LEBANON: MARCH 14 MP BOUTROS HARB: BRIDGING THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001241

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK AND PDAS WARLICK
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARCH 14 MP BOUTROS HARB: BRIDGING THE
CHRISTIAN DIVIDE?

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. William Grant for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) MP Boutros Harb told Charge Grant in an August 20
meeting that the March 14 coalition faces two problems:
relations between March 14 Christians and Muslims/Druze, and
relations among March 14 Christians. Expressing concern that
divisions within March 14 will result in failure in the 2009
parliamentary elections, Harb relayed that March 14 Christian
leaders have approached Sunni MP and March 14 leader Saad
Hariri on addressing this and Hariri seems receptive. Harb
thinks March 14 can achieve a simple majority.


2. (C) Harb also said he is working on bridging the Christian
divide by bringing together two fellow March 14 Christians,
Kataeb leader and former President Amine Gemayel and Lebanese
Forces leader Samir Geagea. He mentioned he is encouraging
President Michel Sleiman to form an independent bloc, which
could decrease the opposition's chances to secure a simple
majority. End summary.

CHRISTIAN IN-FIGHTING
THREATENS MARCH 14
--------------


3. (C) Boutros Harb, a prominent Christian MP from the March
14 coalition, told Charge Grant, PolOff and Senior LES
Political Advisor on August 20 that March 14 faces two
problems: relations between March 14 Christians and
Muslims/Druze, and relations among Christians. On the former
issue, Harb said that March 14 leaders "needed to be as smart
as Hizballah," referring to Hizballah's recent tactic of
awarding its allies with cabinet seats, instead of nominating
its own members to be ministers. He noted that March 14
Christian leaders have started discussing this issue with
Sunni MP and March 14 leader Saad Hariri, who Harb said was
"improving, but still prefers to hold behind-the-door
meetings, rather than discussing issues as a group."


4. (C) Harb said he is working on bridging the Christian
divide within March 14, and that he hosted a dinner two days
earlier for this very purpose with Kataeb leader and former
President Amine Gemayel and Lebanese Forces leader Samir
Geagea. Gemayal and Geagea, nominally allies in March 14,
are rivals for Christian support. Harb warned that if the
alliance is not unified in the lead-up to the 2009
parliamentary elections, it could mean the end of March 14,
an outcome that Harb dubbed the "greatest service we could
offer Hizballah."


5. (C) Harb expressed optimism, saying that Gemayel and
Geagea agreed to form sub-committees of advisors charged with
tackling issues together. Harb stressed that the ultimate
goal is March 14 electoral success, rather than a gain in
seats to any particular party within the alliance. Harb was
critical, however, of the March 14 Secretariat, claiming he
was not consulted about its formation or activities.

POSSIBILITY REMAINS FOR AN
INDEPENDENT PRESIDENTIAL BLOC
--------------


6. (C) In the 2009 election, no side will win a two-thirds
majority, Harb asserted, and March 14's goal therefore should
be to secure a simple majority, which he believes is
possible. He stressed that a national unity government was
not sustainable because it was limited in what it could
accomplish. It is necessary for the 2009 parliamentary
elections to produce a majority and an opposition.


7. (C) If the March 14 alliance determines it cannot get the
necessary number of votes to secure a simple majority on its
own, it should encourage President Sleiman to form his own
bloc, so as to ensure Hizballah and its opposition allies do
not get a simple majority. Saying that he had raised this
issue with Sleiman, Harb concluded that Sleiman may pursue
this path if he is confident that he can successfully form an
independent bloc. Harb said he is encouraging Sleiman, and

BEIRUT 00001241 002 OF 002


even suggested he would join Seiman's bloc.


8. (C) Harb said that it remains o be seen how MP Michel
Murr, who was formerly allied with Free Patriotic Movement
leader Michel Aoun, will position himself for the elections.
Harb speculated that if Murr is confident he can defeat Aoun,
he will remain independent. However, Harb continued, Murr is
pragmatic and acts out of self-interest and if he feels
threatened by Aoun, he could join an independent group formed
by Sleiman.

COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) Although ostensibly a member of March 14, Harb often
is at the fringe of the alliance and has had conflicts with
others in the coalition. That is one of the reasons he is
not in the inner circle of March 14 members who must be
consulted before a decision is made. His was one of seven
names put forward by the Maronite Patriarch in the fall of
2007 as possible presidential candidates. Harb saw himself
as the consensus candidate since he believed he was the only
March 14 politician capable of winning Parliament Speaker
Nabih Berri's support. At that time, Harb irked some of his
March 14 colleagues by agreeing with Berri that a two-thirds
majority was required in parliament to elect a president
(effectively sabotaging the candidacies of others in March 14
who could only secure a simple majority). Harb's attachment
to March 14 was further strained when the March 14
Secretariat failed to consult him on policy platform paper.
End comment.
GRANT