LEBANON: LAF HELICOPTER ATTACK A HIZBALLAH ERROR?

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001296 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR PM A/S KIMMITT P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT/RAMCHAND DOD/OSD FOR ASD LONG E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: LAF HELICOPTER ATTACK A HIZBALLAH ERROR? REF: IIR 6 857 0351 08 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY AND COMMENT -------------- ¶1. (C) On August 28, a Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) helicopter operating in Hizballah-controlled territory was shot down, resulting in the death of an LAF officer. Details surrounding the incident remain unclear, although the LAF has begun a full investigation. Hizballah did not deny responsibility for the attack but the chief military prosecutor (please protect) does not believe Hizballah planned the attack. Occuring on the eve of the government's appointment of Jean Kahwagi as new LAF commander, this incident is yet another example of the ongoing confrontation between Hizballah and the GOL over the issue of Hizballah's weapons. Following Hizballah's May takeover of most of West Beirut and parts of Chouf and Aley, the August 28 helicopter incident represents a chink in the armor of Hizballah's claims that its weapons are exclusively for the purpose of the resistance. End summary and comment. HELICOPTER DOWNED IN HIZBALLAH TERRITORY -------------- ¶2. (C) On August 28 a Lebanese Armed Forces helicopter was shot down and one officer killed in an unprovoked attack in the southern region of Iqlim Al-Tuffah. The shooting reportedly occurred during a routine training flight, forcing the crew to make an emergency landing. No other injuries were reported. LAF RESPONDS -------------- ¶3. (C) Newly appointed LAF Commander Jean Kahwagi publicly pledged that the investigation into the shooting would "persist until all the details are disclosed." LAF sources assure us that it will handle the investigation according to the rule of law. Defense Minister Murr told the press on August 29 that "there are ongoing investigations conducted by both the military police and the LAF's military security, and we, as a defense ministry and institution and LAF consider handing in and detaining the perpetrator are the minimum we expect." (Comment: Some have speculated that the timing of the attack was a warning to the incoming LAF Commander -- named the day after the incident -- not to challenge Hizballah's arms. End comment.) HIZBALLAH HANDS OVER CULPRIT, BUT MUM ON RESPONSIBILITY -------------- ¶4. (SBU) On August 29, the day after the incident, Hizballah handed over an unidentified man as a suspect to investigators. Vowing to cooperate with the authorities, Hizballah did not acknowledge any responsibility, claiming the killing of the soldier was unintended and that the helicopter had been mistaken for an Israeli aircraft. Deputy Hizballah SYG Sheikh Naim Qassem denied the incident was meant to target the LAF, declaring that "(Hizballah) has one message to the LAF: we are with you in the same tunnel, and we will not let the 'Americanized' players ad those who look for evil doings play with us." SYG Hassan Nasrallah later stressed that such incidents would not lead to clashes between Hizballah and the LAF. CHIEF MILITARY JUDGE BELIEVES ATTACK NOT PLANNED -------------- ¶5. (S) Jean Fahd (strictly protect),the chief military judge who has been assigned the case, told DCM September 2 his view that Hizballah did not plan this attack. According to Fahd, the LAF notified UNIFIL some six weeks before the August 28 BEIRUT 00001296 002 OF 004 incident that it planned to conduct helicopter training in what is known as Area 31, including the site of the attack. The LAF began this training on August 19 and conducted at least three flights. Fahd said that after the third flight, Hizballah complained about the LAF flights to the G-2 for the south (probably referring to Col. Abbas Ibrahim, a Shia). Fahd said one of the issues not clear is what the south G-2 did with this information. The overall LAF G-2, BG Georges Khoury, has unofficial responsibility for liaison with Hizballah. ¶6. (C) Fahd said he believes, based on what he has seen so far, that the attack was not planned by Hizballah but rather was the action of an individual who believed he was attacking an Israeli helicopter. As evidence of that, Fahd noted several points. First, the individual who shot the LAF officer was "shocked" when he learned what he had done. Second, reports by the LAF officers who were first on the scene suggested that one individual had carried out the attack, rather than it being something more organized. Third, Hizballah is cooperating with judicial authorities, and have shown in their inteviews with