LEBANON: GEMAYEL WITH HALE: CLEAR USG SUPPORT FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001262

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR IS LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: GEMAYEL WITH HALE: CLEAR USG SUPPORT FOR
LEBANON NEEDED

REF: BEIRUT 1225

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a August 27 meeting, former president and Kataeb
party leader Amine Gemayel told visiting NEA DAS David Hale
that a clear message from the U.S. would be critical for
Lebanon in its struggle against Iranian and Syrian attempts
to destabilize the country. Gemayel supported the idea of
indirect Lebanese talks with Israel on Sheba'a Farms;
however, he believes peace talks with Israel would not be on
the table. Gemayel said his Kataeb Party was "anxious" over
the upcoming parliamentary elections and said additional USG
support in the form of political communications consultants
would be welcomed. He also said President Sleiman's National
Dialogue agenda was unclear and added that Sleiman's
presidency had gotten off to "a slow start." DAS Hale
assured Gemayel that U.S. support to Lebanon remained firm
and would continue. End Summary.


2. (C) Visiting NEA DAS Davd Hale, accompanied by
Ambassador, NEA/ELA Lebano Desk Officer, and PolOffs, met
with the former resident and Kataeb (Phalange) Party leader
Amine Gemayel at the Kataeb headquarters in Beirut on August

27.

CLEAR SUPPORT FROM
THE USG IS CRUCIAL
--------------


3. (C) DAS Hale told Gemayel that the purpose of his visit
was to dispel any misperceptions that USG interest in Lebanon
had waned. He wanted to reaffirm USG commitment to
supporting Lebanese sovereignty and independence as well as
GOL institutions. DAS Hale added that the USG also wanted
Lebanon to implement fully UNSCRs 1559 and 1701. Gemayel
agreed that Lebanon needed to move forward on implementing
UNSCR's 1559 and 1701, and added that the Special Tribunal
for Lebanon also needed to be established. However, Gemayel
said Lebanon needed clear messages of support from the USG,
UN, France, and its other friends.


4. (C) Gemayel stressed his belief that Iran and Syria were
attempting to destabilize Lebanon through Hizballah and
referred to the May 2008 clashes between pro-government
forces and the Hizballah-led opposition as a clear example of
Iranian/Syrian attempts to exert influence over Lebanon.
Gemayel argued that USG statements calling the May clashes a
"domestic matter," take the spotlight off Iranian/Syrian
interference in Lebanon. DAS Hale was quick to point out to
Gemayel that the USG never referred to the May clashes as
solely a "domestic" Lebanese affair and that USG pressure on
Iran and Syria remains firm.


5. (C) Gemayel also expressed his frustration with the
French, using similar arguments he made to DCM and Poloff
during their August 19 meeting with Gemayel (reftel).
Gemayel said France was too quick to begin warming its
relations with Syria and that French statements supporting
Syria's supposed positive steps towards Lebanon only help the
March 8 opposition.

INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH
ISRAEL ON SHEBA'A OKAY
--------------


6. (C) Gemayel said the GOL should also consider indirect
talks with Israel over the Sheba'a Farms issue. He noted
that Syria was doing this through Turkish mediators and even
Hizballah negotiated with the Israelis through German and UN
mediation on the prisoner exchange. France, Jordan, or the
UN could serve as the third party negotiator between the GOL
and Israel over Sheba'a Farms, Gemayel added. Gemayel
dismissed the idea of direct Lebanese talks with Israel or
indirect talks on a peace treaty, suggesting that the
indirect talks cover only the Sheba'a Farms topic.

BEIRUT 00001262 002 OF 003




7. (C) In Gemayel's opinion, a solution to Sheba'a Farms
would remove Hizballah's excuse for holding on to its
weapons. DAS Hale agreed that Hizballah needed to be
stripped of this excuse and that the UN through Secretary
General Ban Ki Moon would be a perfect third party to help
Lebanon and Israel solve the issue of Sheba'a Farms. DAS
Hale suggested that the GOL should support SYG Moon's
proposed technical mission to Beirut, Damascus, and Jerusalem
concerning the disputed territory.

KATAEB ANXIOUS
OVER 2009 ELECTIONS
--------------


8. (C) Gemayel also announced that his Kataeb Party had a
four point platform that it will promote in the upcoming
elections: decentralization, secularism, neutrality, and a
Lebanon where, "dialogue is supported and nurtured between
the different domestic confessions and the international
community." He said he brought in a new consultant from
Booz, Allen, and Hamilton (BAH) Paris office, to serve as a
the party's chief planner for the 2009 parliamentary
elections. He added that Kataeb's work with the
International Republican Institute (IRI) had been helpful and
that they have an open dialogue with one another about the
party's different needs.

NATIONAL DIALOGUE
AGENDA UNCLEAR
--------------


9. (C) Gemayel also said President Sleiman's agenda for the
planned National Dialogue remained ambiguous. He said
Sleiman sent a envoy to talk to him about the National
Dialogue. Gemayel told the envoy that two issues needed to
be clarified in order for Kataeb to support the National
Dialogue agenda: defining Lebanese "Sovereignty" and defining
Hizballah's "allegiance."


10. (C) In reference to Lebanese sovereignty, Gemayel
pointed out that large area of Lebanon remained out of the
control of the GOL, referring to the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC) camp in
Qoussaya and Hizballah's control over Beirut's southern
suburbs. Healso wanted Hizballah to declare where its
allegances lie. He said Secretary General Hassan Nasralah
has made clear statements that his allegiance is to Iran's
leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Gemayel said in his opinion
the National Dialogue would not be successful without
clarifying these two issues. Gemayel said the President's
envoy did not state whether or not these topics would be on
the agenda.


11. (C) Gemayel also said President Sleiman had gotten off to
a slow start. He added that the first year is the most
important in any presidency and he also criticized Sleiman's
choices for advisors, saying he expected better. He argued
that the lack of a new LAF Commander was sending a very bad
signal and that Sleiman should work with PM Siniora to solve
fill this vacancy immediately. DAS Hale said it was better
to choose the right man for leadership of the LAF, than to
choose the wrong man in a hurry.

HOW THE USG CAN HELP LEBANON
--------------


12. (C) Besides sending a clear political message, Gemayel
said the U.S. could support March 14 by continuing to provide
expertise on how March 14 can improve its communication
strategy. He also argued that March 14 could use
organizational advice in preparation for the 2009
parliamentary elections. Gemayel said the work with IRI had
been helpful and he welcomed additional support from other
institutions as well.


13. (C) DAS Hale said USG support of the Internal Security
Forces (ISF) and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) would be another
tangible way that the USG could show its support to Lebanon

BEIRUT 00001262 003 OF 003


and counter Hizballah and that this would remain a priority
for the USG. Gemayel argued that continued LAF support is
key, but clear political support would be needed, or else the
LAF assistance would go to waste. DAS Hale also said Lebanon
had friends in the region referring to Egypt and Jordan, and
ended the meeting saying that he was very encouraged by their
discussion


14. (U) DAS Hale has cleared this cable.
SISON