LEBANON: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF GENERAL DAVID

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001133

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SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, PM/FO
ALSO FOR IO A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK
P FOR HMUSTAPHA AND RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC LE MARR MOPS SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF GENERAL DAVID
PETRAEUS

REF: A. BEIRUT 1112

B. BEIRUT 1104

C. BAGHDAD 2298

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. William Grant for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) General Petraeus, Welcome to Lebanon. Your visit
provides another excellent opportunity to reinforce our
message of strong, continued U.S. government support for a
sovereign, independent, and democratic Lebanon. Your visit
continues a series of high-level USG contacts since President
Sleiman was elected on May 25, including Secretary Rice,
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman, Assistant
Secretary of Defense Mary Beth Long, CENTCOM J5 Policy and
Planning Director Major General Allardice, CODEL Rahall, and
State's Director of Policy Planning David Gordon. President
Bush has invited President Michel Sleiman to visit
Washington, a trip that is expected to occur on the margins
of the UN General Assembly in September.

POLITICAL OVERVIEW
--------------


2. (C) There have been significant political developments
since May 2008, when the government's decision to dismantle
Hizballah's communications systems and remove the chief of
airport security sparked armed clashes between Hizballah and
Lebanese civilians. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) did
little to intervene, leading many to question the LAF's
effectiveness. The Qatari-brokered "Doha Agreement" of May
21 ended the political impasse and paved the way for the May
25 election of consensus candidate and former Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman as president. After
much wrangling between the majority and opposition, Sleiman
asked PM Siniora to form a national unity government on July
11, composed, as per the Doha Agreement, of 16 majority
ministers, 11 from the opposition (the so-called "blocking
third"),and three for President Sleiman.


3. (C) The new cabinet currently is close to completing its
"ministerial statement" to parliament outlining the
government's program, which parliament must approve.
Hizballah's arms and the role of the "resistance", code for
Hizballah, remain the key sticking points. Predictions are
that the ministerial committee drafting the statement will
agree on August 1, with final approval by parliament a week
later. Should these issues not be addressed in the
ministerial statement, they probably will be referred to the
National Dialogue process that President Sleiman pledged to
convene as part of the Doha Agreement.

SPORADIC VIOLENCE
IN THE NORTH
--------------


4. (C) There is speculation that the disagreements over the
ministerial statement and efforts to pressure the Siniora
government are the cause of recent clashes in the Tripoli
area in north Lebanon (Ref B). The LAF did not initially
perform well after deploying to Tripoli, but now appears to
have the situation under control. However, the security
situation in Tripoli remains tense.

2009 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
--------------


5. (C) The May 2009 parliamentary elections will be pivotal
in shaping the country's direction. The majority March 14
coalition is still formulating its message for the elections,
while the Hizballah-led opposition, in its typical,
disciplined fashion, is further along in its election
strategy. With the outcome of Shia- and Sunni-dominated
districts predictable, all parties view winning the Christian
vote in key districts as important to the determination of
which side will get the parliamentary majority. The Shia

BEIRUT 00001133 002 OF 002


vote is almost entirely with Hizballah and its allies in the
opposition. The Sunni vote is almost entirely with Saad
Hariri and the current "March 14" majority. The Christian
vote is split between the two.

HARIRI'S VISIT TO IRAQ: MOVING
THE LEBANESE CLOSER TO NAJAF
--------------


6. (C) As you are aware, Saad Hariri, son of assassinated
former PM Rafik Hariri and leader of the majority March 14
coalition, visited Iraq on July 17 (Ref C). Saad called his
trip "very good" in that it shocked Hizballah and improved
his relationship with the Lebanese Shia (Ref A). He
explained his purpose was to show that the Iraqi Shia are
Arabs and not Iranians. Another goal was to reinforce the
position of the holy city of Najaf to counter the Iranian
influence represented by Qom. Hariri plans to facilitate
future visits to Iraq by Lebanese Shia students to deepen the
relationship with Najaf. In his view, Iraq is moving "away
from an Iranian agenda," which he predicted would have a
"tremendous" impact on Lebanon. Hariri's trip to Iraq
generated positive reactions in Lebanon and improved his
standing in the eyes of independent Lebanese Shia because of
his meeting with Ayatollah Sistani, which lessened
perceptions many Lebanese Shia have that he is "an American
agent."

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE
--------------


7. (S/NF) Despite recent disappointing performances in Beirut
and Tripoli, the LAF performed surprisingly well in 2007 to
defeat Islamic extremists in the Nahr al-Barid Palestinian
refugee camp, in part thanks to expedited U.S. assistance.
The U.S. is providing the LAF a robust military package of
equipment and training (over $410 million out of a total U.S.
assistance package of over $1 billion since the 2006
Hizballah-Israel war). Nevertheless, PM Siniora and Hariri
continue to stress the need for upgraded assistance and
accelerating existing programs. Hariri, in particular,
repeatedly raises the need for attack helicopters, most
recently with Secretary Rice and Eric Edelman, stressing that
attack helicopters would have enabled the LAF to defeat Fatah
al-Islam extremists in Nahr al-Barid more quickly and to
stand up to Hizballah in May. U/S Edelman is working on
options to present to Defense Minister Elias Murr. PM
Siniora has also complained of the slowness with which
requests for USG-security assistance are processed.

RELATIONS WITH SYRIA
--------------


8. (C) President Sleiman met his Syrian conterpart, Bashar
Asad, in Paris on the sidelinesof the Union for the
Mediterranean meeting in July. Following their meeting,
Sleiman accepted Asad's invitation to visit Damascus and has
told us he will go soon after the cabinet finishes work on
the ministerial statement. Syria has said it wants to
establish diplomatic relations with Lebanon and is willing to
discuss issues such as border demarcation and the status of
Lebanese citizens detained in Syria. However, many Lebanese
observers believe Syria will slow-roll the process of
exchanging embassies and is only paying lip service to
Lebanese sovereignty. Our March 14 contacts continuously
stress the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon as the only "big
stick" capable of thwarting Syrian interference, and
criticize what they view as slow progress in establishing the
Tribunal.
GRANT