The Egyptians, he said, shared the same views as March 14. Geagea reported, however, that the Egyptians were concerned about Syria troop deployment along the Lebanon-Syria border and were pessimistic about the Middle East Peace Process. Geagea said he had accepted invitations to visit the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar and Turkey, but the agendas and timing of these trips was not yet determined. Additionally, Geagea said he would like to visit with the new U.S. administration in late February or early March. COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) The more Geagea discussed the internal disagreements among his March 14 allies, the more it appeared March 14 was still far from a unified strategy and message for the parliamentary elections. End comment. SISON