Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BEIRUT1249
2008-08-25 16:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: LEBANON'S SALAFISTS GROUPS: NEITHER

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC LE MARR MOPS SY 
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PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #1249/01 2381631
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251631Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2846
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2782
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3022
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001249 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK
P FOR HMUSTAPHA AND RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC LE MARR MOPS SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: LEBANON'S SALAFISTS GROUPS: NEITHER
JIHADISTS NOR MONOLITHIC

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. William Grant for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001249

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK
P FOR HMUSTAPHA AND RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC LE MARR MOPS SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: LEBANON'S SALAFISTS GROUPS: NEITHER
JIHADISTS NOR MONOLITHIC

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. William Grant for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Many in Lebanon were surprised when Shia-dominated
Hizballah signed a memorandum of understanding on August 18
with some Salafist Sunni groups in the northern city of
Tripoli, ostensibly to reduce Shia-Sunni tensions that had
produced violent clashes and deaths there. Then, the next
day, one of the Salafist leaders who had signed the MOU
renounced it, or at least said it should be "frozen". This
prompted us to look at the Salafist groups. Many groups
exist, but they are not monolithic. Most observers do not
consider Lebanon's Salafists as "jihadists." Tripoli is a
stronghold of several such groups. Hizballah's efforts to
reach out to them could be an effort for the 2009 elections
to take Sunni votes away from majority leader Saad Hariri and
his Future Movement, part of the March 14 majority. End
summary.

LEBANESE SALAFI vs.
JIHADI TRADITION
--------------


2. (C) Lebanon's Salafist groups, generally, cannot be
labeled as "jihadists." Embassy sources tell us Lebanese
Salafists worship Allah, perform charitable acts and follow
closely the other tenets of Islam. However, they do not
traditionally cite Koranic verses that reference the use of
the "sword" or espouse violent jihad. The call for violent
jihad, believed to have originated among Saudi Arabia's
Salafist jihadist groups, has not been adopted widely in
Lebanon.


3. (C) Salafists groups in the northern city of Tripoli are
believed to each have ties to individual Arabian Gulf
countries, such as Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates,
and Saudi Arabia. Although a minority of Lebanese Salafists
try to emulate the jihadist groups in the Gulf, there is
little apparent appetite in Lebanon for jihadist philosophy
or tactics.

SALAFISTS INFLUENTIAL IN TRIPOLI
--------------


4. (SBU) Tripoli experienced a wave of armed clashes in July
2008 between Sunni and Shia groups. In early August, a bus
bombing that targeted the Lebanese Armed Forces and resulted
in the deaths of soldiers and civilians added to tensions
there. Subsequently, politicians across the political
spectrum, including Salafist and religious leaders in
Tripoli, urged calm and called for Lebanese unity.


5. (SBU) Many different groups in Sunni regions in Lebanon

identify themselves as "Salafist." However, the most
discussed in the media are located in Tripoli. The
MEPI-funded Lebanese NGO CESMO (Centre d'Etude Strategiques
pour Le Moyen-Orient) assessed that there are at least seven
influential Salafist groups in Tripoli alone. These seven
constitute a strong voting bloc and are influential. As a
group, they are often courted by local politicians.

BUT NOT MONOLITHIC
--------------


6. (SBU) While Tripoli's Salafists groups often cooperate,
they are not monolithic. On August 18, (Shia) Hizballah
signed a memorandum of understanding with 15 Lebanese (Sunni)
Salafist groups which called for a ban on the use of violence
to settle Shia-Sunni political disputes and dialogue.
However, on August 19, the leader of one of the influential
Salafists groups in Tripoli that had signed the agreement,
Hassan Al-Shahhal, announced that the MOU would be "frozen"
to allow more time to study the issue.


7. (SBU) Shahhal's backpedaling was the result of public
rejection of the agreement by several leaders of Lebanon's
other Salafist groups. Da'ii Al-Islam Al-Shahhal, his cousin

BEIRUT 00001249 002 OF 002


and the founder of the Lebanese Salafist Movement, took
Shahhal to task. In a press conference on August 19, Da'ii
Al-Islam called for additional study and consultation before
beginning a dialogue. Other groups which publicly rejected
the MOU included The Islamic Grouping and government majority
leader Saad Hariri's Future Movement, which is Sunni
dominated.


8. (SBU) Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah said he was
surprised by the reaction to the MOU, but remained open to
dialogue.

COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) Shia-Sunni tension in Tripoli concerns many of our
contacts. Some fear Syria will use it as a pretext to
justify the return of Syrian forces to Lebanon. Others view
the steps to arrange a Salafist-Hizballah MOU as a response
to the inability of Sunni leadership to protect Lebanon's
Sunni population in heavily Sunni Tripoli and elsewhere. We
believe the possibility of such an agreement also has
political implications and should not be viewed through the
prism of terrorism alone. Lebanon's Salafist groups
represent one of the political factions that will have an
impact the outcome of 2009 parliamentary election if they are
close. It is possible that an alliance between Shia
Hizballah and Salafist groups, or other Sunni groups, could
provide Hizballah with an electoral benefit in areas such as
Tripoli. If the Hizballah-dominated opposition could gain
one or a few seats in an area like Tripoli where Hizballah
traditionally has not been strong, it could help tip the
balance in the election between the current majority and
opposition.
GRANT

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