LEBANON: GHAJAR AND SHEBAA ON THE MIND OF NEW UN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001515 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, PM/FO ALSO FOR IO A/S HOOK, WARLICK P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER/GERMAIN NSC FOR ABRAMS/YERGER/MCDERMOTT/RAMCHAND E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: GHAJAR AND SHEBAA ON THE MIND OF NEW UN SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR LEBANON REF: BEIRUT 1498 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) New UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Michael Williams stressed the need for urgent progress on Ghajar, warning that should the Israelis fail to respond to UNIFIL's proposal for withdrawal, the next UNSCR 1701 report would be tough on Israel during an October 22 call on Ambassador. Confirming that the report would address the recent Syrian troop deployment on Lebanon's northern border, Williams accused the Syrians of being "non-transparent" and uncooperative on border issues, while at the same time HE blamed the GOL for not taking ownership of its border security. Williams also expressed concerns that the handover from UNIIIC to the Special Tribunal would be delayed. He also expressed concern that March 14 was not doing a good job of preparing for the 2009 parliamentary elections, especially in terms of presenting a unified message to voters. End summary. ¶2. (C) The new UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL), Michael Williams, accompanied by UNSCOL Political Officers Rami Shehadeh and Salvatore Pedulla, paid a call on the Ambassador on October 22, in which DCM and Pol/Econ Chief also participated. Noting the long gap between his predecessor's (Geir Pedersen) departure in February and his own recent arrival, Williams acknowledged that he had a lot to catch up on and relationships to reestablish. He was currently finishing up his round of introductory calls on Lebanese leaders, having met with majority leader Saad Hariri the previous evening and Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun (a meeting he likened to "a trip to the dentist") and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander General Kahwagi earlier in the day, and scheduled to have his first meeting with Hizballah (with Labor Minister and MP Mohamad Fneish) immediately following his meeting with the Ambassador. Williams planned to travel to Tel Aviv (November 2-3) and Damascus (November 5) before heading to New York in mid to late November to present UNSCOL's next UNSCR 1701 report. 1701 REPORT WILL BE "TOUGH" ON ISRAEL IF NO PROGRESS ON GHAJAR -------------- ¶3. (C) Williams said UNSCOL would deliver the next UNSCR 1701 report to the UN Security Council on November 20. He warned that if there was no significant progress on Ghajar, i.e., if the Israelis failed to respond to UNIFIL's proposal for Israeli withdrawal (reftel),he would be "blunt" in his upcoming meetings with the Israelis that the report would be "tough" on Israel. ¶4. (C) Ghajar was in a delicate stage, Williams continued; UNIFIL Commander General Graziano had secured the GOL's support for his proposal for Israeli withdrawal and was now waiting for Israel's response, which might not come before the 1701 report was completed. Williams said his goal was a "satisfactory" outcome on Ghajar, adding that Israeli withdrawal from the northern half of the city would provide a much better context to address the issue of Shebaa Farms. Failure on Ghajar would make Shebaa even more complicated, and would be "quite a blow" for the Lebanese government and especially, he said, for the March 14 majority. So far, he commented, Hizballah was one of the big winners from 1701, especially after the recent prisoners exchange with Israel. ¶5. (C) Williams reported that in his first official call on PM Siniora, the PM was very critical of the UN, accusing it of having held the Shebaa and Ghajar files for two years with no progress. Williams affirmed that Siniora, repeating his mantra that Lebanon would be "the last in the Arab world" to make peace with Israel, refused to entertain the idea of indirect talks with Israel, which Williams attributed to BEIRUT 00001515 002 OF 003 Siniora's belief that he lacked the political cover to do so and concerns about his own physical security. ¶6. (C) Referring to a proposal reportedly floated by March 14 Druze leader Walid Jumblatt that Syria and Lebanon should present a joint demarche to the UN Secretary General on the Shebaa issue, Williams said he would raise the issue with Syrian FM Moallem during their upcoming meeting. However, the Syrians had been "totally uncooperative" with the UN in the past, he said, citing a 1963-64 UN border commission case, in which documents had gone missing and were presumably somewhere in Syrian archives. ¶7. (C) Williams confirmed that the 1701 report also would include the recent Syrian troop deployment on Lebanon's northern border, but he stressed that the numbers were far less than those reported in the press. LAF Commander General Kahwagi told him that earlier in the day that he had been in constant contact throughout with his Syrian counterpart, General Habib, Williams said, although Shehadeh noted that the lack of prior notification on the part of Syria was "troubling." Williams agreed, commentng that on Syria's lack of transparency, "a wordthe Syrians can't spell." Syrian FM Moallem had areed with UN SYG Ban Ki Moon during their meeting at UNGA on the need to establish diplomatic relations with Lebanon and to control smuggling, Williams relayed. He hoped that the UN could build on this momentum to secure better cooperation with Syria in fighting terrorism. ¶8. (C) Noting that the first LIBAT report had been his idea, Williams said both the first and second LIBAT reports were good, comprehensive reports with good recommendations. The GOL had acknowledged this, he said, but now needed to take ownership of its strategy. Williams agreed with the Ambassador that Interior Minister Baroud, while impressive, was more focused on the upcoming elections and Tripoli security issues than border issues although Baroud had told Williams in their introductory meeting that the security committee he is chairing was a useful tool for addressing this topic. CONCERNS ABOUT SPECIAL TRIBUNAL -------------- ¶9. (C) Williams (please protect) also expressed concerns that the handover from UNIIIC to the Special Tribunal would not take place in January as planned. Administrative, financial, and bureaucratic obstacles were proving difficult to overcome, and UNIIIC Commissioner Bellemare had told Williams he was frustrated by the lack of progress in The Hague. Williams said there had been talk of delaying the Tribunal for a month, but feared even this would not be enough time to get all the pieces in place. In the meantime, the Tribunal risked losing personnel and, more importantly, credibility. The Ambassador noted that the U.S. was looking to step up its technical assistance to UNIIIC, adding that expectations in Lebanon that there would be indictments before the spring parliamentary elections were unrealistic. SLEIMAN PROMISES NEW PROPOSALS FOR NEXT NATIONAL DIALOGUE SESSION -------------- ¶10. (C) William relayed that in his introductory call on President Sleiman, the President said he had new proposals for the next National Dialogue session, scheduled for November 5. However, Sleiman was "coy" when Williams tried to pry for details. SKEPTICAL ABOUT MARCH 14 -------------- ¶11. (C) Williams said that in his meeting with Saad Hariri the previous evening, Saad has assured him that "everything was under control" in terms of the parliamentary elections. But, he added, "every time Saad says this it makes me more nervous," especially since his sense was that March 14 was by no means guaranteed an electoral victory. Williams agreed BEIRUT 00001515 003 OF 003 that to date, March 14 was doing poorly in terms of messaging and presenting a unified front. COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) Williams is a frank and knowledgeable interlocutor with a good grasp of the lay of the land, not only in terms of 1701 issues, but of the overall political environment as well. We expect he will, like his predecessor, become a useful conduit to us for insights on Hizballah's thinking. End comment. SISON