LEBANON: MARCH 14 DRUZE MP REMINDS DAS HALE THAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001278

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, PM/FO
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK, WARLICK
P FOR HMUSTAFA, RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR ABRAMS/YERGER/MCDERMOTT
DOD/OSD A/S LONG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARCH 14 DRUZE MP REMINDS DAS HALE THAT
HIZBALLAH HAS NO INTENTION OF GIVING UP ITS ARMS

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) March 14 MP Marwan Hamadeh expressed concerns about
ongoing affronts to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and
Israeli actions benefiting Hizballah and Syria during his
August 29 meeting with visiting NEA Deputy Assistant
Secretary David Hale. Hamadeh predicted Hizballah would
either delay the 2009 parliamentary elections or challenge
the results if Hizballah's arms were threatened. According
to Hamadeh, the August 28 attack on a LAF helicopter occurred
in an area of south Lebanon that is of great strategic
importance to Hizballah. Meanwhile, the ongoing violence in
Tripoli in the north was creating a military vacuum in south
Lebanon as LAF troops were redeployed to the north to deal
with it. Hamadeh also stressed the need for the
international community to send strong signals that the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon was moving forward and that
justice would eventually prevail. End summary.

"WILL GUN POWER CHANGE
THE ARMY'S WILLPOWER?"
--------------


2. (C) NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary David Hale, accompanied
by Pol/Econ Chief and Senior LES Political Advisor, met with
Progressive Socialist Party MP Marwan Hamadeh, independent MP
Ghassan Tueini (owner and publisher of An-Nahar newspaper and
member of the 2006 National Dialogue),and Rosana Abou Monsif
(An-Nahar editorialist) at An-Nahar headquarters in downtown
Beirut on August 29, shortly before the cabinet appointed
General Jean Kahwagi as the next commander of the Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF).


3. (C) Hamadeh warned that the LAF was in a dreadful
situation. Citing the LAF's inaction during the one and a
half years of Hizballah's occupation of downtown Beirut, its
killing of civilians during clashes in Beirut early in the
year, its failures to prevent arms smuggling to the south, to
control security outside the Palestinian camps, and to
confront Hizballah in May, and, most recently, its
ineffectiveness in stopping the violence in Tripoli, Hamadeh
warned that the debate over the choice of LAF Commander was
the latest in a long list of events debilitating the Lebanese
army. Alluding to U.S. military assistance for the LAF,
Hamadeh wondered aloud, "Will gun power change the army's
willpower?"


4. (C) DAS Hale replied that the U.S. remained focused on and
committed to Lebanon, and that U.S. military assistance to
the LAF was important not only because of the needs of the
military, but also as a symbol of tangible U.S. support for
Lebanon and its institutions. The biggest challenge for
Lebanon was the continuing flow of arms to Hizballah, Hale
said, noting that reducing the flows would also help in
resolving Sheba'a Farms. UNSC Resolution 1701 must be
implemented, he stressed.


5. (C) Despite the recent turmoil, DAS Hale continued, the
Lebanese people were resilient and wanted independence.
Everyone seemed to want the Doha Accord to stick, he added,
and it needed to be implemented. Hale also stressed that
Christian unity was essential; throughout Lebanon's history,
Christian unity was good not only for the Christians but for
the country as a whole, and it was in their collective
interest to win the 2009 parliamentary elections, which would
determine the future of Lebanon. The U.S. was trying to
help, Hale stressed, but needed to be careful not to do or
say anything that might backfire against the March 14
majority.


6. (C) Hamadeh agreed that the U.S. needed to be careful in
supporting March 14, but warned that when the U.S. is too
quiet, its allies lose confidence while the enemies of the
U.S. perceive it as abandoning its friends whenever the

BEIRUT 00001278 002 OF 002


situation gets difficult or it no longer serves U.S.
interests. He predicted Hizballah would either prevent the
2009 parliamentary elections from occurring, or would
challenge the results. Hizballah's tactic now, he said, is
to delay the National Dialogue, possibly until the elections.
There will be no early or peaceful solution to the question
of Hizballah's arms, he stated.

ISRAEL BOOSTING
HIZBALLAH AND SYRIA
--------------


7. (C) Hamadeh and Abou Mansif complained that Israel's
policies toward Syria and Hizballah were boosting their
influence within Lebanon. They viewed the recent violence in
Tripoli and August 28 attack on a Lebanese Armed Forces
helicopter in south Lebanon as attempts to undermine the LAF
and create a power vacuum in the south.


8. (C) Lebanon had always suspected Israel of propping up the
Asad regime, Hamadeh said, commenting that notwithstanding
Israel's peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, the
Israeli-Syria relationship was the most stable. Tueini, a
fellow student of Henry Kissinger at Harvard, pointed to
Kissinger's memoirs, in which he claimed Hafez Asad had
consulted the Israelis on how far he could go before invading
Israel.


9. (C) Tueini complained that French President Sarkozy was
not helping either by assisting Bashar Asad build up a new
image. Hale responded that the U.S. position remained that
Syria must change its behavior and he enumerated the range of
objectionable policies; otherwise, Asad would continue his
practice of appearing to be forthcoming but in reality giving
nothing of significance.


10. (C) Hamadeh stressed the need for signals from the
international community that things are moving forward with
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which he called one of the
last products of the Cedar Revolution. He agreed with DAS
Hale that the process should not be politicized, arguing
instead that the focus should be on justice. We need to know
that justice will prevail, even if late, he said.


11. (C) The Lebanese also were at a loss to understand
Israel's continuing concessions to Hizballah, Hamadeh said,
which only boosted its credibility. Tueini agreed, adding
that the recent prisoner exchange was a "big bonus" for
Hizballah. Hamadeh, dubbing UNIFIL a "bunch of tourists"
south of the Litani River, acknowledged the symbolic and
psychological importance of maintaining a buffer zone between
Hizballah and Israel, but said UNIFIL was doing nothing
effectively on the ground. How is it possible, he said, that
in two years UNIFIL has not produced a single rifle?


12. (C) Hamadeh noted that the August 28 attack against a LAF
helicopter occurred in an area of immense strategic
importance for Hizballah, at the crossroads of the Bekaa,
south Lebanon, and Chouf Mountains, from which Hizballah
could easily invade the south. By fixating the LAF's
attention on Tripoli, Hamadeh said Syria was creating an
abyss in the south by forcing troops to redeploy to the
north. He noted that General Jean Kahwagi (whom the cabinet
named as LAF Commander shortly after the meeting) and General
Chikhani (the commander of the 10th brigade in the south) had
both been transferred to the north, leaving a vacuum of
experienced LAF leadership in the south.


13. (C) DAS Hale has cleared this cable.
SISON