investigators that they are unhappy about the incident. ¶7. (C) Fahd said when the investigative phase is finished, the investigating judge and he will decide if there is a basis for prosecuting the suspect. He estimated that would take some 3-4 months. He was confident normal judicial procedures would be followed. DETAILS REMAIN UNCLEAR -------------- ¶8. (C) Preliminary reports revealed no motives behind the attack; rather, the man who opened fire reportedly did so because he was suffering from tension, as were the rest of his comrades, who believed the helicopter was an Israeli military airdrop. LBC television also reported the helicopter was hit by three bullets, one of which penetrated the windshield and killed the officer. By 2 September, military investigators expanded their hypothesis to include the possibility that there was more than one person involved in the attack based on testimony by the co-pilot and other witnesses. Investigators reportedly have demanded Hizballah turn over three other men allegedly involved in the attack. LBC television reported that Hizballah was responding positively to investigators demands. ¶9. (S) The area of the shooting is a new training area for the LAF, which is aware that this is a sensitive area for Hizballah. An LAF Air Force intelligence officer (G-2) reportedly contacted LAF G-2 Director Georges Khoury requesting that his office conduct the required liaison with Hizballah prior to the incident. According to the LAF deputy G-2, this coordination never took place. The Air Force officer opined that Khoury had intentionally not informed Hizballah to create an incident to show why he should be selected as the next LAF commander (reftel). (Note: There was no independent verification that Khoury failed to communicate with the LAF operations desk. End note.) ¶10. (S) A conflicting version of the incident states that the officer was killed on the ground after the helicopter had landed to investigate if it had been hit by rounds impacting the fuselage. Upon landing, the co-pilot left the aircraft to inspect and was shot in the head about one meter from the helicopter. The helicopter commander got out to investigate and two shots were fired at him. He was met by the assailants and pushed to the ground and beaten. He confirmed these men were Hizballah members. When the helicopter failed to make a scheduled radio check, the LAF sent a second helicopter to inspect. As it approached the area, it also was fired upon. Hizballah members contacted the LAF Air Force HQ to warn them not to enter the area without prior coordination from Hizballah commanders. At that time coordination was made and a single vehicle entered the location with an additional pilot to fly the damaged helicopter out (reftel). POLITICAL LEADERS BEIRUT 00001296 003 OF 004 QUESTION HIZBALLAH'S INVOLVEMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) The helicopter downing was a major topic of conversation during NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary David Hale's August 26 - 31 visit to Lebanon. March 14 SYG Fares Souaid, meeting with Hale just after the incident on August 28, held an impromptu press conference in which he called the incident unacceptable and demanded that Hizballah turn over the individual(s) responsible for a full investigation. News outlets reported Souaid was the only official to accuse Hizballah. ¶12. (C) On August 29, March 14 Christian MP Boutros Harb, whose family hails from Hanna's hometown of Tannourine, called Hanna's death "an assassination." Even if the plane was shot down, he said, he had received information that the soldiers were alive when the plane was grounded, and killed afterwards. ¶13. (C) Druze March 14 MP Marwan Hamadeh told us that the army was in a "dreadful situation" following incident and other challenges to the LAF in recent years, including the recent debate over the new LAF commander. Hamadeh noted that the attack occurred in an area of immense strategic importance for Hizballah, at the crossroads of the Bekaa, south Lebanon, and Chouf Mountains, from which Hizballah could easily invade. ¶14. (C) Minister of Culture Tammam Salaam told DAS Hale August 30, one day after the cabinet named Kahwagi as the new LAF Commander, that the appointment should give the impression that security is under control. Instead, the helicopter incident represented a step backwards. Salaam did not believe Hizballah would be held accountable for the incident, but credited Hizballah for not being "arrogant" in its public statements on the incident. Salaam added that what was evolving between Hizballah and the GOL was a "security by consensus" understanding. ¶15. (C) Also on August 30, Minister of Agriculture Elias Skaff, calling the helicopter shooting an "accident," told us that the