LEBANON: MARCH 14 SECRETARIAT PERCEIVES MARCH 8

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001197 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK P FOR HMUSTAPHA AND RRANGASWAMY USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/MCDERMOTT E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC LE SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARCH 14 SECRETARIAT PERCEIVES MARCH 8 "SPLIT" REF: A. BEIRUT 1188 ¶B. BEIRUT 1180 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. William Grant for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) March 14 Secretary General (SYG) Fares Souaid and member Samir Franjieh report that March 14 is preparing to capitalize on what it perceives as a split between the "Syrian March 8" and "Iranian March 8" in an attempt to attract voters -- especially Christian voters who usually support Michel Aoun -- to March 14. Souaid and Franjieh were optimistic March 14 would be able to maintain a unified, coalition message during the 2009 parliamentary elections. However, both acknowledged some hesitancy on the part of the March 14 political leadership to move beyond their individual parties to present a themselves as one coalition. They viewed the August 13 bombing in Tripoli as a "bloody message" to Syria and President Michel Sleiman not to discount Hizballah's weapons. Souaid and Franjieh said most March 14 members preferred BG Georges Khoury as LAF commander, despite Saad Hariri's objections. End summary. SYRIAN MARCH 8 vs. IRANIAN MARCH 8? -------------- ¶2. (C) In an August 13 meeting with Pol/Econ Chief, PolOff, and Senior LES Political Advisor, March 14 SYG Fares Souaid and MP Samir Franjieh described what they termed "a political split" occurring between the "pro-Syrian" March 8 (led by Amal leader and Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri, and the "pro-Iranian" March 8 (led by Hizballah MP Ali Ammar). Souaid noted that Berri did not appear displeased with March 14 MPs attacks against Hizballah during the parliamentary debate over the ministerial statement, giving March 14 MPs such as Tripoli bloc MP Mosbah Ahdab free reign to criticize. The Secretariat would highlight this perceived split in upcoming press statements in an effort to draw voters to March 14 and away from March 8/Aoun, he said. ¶3. (C) In addition, Souaid said the surprise August 12 resignation declaration of independent Shia MP Hussein al Husseini from parliament prior to the vote of confidence signaled problems between Syria and Hizballah. Husseini, he explained, was close to the Syrians and was on Hizballah's list in the 2005 elections. In Souaid's view, Husseini's speech was a "precaution" against problems between Syria and Hizballah by putting himself under the "umbrella" of former Amal Imam Moussa Sadr. According to Franjieh, Husseini's resignation came as a complete surprise to the parliament, including the Hizballah MPs. HIZBALLAH ARMS A MAJOR PART OF MARCH 14 ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN -------------- ¶4. (C) 50 March 14 MPs took to the podium during the parliamentary debate on the ministerial statement (Ref A), with almost all of them raising the issue of Hizballah's arms, Souaid noted. Souaid and Franjieh believed the debate was a good demonstration of March 14 coalition members staying on message. They were optimistic the same will happen during the 2009 campaign. Souaid affirmed that March 14 would use the issue of Hizballah's arms in its pre-election campaign strategy to attract Sunni, Druze, and Christian March 8 voters away from Michel Aoun. Pol/Econ Chief, citing recent polls indicating the economy as the major voter concern, stressed the importance of presenting a positive, proactive program as well to demonstrate to voters what March 14 intends to do to better the lives of ordinary Lebanese citizens. ¶5. (C) The March 14 secretariat published a letter to all of the political parties within its coalition the week of August 4 calling for each of the parties to display the March 14 logo on their websites and include links to the other parties, Souaid said. He reported that the response from the BEIRUT 00001197 002 OF 003 parties has been positive, and this is the first step in creating a common platform for the 2009 parliamentary elections. Furthermore, he had been in touch with the advisor in charge of Hariri's Future Movement electoral machin, Faleh Farroukh, to begin coordinating strategies ¶6. (C) Franjieh expressed concerns about March 14's image in the eyes of the public. He said he sensed that