LEBANON: SLEIMAN MAKES CASE FOR NEW LAF WEAPONS;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001474 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK AND PDAS WARLICK USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINR UNSC MOPS SY LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: SLEIMAN MAKES CASE FOR NEW LAF WEAPONS; NOT OVERLY CONCERNED ABOUT SYRIAN TROOP DEPLOYMENT Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In an October 7 meeting with DAS David Hale and the Ambassador, President Michel Sleiman presented the case for U.S. provision of precision weaponry to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to fight terrorists. He said Syrian President Bashar Asad had assured him Syrian troops deployed on the Syrian-Lebanese border were there to stop weapons smuggling and the movement of terrorists across the border. He said he hoped to make progress on the issue of Hizballah's weapons through the National Dialogue, and worried about the danger of extremism in the Palestinian refugee camps. He expressed his hope for the emergence of a new independent political bloc in addition to the current March 14 and March 8 alliances, and he spoke of his travel plans, saying he wanted to put Lebanon "back on the world map." End summary. ASSISTANCE FOR THE LAF -------------- ¶2. (C) Visiting NEA DAS David Hale and Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief and EconOff, met President Sleiman at Baabda Palace on October 7. The President said Defense Minister Murr and LAF Commander Kahwagi told him the first U.S.-Lebanon Joint Military Commission meeting October 6 had gone well, but that there were still questions about the kind of weapons Lebanon might receive from the USG. He said he had told Secretary Gates on September 25 that Lebanon needed precision weapons in order to fight terrorists, and told DAS Hale that the Nahr al-Barid battle had shown how important it is for the LAF to have weapons that allow it to shoot accurately from the air. ¶3. (C) Sleiman stressed the issue of the choice of weapons, saying that Lebanon was not an aggressive country, but that it needed good weaponry not to fight Israel, but to fight the terrorists, whose new strategy is to attack the LAF and the Internal Security Forces (ISF). He said the terrorists can no longer reach targets in the United States or in Europe, so they are constrained largely to Muslim countries. Instead of attacking civilians, which turns populations against them, they have decided to associate the military with the interests of the west and attack it instead. ¶4. (C) DAS Hale emphasized the importance of finding the right solution for Lebanon that would ensure the LAF,s long-term needs were met while providing a quick political impact. Ambassador Sison told the President that Under Secretary of Defense Eric Edelman had expressed interest in making a trip to Beirut soon to follow up. UNCONCERNED WITH SYRIAN TROOPS -------------- ¶5. (C) When asked his thoughts on the presence of Syrian troops on Lebanon,s northern border with Syria, Sleiman said Kahwagi and Murr had told him the Syrian troops were not a danger. He said he had spoken to Syrian President Asad, who told him the troop deployment was a serious effort to combat smuggling, which Sleiman said was in line with his discussions with Asad in Damascus, as well as with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701. He said he was taking this answer from the Syrians at face value, and that Asad insisted he was sincere in trying to help Lebanon. ¶6. (C) DAS Hale expressed skepticism about how serious Syria was in its efforts to stop smuggling. Referring to the October 6 statement by Deputy State Department Spokesman Robert Wood warning against Syrian intervention in Lebanon, Hale said the USG had thought it important to go public with the information and make it clear that interference would not be tolerated. ¶7. (C) Sleiman said that since his September 25 meeting with President Bush, he had pushed the Syrians to stop terrorists crossing the border and to curb arms smuggling. He said Asad had responded positively. Sleiman said he was certain the Syrians would not enter Lebanon, and that he hoped their BEIRUT 00001474 002 OF 003 presence would stop weapons smuggling. ¶8. (C) In response to DAS Hale,s question about why the Syrians only deployed to the north, and not along their entire border with Lebanon, Sleiman said it was because the Syrians have a history with the northern border, through which Muslim Brotherhood extremists crossed into Syria to fight the Syrian government in the 1980s. ¶9. (C) DAS Hale explained the circumstances around the Secretary,s recent meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Moallem. While there had been developments in the region warranting contact, the USG remains dissatisfied with Syrian actions in many areas. Our contacts involved telling the Syrians directly what they needed to do to improve their behavior and play a more constructive role in the region. Hale stressed that U.S. policy toward Syria had not changed, and that the U.S. would not compromise on Lebanese sovereignty or the implementation of UNSCR 1701. ¶10. (C) Sleiman said he constantly underscored with President Asad and his envoys the importance of stopping the movement of terrorists and weapons across the border and the need to implement UNSCR 1701. When DAS Hale asked what Asad,s response was, Sleiman said, &He says yes, but we want implementation.8 ¶11. (C) Sleiman said he did anticipate that the establishment of diplomatic relations between the countries would move forward soon, and he expected the Syrian parliament to approve it by the middle of October. HIZBALLAH,S WEAPONS -------------- ¶12. (C) DAS Hale briefed Sleiman on NEA PDAS Feltman,s recent trip to Israel. He communicated Israeli concerns about the rearmament of Hizballah, and their perception that neither the Lebanese, nor Syria, nor the international community was doing enough to stop it. He said the Israelis had expressed interest in looking at ways to improve the situation in the south. ¶13. (C) Sleiman said he hoped that LAF troops that had been moved from the south to the north because of the violence around Tripoli could soon be moved back to the south. He said he hoped the National Dialogue would settle the question of Hizballah,s weapons, and that a compromise could be found under which Hizballah agreed not to use its weapons except in the case of Israeli aggression. Sleiman said that he expected this discussion could get underway during the Dialogue,s next session November 5, though he did not expect it to be resolved in one day. ¶14. (C) DAS Hale asked Sleiman about the situation in Tripoli. Sleiman said it was better than before, though he believed there was still a real danger from the Palestinian refugee camps. He said that there were no plans to send LAF troops into the Beddawi camp, but that General Kahwagi was looking into taking new security measures in the area around the camp. ELECTIONS -------------- ¶15. (C) DAS Hale brought up the spring 2009 parliamentary elections in Lebanon. He said the United States saw its role as one of supporting the elections, though obviously the USG hoped that the forces of peace, moderation, and stability would prevail, and that elected Lebanese representatives would show strong support for state institutions. ¶16. (C) Sleiman said it would be good to have a solid representation of March 14, March 8, as well as independents in the new parliament. He said that if the National Dialogue could bring about a resolution to some of the major issues, an independent party might have a chance to emerge, which Sleiman believed would be beneficial for the political process. (Comment: Although Sleiman himself has been mum on the subject, many believe he will try to form his own independent bloc in the new year. There are several BEIRUT 00001474 003 OF 003 Christian MPs close to Sleiman who are reluctant to run on a March 14 list. Advocates of this concept believe it will enable independent, pro-March 14 candidates to win in districts where a March 14 branding is an electoral liability. End comment.) &I WANT TO PUT LEBANON BACK ON THE WORLD MAP8 -------------- ¶17. (C) Following up on his recent travel to the United States, Sleiman gave a rundown of his other upcoming foreign visits, noting that in October, he would visit Saudi Arabia, Canada for the meeting of the Francophonie, Italy, and the Vatican. When the Ambassador asked about his plans for an Iran trip, he said he would visit Tehran in November. He said he believed it was important after such a long leadership vacuum in Lebanon for him to put his country &back on the world map.8 &I will work at least until the end of the year to put Lebanon back in its rightful place,8 he said. SISON