LEBANON: LEBANON'S SALAFISTS GROUPS: NEITHER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001249 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK P FOR HMUSTAPHA AND RRANGASWAMY USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/MCDERMOTT E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC LE MARR MOPS SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: LEBANON'S SALAFISTS GROUPS: NEITHER JIHADISTS NOR MONOLITHIC Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. William Grant for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Many in Lebanon were surprised when Shia-dominated Hizballah signed a memorandum of understanding on August 18 with some Salafist Sunni groups in the northern city of Tripoli, ostensibly to reduce Shia-Sunni tensions that had produced violent clashes and deaths there. Then, the next day, one of the Salafist leaders who had signed the MOU renounced it, or at least said it should be "frozen". This prompted us to look at the Salafist groups. Many groups exist, but they are not monolithic. Most observers do not consider Lebanon's Salafists as "jihadists." Tripoli is a stronghold of several such groups. Hizballah's efforts to reach out to them could be an effort for the 2009 elections to take Sunni votes away from majority leader Saad Hariri and his Future Movement, part of the March 14 majority. End summary. LEBANESE SALAFI vs. JIHADI TRADITION -------------- ¶2. (C) Lebanon's Salafist groups, generally, cannot be labeled as "jihadists." Embassy sources tell us Lebanese Salafists worship Allah, perform charitable acts and follow closely the other tenets of Islam. However, they do not traditionally cite Koranic verses that reference the use of the "sword" or espouse violent jihad. The call for violent jihad, believed to have originated among Saudi Arabia's Salafist jihadist groups, has not been adopted widely in Lebanon. ¶3. (C) Salafists groups in the northern city of Tripoli are believed to each have ties to individual Arabian Gulf countries, such as Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. Although a minority of Lebanese Salafists try to emulate the jihadist groups in the Gulf, there is little apparent appetite in Lebanon for jihadist philosophy or tactics. SALAFISTS INFLUENTIAL IN TRIPOLI -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Tripoli experienced a wave of armed clashes in July 2008 between Sunni and Shia groups. In early August, a bus bombing that targeted the Lebanese Armed Forces and resulted in the deaths of soldiers and civilians added to tensions there. Subsequently, politicians across the political spectrum, including Salafist and religious leaders in Tripoli, urged calm and called for Lebanese unity. ¶5. (SBU) Many different groups in Sunni regions in Lebanon identify themselves as "Salafist." However, the most discussed in the media are located in Tripoli. The MEPI-funded Lebanese NGO CESMO (Centre d'Etude Strategiques pour Le Moyen-Orient) assessed that there are at least seven influential Salafist groups in Tripoli alone. These seven constitute a strong voting bloc and are influential. As a group, they are often courted by local politicians. BUT NOT MONOLITHIC -------------- ¶6. (SBU) While Tripoli's Salafists groups often cooperate, they are not monolithic. On August 18, (Shia) Hizballah signed a memorandum of understanding with 15 Lebanese (Sunni) Salafist groups which called for a ban on the use of violence to settle Shia-Sunni political disputes and dialogue. However, on August 19, the leader of one of the influential Salafists groups in Tripoli that had signed the agreement, Hassan Al-Shahhal, announced that the MOU would be "frozen" to allow more time to study the issue. ¶7. (SBU) Shahhal's backpedaling was the result of public rejection of the agreement by several leaders of Lebanon's other Salafist groups. Da'ii Al-Islam Al-Shahhal, his cousin BEIRUT 00001249 002 OF 002 and the founder of the Lebanese Salafist Movement, took Shahhal to task. In a press conference on August 19, Da'ii Al-Islam called for additional study and consultation before beginning a dialogue. Other groups which publicly rejected the MOU included The Islamic Grouping and government majority leader Saad Hariri's Future Movement, which is Sunni dominated. ¶8. (SBU) Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah said he was surprised by the reaction to the MOU, but remained open to dialogue. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Shia-Sunni tension in Tripoli concerns many of our contacts. Some fear Syria will use it as a pretext to justify the return of Syrian forces to Lebanon. Others view the steps to arrange a Salafist-Hizballah MOU as a response to the inability of Sunni leadership to protect Lebanon's Sunni population in heavily Sunni Tripoli and elsewhere. We believe the possibility of such an agreement also has political implications and should not be viewed through the prism of terrorism alone. Lebanon's Salafist groups represent one of the political factions that will have an impact the outcome of 2009 parliamentary election if they are close. It is possible that an alliance between Shia Hizballah and Salafist groups, or other Sunni groups, could provide Hizballah with an electoral benefit in areas such as Tripoli. If the Hizballah-dominated opposition could gain one or a few seats in an area like Tripoli where Hizballah traditionally has not been strong, it could help tip the balance in the election between the current majority and opposition. GRANT