voters might be willing to vote for March 14, but not necessarily for a particular party or party candidate list. Franjieh said he is pushing for March 14 to adopt a unified message across the board and to choose candidates that March 14 can "defend." He acknowledged that perhaps not all candidates would be known until late in the process, but he is wary of the perception that there could be more than one March 14 candidate list, thus lessening the effectiveness of the March 14 message. ¶7. (C) Neither Souaid nor Franjieh downplayed the hesitancy of some March 14 political party leaders to identify themselves as March 14 first. However, Souaid was adamant that the Secretariat's message is starting to get through to the leaders through slow, consistent pressure to adopt a unified vision of "prosperity and peace" and present themselves as a coalition with no links to Hizballah and with no "blood on its hands." Souaid said that the approach to the 2009 elections would not follow the contentious negotiations among the March 14 blocs leading up to cabinet formation. TRIPOLI A "BLOODY MESSAGE" -------------- ¶8. (C) Souaid called the August 13 bomb attack against a civilian bus carrying several Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) soldiers in Tripoli a "bloody message" from Hizballah to Syria and to President Michel Sleiman not to discount Hizballah or its weapons. The August 13 bus bombing in Tripoli was also an effort to influence the choice of the next new LAF commander, he added. Receiving a phone call from Saad Hariri, Souaid reported that Hariri was asking the Secretariat to go to Tripoli as a demonstration of support for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and to include a statement condemning the attack in its upcoming press conference. MARCH 14, HARIRI DIFFER IN PREFERENCE FOR LAF COMMANDER -------------- ¶9. (C) According to Franjieh, March 14 would prefer to see G-2 Intelligence Director BG Georges Khoury become the next LAF Commander, calling him "pure Lebanese" and the best candidate of those being discussed (Ref B). Saad Hariri, however, does not want Khoury in the job, explaining that Hariri holds Khoury responsible for allowing the wave of assassinations, including that of Hariri's father former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, during the last several years. Furthermore, Hariri's intelligence advisor, Ghassan Balaa, did not get along with Khoury. Franjieh said Antoine Karim, who had played a good role with Qornet Shewan (the Christian grouping that was a precursor to March 14) would be the best candidate for commander. ¶10. (C) Souaid and Franjieh assessed Defense Minister Elias Murr as "a little bit Syrian, a little bit American, but not Iranian." They believe Murr aspires to become the leader of the Orthodox community and close to President Sleiman. During the clashes in May 2008, Franjieh said Murr tended to take a "middle" position, closer to Sleiman. COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) March 14's assessment of competing alliances within the March 8 coalition is plausible, and reflects perceptions here (wishful thinking?) of a possible Syria/Iran split. Despite Souaid's previous assertions that he has no interest in running an electoral campaign, viewing his role primarily as developing March 14's political program, it appears the BEIRUT 00001197 003 OF 003 Secretariat is now thinking about March 14's electoral strategy. However, we do not yet sense that March 14 has come to a consensus on its electoral message, other than being the alternative to Hizballah and its arms. ¶12. (C) A MEPI funded IRI program is working with March 14 leaders and the Secretariat to provide strategic communication advice to March 14. IRI held a conference on August 12 that appears to have been successful in focusing the Secretariat on the need to develop a cohesive electoral strategy. ¶13. (C) We hope March 14 leaders will buy into the idea of presenting candidates on a joint March 14 list, rather than adopt the partisan politics displayed in the ugly internal battle over cabinet formation, whose scars -- especially among March 14 Christians -- still linger. Unfortunately, we predict the fight over whose candidates appear on which lists will be even uglier. Nevertheless, it is heartening to hear the Secretariat using the term "coalition," a new development, suggesting that the shift has begun from March 14 being a grouping of political blocs whose only common interest is winning the 2009 elections to a mature political coalition. GRANT