LEBANON: INDEPENDENT SHIA GEARING UP FOR 2009

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001326 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR S/P DGORDON/AJAIN/JCOHEN DRL FOR A/S KRAMER, DAS RUGGLES P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR PHUM EAID LE IZ SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: INDEPENDENT SHIA GEARING UP FOR 2009 ELECTIONS Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Lokman Slim, an independent Shia organizer and Director of NGO Hayya Bina, told the Ambassador on September 5 that the March 14 coalition needs to take the independent Shia portfolio more seriously. Slim surmised that Shia independents could have a real possibility of winning parliamentary seats during the 2009 elections in several of the heavily contested districts, if given support. Slim, and some of his colleagues, are supportive of independent Shia cabinet minister Ibrahim Shamseddine. Slim viewed (Sunni) majority leader Saad Hariri's July visit to Iraq, especially Najaf, positively for independent Shia and bridging the gap between Lebanese and Iraqi Shiites. ¶2. (C) Slim and his assistant also shared with the Ambassador details of a confrontation between Hayya Bina's local partners and Hizballah at two summer camps Hayya Bina sponsored in partnership with USAID/OTI. Slim described the recent violence in Tripoli as worrying and believed that former Prime Minister Najib Mikati is competing with Saad Hariri for support in Tripoli. End summary. INDEPENDENT SHIA SHOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY -------------- ¶3. (C) Lokman Slim, an independent Shia organizer and Director of NGO Hayya Bina, complained September 5 to the Ambassador, accompanied by Poloffs, that March 14 leaders were still not taking the Shia portfolio seriously enough. Slim, and his assistant Inga Schei, said independent Shia candidates continued to encounter problems of coordination with their "objective allies," i.e. majority/Sunni leader Saad Hariri, Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)/Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, and Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, all March 14 leaders. Slim was especially critical of Hariri's long absences outside of Lebanon during the summer months and what he called "lack of communication" between Qoreitem (Hariri's residence) and many groups, including independent Shia. ¶4. (C) Although not a politician himself, Slim believed that Shia independents would have an opportunity to win parliamentary seats in key districts in the 2009 elections. He predicted that with the proper support and focused effort, independent Shia candidates, and their allies, could win two seats in Baabda, one in Zahle, two in West Bekaa, and one seat in Jbeil. Slim and Schei are planning to lead a conference in Berlin in November or December, through the Aspen Institute-Berlin if funding is secured, to discuss why independent candidates have had difficulty winning in past elections and how to boost support for them among voters in difficult regions. ¶5. (C) Slim said the independent Shia still have considerable "homework" to do. However, he was optimistic about garnering more support for independent Shia after an iftar he plans to host for respected cleric Sayyed Ali al-Amine, former Mufti of South Lebanon, who opposes Hizballah and was removed from his position earlier this year. Slim would also like to organize several other iftars, in partnership with local Shia leaders in several districts, including in the Bekaa, the south, and Dahiyeh, if funding is secured. Schei noted Hayya Bina is considering other "culturally-appropriate" projects in the lead-up to the 2009 elections to bolster support for independent Shia candidates. However, Slim bluntly stated his personal belief that moderates would be better served if the 2009 elections were postponed, calling them "a big risk" in view of Hizballah's strength. SLIM: SHAMSEDDINE IN A UNIQUE POSITION -------------- ¶6. (C) Slim said that following the formation of the cabinet BEIRUT 00001326 002 OF 003 on July 11, there was tension between former MP Duraid Yaghi, an independent Shia and member of Walid Jumblatt's party, and Jumblatt because Jumblatt had supported the appointment of independent Shia scholar Ibrahim Shamseddine as Minister of Administrative Reform. According to Slim, he mediated between Yaghi and Jumblatt and enabled a reconciliation between the two. Slim said he would like Yaghi to run for a parliamentary seat in 2009. ¶7. (C) Shamseddine, Slim said, is in a unique position as the only independent Shia representative in the cabinet. Slim said he had encouraged Shamseddine in a recent meeting to take advantage of his position to visit all parts of the country, including Hizballah-dominated areas, and to begin laying the groundwork for others like him. Slim assessed that Shamseddine would need to be pushed to