LEBANON: HIZBALLAH'S ARMS WEIGH ON SLEIMAN AS HE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001378 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, PM/FO ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK, WARLICK P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR ABRAMS/YERGER/MCDERMOTT/RAMCHAND E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: HIZBALLAH'S ARMS WEIGH ON SLEIMAN AS HE PREPARES FOR U.S. TRIP Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Advisor and confidant to President Sleiman BG (retired) Fares Soufia said Sleiman was looking forward to his upcoming visit to the United States and appreciated continuing U.S. support and assistance. Sleiman was working hard to promote reconciliation within Lebanon and therefore was meeting with internal and external players from all sides, with Hizballah's arms the main "problem." Soufia stressed that the National Dialogue should not be rushed, but that it would have a "happy ending" with the help of the U.S. and Lebanon's neighbors. He did not rule the possibility that the spring 2009 parliamentary elections could be delayed if the Dialogue was not concluded before then. End summary. ¶2. (C) BG (ret.) Fares Soufia, advisor and friend of over 40 years to President Sleiman, a former Lebanese Defense Attache to Washington, and green card holder, will accompany Sleiman on his upcoming trip to the United States. The Ambassador began by expressing enduring U.S. support for Lebanon, stressing that the momentum of the strong U.S. commitment would carry through the U.S. elections and beyond. The U.S. had very ambitious plans for providing assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF),in addition to economic assistance, she said. She added that Sleiman's U.S. interlocutors would be interested in hearing his views on regional developments, the recently convened National Dialogue, and Sleiman's recent meeting with Palestinian President Abu Mazen. ¶3. (C) Soufia said the GOL welcomed U.S. support, but stressed the need for more visible assistance to the LAF. Sleiman had succeeded in maintaining LAF unity in difficult times, he said, including the summer 2007 fighting against Islamic extremists in Nahr al-Barid. He was trying to do the same with respect to recent clashes in Tripoli and other areas, by "walking a middle path." Soufia reiterated Sleiman's previous comments to the Ambassador that the LAF should not do police work, and noted that the Ministries of Defense and Interior had recently formed a committee to coordinate on security matters. ¶3. (C) Soufia, saying he was "not worried," expected Sleiman's U.S. visit to be a good one, immediately adding that "the main problem is the resistance." He placed Sleiman's U.S. trip in the context of complementing a regional tour (that would include Iran and Saudi Arabia) to talk to about the issue, adding that the U.S. role would be to push Syria. Reverting to one of Sleiman's key themes, Soufia said Lebanon was waiting for the regional dynamics to change, with the peace process as the main issue. ¶4. (C) Citing clashes between members of Lebanese Forces and Marada that resulted in two deaths, Soufia commented that Sleiman was facing some very tough problems at home, where small incidents could easily escalate into larger conflicts. Sleiman was therefore working to promote reconciliation between Lebanon's various political adversaries, reportedly telling them to put the national interest above their own partisan interests. Soufia confirmed press reports that Sleiman had tasked advisor Nazem Khoury, working with independent MP Michel Murr, to form a committee to work on reconciliation issues. ¶5. (C) It was "delicate" work, Soufia noted, adding that the handshake between majority Saad Hariri and Hizballah MP Raad Mohamad at the National Dialogue was a good first step and that Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah had "started to apologize" for the May violence in a recent iftar speech. First we must have reconciliation, he said, then political discussions. Sleiman believed in the need to talk to everyone, including Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah, his ally, Free Patriotic Leader Michel Aoun, and Syrian President Gashar Asad, stressing that after the 2006 war and events of May 7, he wanted to ensure that sure that the National BEIRUT 00001378 002 OF 002 Dialogue was successful. ¶6. (C) Regarding the Dialogue agenda, Soufia said Sleiman would focus on the main issues, leaving other issues for the cabinet. He affirmed, however, that the Dialogue would continue to be limited to the 14 original participants. Asked why Sleiman had scheduled the next session for November 5, Soufia said it was necessary not to rush the Dialogue, and reiterated Sleiman's message to the Dialogue participants that "failure is not an option." The dialogue will have a happy ending, he said, with the help of the U.S. and Lebanon's neighbors. ¶7. (C) Soufia hoped the Dialogue would conclude before the spring 2009 parliamentary elections, so that the country could make a "fresh start," but admitted that the elections might be postponed if the Dialogue was not finished. "This is an option," he said. Soufia, however, said Sleiman forming his own political bloc was not an option. "The only option for Michel Sleiman is Lebanon," he declared. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) Despite Soufia's assurances that he was looking forward to a "great" visit, he also indirectly conveyed continuing underlying apprehension about the trip. His comment that he was "not worried," immediately followed by his reference to the "resistance," combined with Sleiman's decision to launch the National Dialogue prior to the trip, suggest that Sleiman continues to fear his U.S. interlocutors will beat him up on the issue of Hizballah's arms. Sleiman needs to hear a stern message on this topic, but it should be tied to the "carrot" of increasing U.S. military assistance to the LAF and ISF should U.S. concerns on Hizballah's arms be addressed. ¶9. (C) Sleiman may not be looking to form his own political bloc (at least yet; many expect he will consider doing so before the elections),but he has indicated a desire to regain presidential powers lost in the 1989 Taif Record. Recently, Sleiman proposed amending the Accord to give the President the power to dissolve both parliament and the cabinet, and to remove time limits on the President's response to cabinet decrees. End comment. SISON