Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BEIRUT1468
2008-10-10 15:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: SAUDI AMBASSADOR ON HARIRI AND HIZBALLAH;

Tags:  PGOV PINR PREL PTER LE SA 
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OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #1468/01 2841500
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101500Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3256
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3020
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3231
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001468 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, NEA/ARP
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK AND PDAS WARLICK
USUN FOR KHALILIZAD, WOLFF, SCHEDELBAUER
NSC FOR ABRAMS, RAMCHAND, MCDERMOTT, YERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL PTER LE SA
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SAUDI AMBASSADOR ON HARIRI AND HIZBALLAH;
SLEIMAN'S TRIP TO SAUDI ARABIA

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) (d)

SUMMARY
--------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001468 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, NEA/ARP ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK AND PDAS WARLICK USUN FOR KHALILIZAD, WOLFF, SCHEDELBAUER NSC FOR ABRAMS, RAMCHAND, MCDERMOTT, YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2018 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL PTER LE SA SUBJECT: LEBANON: SAUDI AMBASSADOR ON HARIRI AND HIZBALLAH; SLEIMAN'S TRIP TO SAUDI ARABIA Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The Saudi leadership has neither encouraged nor discouraged majority leader Saad Hariri from meeting Hizballah SYG Nasrallah, the Saudi Ambassador reported on October 8. In fact, he claimed the Saudis refrain from giving directions to Hariri or other Lebanese, providing advice and counsel instead. He urged that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia cooperate to deliver messages to March 14 on election matters, because if March 14 loses in 2009, "Iran will win". The Saudi Ambassador believed Syria did not intend to invade Lebanon, but was concerned that they might make some unintentional mistake with their military maneuvers. He was dismissive of independent Shia politician Ahmad al-Assad to whom, he confirmed, the Saudis had given financial support. End Summary. SLEIMAN TRAVEL TO SAUDI ARABIA OCTOBER 12-13 -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by DCM, met with Saudi Ambassador Abdulaziz Khoja on October 8 at the U.S. Embassy. Khoja noted that Lebanese President Sleiman will make his first-ever trip to Saudi Arabia on Sunday, October 12, returning the next day. The Saudis will accord Sleiman full honors, including King Abdallah welcoming him at the airport. Accompanying Sleiman will be the ministers of economy (Mohammed Safadi),public works (Ghazi Aridi),education (Bahia Hariri),foreign affairs (Fawzi Salloukh),Minister without portfolio Nassib Lahoud and Deputy Prime Minister Issam Abu Jamra. Khoja confirmed that Minister of Defense Elias Murr would not be on this trip but would travel to Saudi Arabia later in October. (Note: Murr is traveling to seek Saudi funding for the increased military assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces that has been the subject of extensive U.S.-Lebanese bilateral discussions. End Note). HARIRI-NASRALLAH MEETING: NO OBJECTIONS -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador asked about the Saudi view of the meeting expected to occur soon between majority leader Saad Hariri, a Sunni leader seen as very close to Saudi Arabia, and Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah. Har
iri had told her two weeks ago he felt "pressured" to meet with Nasrallah, the Ambassador noted. "Not by us" Khoja said, "it was Saad's idea." Khoja said that the King and Saudis in general did not want to be in the position of telling Hariri what to do and not do. "We don't want to act like Syria" giving orders to Lebanese officials, Khoja said, but prefer to give advice and counsel. Saad had been told that he should pursue or not pursue such a meeting based on Lebanon's interests, Khoja said. Khoja believes Hizballah was seeking the meeting to improve its negative image in Lebanon, especially among Sunnis, following the May 7 violence. He claimed Hizballah's image in Arab states was very tarnished by the May events. Khoja clearly was skeptical about the value of the meeting, and said Hizballah had much more to gain from it than Hariri. (Note: Hariri remains out of the country but is expected back soon. End Note) U.S. AND SAUDI ARABIA MUST ADVISE MARCH 14 LEADERS ON ELECTIONS -------------- - ¶4. (C) Turning to politics, Khoja said that March 14 must win the 2009 elections "or Iran will win." He urged that the U.S. and KSA give advice to March 14 figures to ensure greater success; in particular, Samir Geagea should not put up candidates from his Lebanese Forces party who would compete with allies in March 14, Amine Gemayal should not push the candidacy of his son Sami because Sami's inexperience makes him a weak candidate and Walid Jumblatt must be kept from drifting from the March 14 fold. The Ambassador suggested approaching Mohammed Safadi, a March 14 Sunni leader from Tripoli seen as a rival to Hariri and Siniora, as well as urging Hariri to reach out to the Armenian Tashnaq party; Khoja agreed with both ideas as means of solidifying March 14 support. BEIRUT 00001468 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) The Ambassador asked if Saudi Arabia had provided financial assistance to independent Shia Ahmad al-Assad, noting stories she had heard that al-Assad had used the funds he obtained from the Saudis for personal purposes. Saying "I heard the same", Khoja confirmed the Saudi assistance to al-Assad and made clear his own displeasure, saying he had refused to agree to meet with al-Assad in Saudi Arabia or Lebanon. "Hizballah and Amal are laughing at him," Khoja said, by sending their people to al-Assad to get money under the pretense of supporting him. FAVORS INCREASED MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON -------------- ¶6. (C) "I hope you can do it," Khoja said during a discussion of increased U.S. military assistance to Lebanon, referring to presumed Israeli objections raised by the Lebanese media. The Ambassador explained that recent Lebanese press reporting was overly simplistic and that during the Joint Military Commission earlier in the week, DOD officials had presented to the Lebanese side various options to meet LAF equipment needs. The U.S. was intent on building a strong relationship with the Lebanese Armed Forces, The Ambassador added. ¶7. (C) Khoja said he did not think Syria intended to invade Lebanon, but was worried that the Syrians might overplay their hand with their recent military activity near the Lebanese border and do something unintentionally. He saw the recent Syrian activity as psychological pressure intended to influence the Lebanese election in the north, a stronghold for Saad Hariri. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) We find interesting Khoja's point that the Saudis try to influence Saad Hariri by "counsel" rather than telling him what to do. Among the widely-accepted theories in Lebanese political circles is that Saad routinely takes direction during his frequent contacts with King Abdallah. End Comment. SISON

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