shooter was not targeting the helicopter; rather, the accident resulted from a random spray of fire. In a mumbled comment, not further elaborated, Skaff said the event "was not supposed to go this way." Skaff believed the situation would calm down now that an investigation has begun. Skaff claimed that helicopters routinely notify UNIFIL before flying over this region, adding that even President Sleiman had remarked that the locale of the incident was in a dangerous area. ¶16. (C) Minister of Finance Mohamad Chatah called the helicopter incident worrying in an August 31 meeting. Chatah said even if the LAF soldier had not been killed, the problem of who controls the airspace -- the state or Hizballah -- remains. Referring to the emergency cabinet meeting convened on August 29, Chatah said he was troubled that ministers were not "calling a spade, a spade" and directly confronting Hizballah about the incident. ¶17. (C) UNSCOL Chief of Staff Jack Christofides told us on August 31 that, although he had not yet discussed the incident with Hizballah, he did not believe Hizballah would risk "rocking the boat" in the run-up to the 2009 parliamentary elections. March 14 Druze Minister of State Wael Abu Four later told us that Wafiq Safa, Hizballah's security chief, had warned the LAF previously to stop flying in the area, but the message was not conveyed to the LAF operations department. Abu Four deemed the incident a very strong message from Hizballah to the LAF on the eve of Kahwagi's nomination, and suggested that the perpetrator handed over by Hizballah was not the real culprit. EMBARRASSMENT FOR AOUNISTS -------------- ¶18. (C) Hanna came from a family of Aoun/Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) supporters, putting Aoun, allied since 2006 BEIRUT 00001296 004 OF 004 with Hizballah, in a difficult situation, Druze MP Marwan Hamadeh told us on August 29. Aoun's top advisor, son-in-law, and recently appointed Telecom Minister Gebran Bassil's home in Betroun (where Hanna lived) was attacked the day of Hanna's funeral. On August 30, Bassil, refraining from mentioning Hizballah by name, expressed regret over what he called the "political manipulation" of Hanna's martyrdom. He praised the "serious investigation...and the cooperation by the related sides, which led to turning in the person who opened fire" at the helicopter, and said the incident should lead to agreement on the national defense strategy. The press reported on September 3 that residents of nearby Tannourine, home of Hanna's relatives, refused to accept Hizballah's condolences. A RED LINE FOR HIZBALLAH? -------------- ¶19. (SBU) The shooting created a stir of public controversy regarding the LAF's right to patrol areas considered to be Hizballah strongholds. News outlets highlighted comments from UNIFIL spokesperson Yasmina Bouziane, that "there are hostile elements working against the UNSCR 1701 and against stability..." March 14 SYG Fares Souaid asked rhetorically, "Do we now have no-fly zones like the off-limits security zones? Did Hizballah try to set a red line for the Lebanese Army on Lebanese territories?" Former minister Joe Sarkis stressed the shooting was "very dangerous and goes beyond an assassination attempt." ¶20. (SBU) Head of the Catholic archbishops o Sidon and Deir al-Kamar, Archbishop Elie Haddad disagreed, however, saying there are a thousand ways other than premeditated murder to illustrate that the resistance is a red line. He questioned why Hizballah would kill an "innocent martyr." Former opposition Druze minister Wiam Wahhab called on the LAF to focus its investigation not on who shot at the helicopter, but why the helicopter headed to Sujud in the first place. COMMENT -------------- ¶21. (C) Following Hizballah's May takeover of most of west Beirut and parts of the Chouf and Aley regions, the August 28 incident is yet another chink in the armor of Hizballah's claim that its weapons are exclusively for the purpose of the resistance. Although the full details are not yet clear (and may never be, given that this is Lebanon) March 14, the LAF, and the international community should seize the opportunity to demand once again that Hizballah be disarmed, UNSCR 1701 be implemented in full, and that the National Dialogue be convened immediately to address the national defense strategy. We are encouraged that the LAF is taking appropriate actions to investigate the incident, especially as this is one of the first times Hizballah's actions are legally questioned. Sadly, however, Hizballah probably will emerge relatively unscathed from this horrific act, as id did in May, demonstrating once again its knack for handling difficult public relations and the reluctance of most of Lebanon's political leaders to touch this political hot potato. SISON