LEBANON: SLEIMAN MAKES CASE FOR NEW LAF WEAPONS;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001474

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK AND PDAS WARLICK
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINR UNSC MOPS SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SLEIMAN MAKES CASE FOR NEW LAF WEAPONS;
NOT OVERLY CONCERNED ABOUT SYRIAN TROOP DEPLOYMENT

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In an October 7 meeting with DAS David Hale and the
Ambassador, President Michel Sleiman presented the case for
U.S. provision of precision weaponry to the Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF) to fight terrorists. He said Syrian President
Bashar Asad had assured him Syrian troops deployed on the
Syrian-Lebanese border were there to stop weapons smuggling
and the movement of terrorists across the border. He said he
hoped to make progress on the issue of Hizballah's weapons
through the National Dialogue, and worried about the danger
of extremism in the Palestinian refugee camps. He expressed
his hope for the emergence of a new independent political
bloc in addition to the current March 14 and March 8
alliances, and he spoke of his travel plans, saying he wanted
to put Lebanon "back on the world map." End summary.

ASSISTANCE FOR THE LAF
--------------


2. (C) Visiting NEA DAS David Hale and Ambassador,
accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief and EconOff, met President
Sleiman at Baabda Palace on October 7. The President said
Defense Minister Murr and LAF Commander Kahwagi told him the
first U.S.-Lebanon Joint Military Commission meeting October
6 had gone well, but that there were still questions about
the kind of weapons Lebanon might receive from the USG. He
said he had told Secretary Gates on September 25 that Lebanon
needed precision weapons in order to fight terrorists, and
told DAS Hale that the Nahr al-Barid battle had shown how
important it is for the LAF to have weapons that allow it to
shoot accurately from the air.


3. (C) Sleiman stressed the issue of the choice of weapons,
saying that Lebanon was not an aggressive country, but that
it needed good weaponry not to fight Israel, but to fight the
terrorists, whose new strategy is to attack the LAF and the
Internal Security Forces (ISF). He said the terrorists can
no longer reach targets in the United States or in Europe, so
they are constrained largely to Muslim countries. Instead of
attacking civilians, which turns populations against them,
they have decided to associate the military with the
interests of the west and attack it instead.


4. (C) DAS Hale emphasized the importance of finding the
right solution for Lebanon that would ensure the LAF,s
long-term needs were met while providing a quick political
impact. Ambassador Sison told the President that Under
Secretary of Defense Eric Edelman had expressed interest in
making a trip to Beirut soon to follow up.

UNCONCERNED WITH SYRIAN TROOPS
--------------


5. (C) When asked his thoughts on the presence of Syrian
troops on Lebanon,s northern border with Syria, Sleiman said
Kahwagi and Murr had told him the Syrian troops were not a
danger. He said he had spoken to Syrian President Asad, who
told him the troop deployment was a serious effort to combat
smuggling, which Sleiman said was in line with his
discussions with Asad in Damascus, as well as with UN
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701. He said he was
taking this answer from the Syrians at face value, and that
Asad insisted he was sincere in trying to help Lebanon.


6. (C) DAS Hale expressed skepticism about how serious Syria
was in its efforts to stop smuggling. Referring to the
October 6 statement by Deputy State Department Spokesman
Robert Wood warning against Syrian intervention in Lebanon,
Hale said the USG had thought it important to go public with
the information and make it clear that interference would not
be tolerated.


7. (C) Sleiman said that since his September 25 meeting with
President Bush, he had pushed the Syrians to stop terrorists
crossing the border and to curb arms smuggling. He said
Asad had responded positively. Sleiman said he was certain
the Syrians would not enter Lebanon, and that he hoped their

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presence would stop weapons smuggling.


8. (C) In response to DAS Hale,s question about why the
Syrians only deployed to the north, and not along their
entire border with Lebanon, Sleiman said it was because the
Syrians have a history with the northern border, through
which Muslim Brotherhood extremists crossed into Syria to
fight the Syrian government in the 1980s.


9. (C) DAS Hale explained the circumstances around the
Secretary,s recent meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister
Moallem. While there had been developments in the region
warranting contact, the USG remains dissatisfied with Syrian
actions in many areas. Our contacts involved telling the
Syrians directly what they needed to do to improve their
behavior and play a more constructive role in the region.
Hale stressed that U.S. policy toward Syria had not changed,
and that the U.S. would not compromise on Lebanese
sovereignty or the implementation of UNSCR 1701.


10. (C) Sleiman said he constantly underscored with President
Asad and his envoys the importance of stopping the movement
of terrorists and weapons across the border and the need to
implement UNSCR 1701. When DAS Hale asked what Asad,s
response was, Sleiman said, &He says yes, but we want
implementation.8


11. (C) Sleiman said he did anticipate that the establishment
of diplomatic relations between the countries would move
forward soon, and he expected the Syrian parliament to
approve it by the middle of October.

HIZBALLAH,S WEAPONS
--------------


12. (C) DAS Hale briefed Sleiman on NEA PDAS Feltman,s
recent trip to Israel. He communicated Israeli concerns
about the rearmament of Hizballah, and their perception that
neither the Lebanese, nor Syria, nor the international
community was doing enough to stop it. He said the Israelis
had expressed interest in looking at ways to improve the
situation in the south.


13. (C) Sleiman said he hoped that LAF troops that had been
moved from the south to the north because of the violence
around Tripoli could soon be moved back to the south. He
said he hoped the National Dialogue would settle the question
of Hizballah,s weapons, and that a compromise could be found
under which Hizballah agreed not to use its weapons except in
the case of Israeli aggression. Sleiman said that he
expected this discussion could get underway during the
Dialogue,s next session November 5, though he did not expect
it to be resolved in one day.


14. (C) DAS Hale asked Sleiman about the situation in
Tripoli. Sleiman said it was better than before, though he
believed there was still a real danger from the Palestinian
refugee camps. He said that there were no plans to send LAF
troops into the Beddawi camp, but that General Kahwagi was
looking into taking new security measures in the area around
the camp.

ELECTIONS
--------------


15. (C) DAS Hale brought up the spring 2009 parliamentary
elections in Lebanon. He said the United States saw its role
as one of supporting the elections, though obviously the USG
hoped that the forces of peace, moderation, and stability
would prevail, and that elected Lebanese representatives
would show strong support for state institutions.


16. (C) Sleiman said it would be good to have a solid
representation of March 14, March 8, as well as independents
in the new parliament. He said that if the National Dialogue
could bring about a resolution to some of the major issues,
an independent party might have a chance to emerge, which
Sleiman believed would be beneficial for the political
process. (Comment: Although Sleiman himself has been mum on
the subject, many believe he will try to form his own
independent bloc in the new year. There are several

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Christian MPs close to Sleiman who are reluctant to run on a
March 14 list. Advocates of this concept believe it will
enable independent, pro-March 14 candidates to win in
districts where a March 14 branding is an electoral
liability. End comment.)

&I WANT TO PUT LEBANON BACK ON THE WORLD MAP8
--------------


17. (C) Following up on his recent travel to the United
States, Sleiman gave a rundown of his other upcoming foreign
visits, noting that in October, he would visit Saudi Arabia,
Canada for the meeting of the Francophonie, Italy, and the
Vatican. When the Ambassador asked about his plans for an
Iran trip, he said he would visit Tehran in November. He
said he believed it was important after such a long
leadership vacuum in Lebanon for him to put his country
&back on the world map.8 &I will work at least until the
end of the year to put Lebanon back in its rightful place,8
he said.
SISON