LEBANON: WITH DAS HALE, SINIORA CRITICIZES U.S.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001266 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK PM FOR A/S KIMMIT P FOR HMUSTAPHA AND RRANGASWAMY USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR ABRAMS/YERGER/MCDERMOTT DOD/OSD FOR A/S LONG E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINR UNSC MARR IS IR SY LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: WITH DAS HALE, SINIORA CRITICIZES U.S. AND ISRAELI POLICY, WORRIES ABOUT MARCH 14 INFIGHTING Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In an August 27 meeting with NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary David Hale, Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora complained that the U.S. has not come through on its assistance promises and that USG assistance has been dwarfed by Iranian support for Hizballah. He said U.S. and Israeli mistakes had made Iran stronger, and that Israel's recent prisoner swap with Hizballah has only served to strengthen Hizballah as well. He appealed to the U.S. to push Israel on the Sheba'a Farms issue. Siniora also asked for USG help on demining and cluster bomb removal. ¶2. (C) On the Lebanese National Dialogue, Siniora worried that opposition parties were arguing for expanded participation and an expanded agenda in an effort to "fabricate problems" and delay the dialogue. He surmised that infighting in March 14 could hurt its chances in the spring 2009 elections. In reference to President Michel Sleiman's upcoming trip to Washington, Siniora told Hale and the Ambassador that it was essential the U.S. provide the President with concrete deliverables, or risk hurting his fledgling presidency. End summary. U.S. SUPPORT: ILLUSIONS AND BOUNCED CHECKS -------------- ¶3. (C) Visiting NEA DAS David Hale, accompanied by Ambassador, NEA/ELA Lebanon Desk Officer, and PolOffs, met with PM Siniora and his advisor Roula Noureddine on August 27 at Siniora's office in the Grand Serail. DAS Hale opened by addressing any misperception that the U.S. commitment to Lebanon had weakened. He pointed to the extensive support the U.S. is providing to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF). He asked Siniora for advice on what further tangible actions the U.S. cold undertake to demonstrate its continuing suppot. ¶4. (C) Siniora acknowledged that the USG had tried to help in certain ways, but said its financial and vocal support had not come close to equaling that provided to Hizballah by Iran. He claimed he had heard many ideas from various U.S. officials, but that many of those had turned out to be "illusions," and U.S. "checks bounced." He highlighted the need to safeguard Lebanon's democracy, and complained that with all the crises, attacks, and general instability in the country, Lebanon had received no real support. "We were about to be put on our knees," in May, he said, and would have collapsed were it not for the resilience of the Lebanese people. U.S.-ISRAELI MISTAKES MADE HIZBALLAH STRONGER; PROGRESS ON SHEBA'A WILL MAKE THEM WEAKER -------------- - ¶5. (C) Siniora said the Sheba'a Farms issue should have been resolved with UNSCR 1701 in August 2006 as a way to undercut Hizballah and its Iranian and Syrian allies. Furthermore, the Iraq invasion left a vacuum that has been filled by Iran. "You brought them into Iraq, Lebanon, and Gaza. You increased the level of radicalization and violence in the region," he said. He stressed that progress on the Arab-Israeli conflict was necessary to prevent further radicalization, and he suggested that regional powers like Egypt and Saudi Arabia could play a constructive restraining role against Syria and Iran. ¶6. (C) DAS Hale agreed that Iran was the overarching threat in the region, stressing that the U.S. has been working to find solutions that are relevant in each of the areas where Iran is attempting to wield its influence. The U.S. was making progress in Iraq, in the Israeli-Palestinian peace BEIRUT 00001266 002 OF 002 process, and on the multilateral nuclear track with Iran, he said. Hale also noted that in recent meetings, Egyptian and Jordanian leaders had expressed a desire to be helpful in Lebanon, perhaps by providing assistance to government institutions. He said the Secretary had repeatedly raised the Sheba'a Farms issue with the Israelis, but they were not convinced that eliminating the Sheba'a excuse would have an effect on Hizballah. He encouraged Siniora to approach the UN Secretary General about sending a technical team to Sheba'a to get the ball rolling. But meanwhile, DAS Hale stressed, the Israelis are alarmed at the continuing flow of arms to Hizballah across the Syrian border and wanted to see concrete progress on implementation of UNSCR 1701, as does the USG. ¶7. (C) Sidestepping DAS Hale's comment about arms flows to Hizballah, Siniora questioned the usefulness of a UN technical team in Sheba'a, and reiterated that Israeli withdrawal from Sheba'a would remove an important pretext for Hizballah's armed resistance. He said he did not understand how the Israeli government could negotiate a prisoner swap with Hizballah and "give them victory" while refusing to move on the Sheba'a issue. Siniora's advisor (and niece) Roula Noureddine commented on recent Israeli threats against Lebanon, saying it was odd for Israel to threaten the Lebanese government because of Hizballah, and yet say nothing about Syria's support for the party. She wondered if the Israelis were silent because of their ongoing indirect negotiations with the Syrians. INTERNAL ISSUES -------------- ¶8. (C) Turning to the National Dialogue, Siniora was analytical, saying, "We have had patience and prudence, but every day there is a problem" that has prevented the dialogue from starting. He assessed that the opposition parties have been "fabricating problems," suggesting additional participation and agenda items which have delayed the process. ¶9. (C) Asked about March 14's preparations for the 2009 parliamentary elections, Siniora said the March 14 parties need to find a coherent strategy and move out of "crisis management" mode. Minute differences on which parties should be allowed to present candidates for certain seats in key districts are dividing the leadership, he said. "Their opponents have weapons, will, organization, discipline, money, and media. March 14 has the support of the people, but their lack of focus may lead to trouble (in the elections)." USG HELP: "DO NO HARM" -------------- ¶10. (C) Ambassador Sison asked about plans for President Sleiman's upcoming trip to New York and Washington. Siniora stressed that it would be essential for Sleiman to receive deliverables from the visit "or else you will be harming him." ¶11. (C) Finally, responding to DAS Hale's question about what other concrete things the USG could do to help Lebanon, Siniora said there were many questions concerning the elections, and he wanted to make sure not to complicate matters further in that arena. "Do no harm?" asked DAS Hale. "Yes" Siniora responded. He asked for USG assistance on demining and cluster bomb removal. He worried about recent tension in Tripoli and elsewhere in the north, but stressed that it was important not to take sides. He said he hoped to find creative ways to calm things in Tripoli, perhaps by encouraging civil society to engage the community and not leave the field solely to the Salafists and extremists generally-speaking. ¶12. (C) DAS Hale has cleared this cable. SISON