get out, but he said Shamseddine had promised to do his best. BRIDGING THE GAP TO IRAQI SHIA -------------- ¶8. (C) In a more positive tone, Slim praised Saad Hariri's July visit to Iraq. Slim called the visit a "bridge" between Lebanon and Iraq. He was especially impressed by Hariri's meeting with Iraqi Shia cleric Ali Al-Sistani in Najaf. Slim reported that he would like Hariri to follow up his meetings in Iraq with outreach to Lebanon's Shia community. (Note: This had been discussed at Qoreitem, but Hariri's August travel to Europe had interrupted any action. End note.) SUMMER CAMPS FACE HARASSMENT; HIZBALLAH ATTEMPTS TO ASSERT CONTROL IN THE BEKAA -------------- ¶9. (C) Schei shared with the Ambassador the details of two incidents involving Hizballah that occurred during the final days of summer camps sponsored by Hayya Bina, in conjunction with USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI). In Yammouneh, local Hizballah party members placed Hizballah flags at the entrance of the camp and on electricity poles along the street facing the camp. Hizballah members claimed their action was not directed against the camp, but rather against the mayor and his family, whom Hizballah considers to be very pro-American according to the mayor's son-in-law Mohamed Chreif. Hizballah's action caused a heated altercation, with some pushing and shoving, between members of Chreif's family and Hizballah members. ¶10. (C) Although a majority of camp participants stayed out of the fray, the local NGO partner managing the grant, Dar Al Wasia, confronted Hizballah and defended the organization's right to organize USAID/OTI-branded activities, Chreif said. To prevent further escalation, Dar Al Wasia threatened to close down the camp if the Hizballah flags were not removed. Ultimately, a compromise was reached whereby Hizballah removed its flags from the camp entrance, but kept the others along the public street, and the camp continued as planned without further incident. ¶11. (C) In Chamounstar, camp officials learned on the day of a planned photo exhibition at the camp that many families in the surrounding neighborhood had received telephone calls from Hizballah saying the event had been canceled. According to Schei, camp organizers made a round of calls to families stating that the event was scheduled as planned and the turnout improved. ¶12. (C) The Ambassador said she was sorry to hear of the disruptions caused to the camps, but was gratified to know that the events were able to continue. When asked if the USAID/OTI branding was a problem for Hayya Bina, Slim said no. In fact, Hayya Bina has held events in partnership with MEPI, the Embassy's Public Diplomacy section, and with a MEPI-funded partner (the International Republican Institute) on several occasions without incident. WHAT'S MIKATI UP BEIRUT 00001326 003 OF 003 TO IN TRIPOLI? -------------- ¶13. (C) Slim called the recent violence in Tripoli worrying. He alleged rival Sunni and Alawite factions are being funded by outside sources and was not optimistic that tensions would ease anytime soon. Slim, who lives in Dahiyeh, a Hizballah-dominated southern Beirut suburb, said he personally knew of young Hizballah members and other militia-types who were traveling to Tripoli regularly to train fighters there. In addition, Slim believed that former Prime Minister Najib Mikati was involved with funding some of the armed groups. ¶14. (C) Mikati, Slim said, is positioning himself as an alternative to Saad Hariri. Not only is Mikati allegedly funneling money to armed groups, according to Slim, he is also undertaking social outreach initiatives, such as establishing mobile clinics to garner support. Slim speculated that Mikati and recently resigned, independent Shia MP Hussein Husseini were partnering up to improve Husseini's chances of joining a new government as Prime Minister if the opposition wins the majority in the 2009 elections. ¶15. (C) Slim said recent articles in the pan-Arab newspaper Al-Hayyat that were critical of Saad Hariri were calling Hariri's national leadership into question. Slim expressed concern that Hariri's image and influence in Tripoli were diminishing, while Mikati's and former Prime Minister and opposition supporter Omar Karami's images were on the rise. Slim said he was not personally confident efforts by Hariri's Future Movement would have much impact. (Note: Slim's comments came one day before Hariri made a three-day surprise visit to Tripoli. End note.) COMMENT -------------- ¶16. (C) Slim is a regular contact of the embassy in the independent Shia community. His concerns about the possibilities of success for moderate candidates, including independent Shia and their March 14 allies, are troubling, but not unfounded. On the issue of branding, we will need to assess carefully the risk-return tradeoff of how we position U.S. assistance during the electoral period as we move forward. SISON