DASD SEDNEY DISCUSSES CROSS-STRAIT MILITARY ISSUES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 004696

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2033
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS PARM MOPS CH TW
SUBJECT: DASD SEDNEY DISCUSSES CROSS-STRAIT MILITARY ISSUES
WITH PRC TAIWAN AFFAIRS OFFICE DEPUTY

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson.
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Military deployments on both sides of the
Taiwan Strait reflect the continuing state of
hostility between the Mainland and Taiwan, State
Council Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Deputy Director
Sun Yafu told visiting Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense (DASD) David Sedney on December 19. China's
policy is to end the state of hostility, achieve a
peace agreement and implement military confidence-
building measures (CBMs),Sun stated. China has been
slow to move on more sensitive cross-Strait issues,
including military deployments, because conditions are
"not yet ripe" and Beijing is concerned that trying to
move too fast on sensitive issues could lead to
another cross-Strait "breach." Low-level discussions
of military CBMs should be possible, but China "does
not know how to start." Sun warned against too much
U.S. "pressure" to reduce PLA missile deployments,
urging Washington to "trust" that China is "sincerely
trying" to end the cross-Strait state of hostility.
DASD David Sedney commended recently improved cross-
Strait relations but urged Beijing to do more to
assuage Taiwan's concerns and reduce Chinese military
deployments aimed at Taiwan. DASD Sedney expressed
his expectation that U.S policy on Taiwan, consistent
over many administrations, would continue to be so.
End Summary.

APPRECIATION FOR "RESTRAINING" CHEN SHUI-BIAN
--------------


2. (C) Visiting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(DASD) for Asia-Pacific Security Affairs David Sedney
met with State Council Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO)
Deputy Director Sun Yafu on December 19 to discuss
cross-Strait military issues. Deputy Director Sun
thanked the U.S. for its "support" on the Taiwan
issue over the past three years, particularly in
"restraining" former Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian's
efforts to promote "Taiwan independence." Over the
past six months, there have been "major changes" in
cross-Strait relations, Sun stated. Referring to the
upcoming change in administration in the United
States, Sun asked DASD Sedney to share his views on
cross-Strait relations and U.S. policy on Taiwan in
the new administration.

CHINA SHOULD REDUCE THE MILITARY THREAT
--------------


3. (C) The concerns of 15 months ago, when Chen Shui-
bian was pursuing a referendum on Taiwan's
participation in the UN, are much different than those
of today, DASD Sedney remarked. The United States
played an important role in preserving peace in the
Strait and is pleased with the recent progress in
cross-Strait relations, which Washington hopes to see
continue. In recent meetings with Taiwan officials,
DASD Sedney noted, his interlocutors welcomed the
improvement of cross-Strait ties but some expressed
doubt about the real and lasting benefit of relations
with the Mainland. It therefore is important for the
Mainland and Taiwan to take advantage of the current
"historic opportunity," Sedney urged.


4. (C) Though cross-Strait talks are positive,
discussion alone cannot reduce the sense of threat
felt by the people of Taiwan, in both the KMT and DPP,
over Chinese military deployments, DASD Sedney
asserted. Taiwan contacts have expressed great fear
not only over the PRC missile threat but also over PLA
war planes, ships, ground forces, cyber attacks and
information warfare. In October, the United States
announced additional arms sales to Taiwan because
Taiwan needs defensive arms to maintain its security.
The United States has observed that there has been no
reduction of PRC military forces deployed against
Taiwan since Ma Ying-jeou took office. China needs to
take a "significant step" to move things forward on
this front. DASD Sedney noted that he has urged PLA
officers to view things from Taipei's and Washington's

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perspective. When an inquisitive Deputy Director Sun
interjected with a question about the PLA response to
this approach, DASD Sedney lamented that the often
"shallow" nature of discussions with the PLA is a
problem. If deeper discussions with the PLA were
possible, Sedney remarked, the U.S. side could explain
how China's military posture is perceived by many in
Taiwan as menacing.


5. (C) DASD Sedney commended recent improvements in
cross-Strait relations, reiterating that the United
States is supportive of those efforts. Contrary to
those who mistakenly think Washington is using Taiwan
to obstruct China's development and to keep the two
sides apart, U.S. policy, in fact, calls for a
peaceful resolution of issues in a manner acceptable
to the people on both sides of the Strait. U.S.
policy on Taiwan is consistent and has been for several
successive administrations, Sedney noted, adding that
he expects it will continue to be so in the next
administration. Defense Secretary Gates wants good
U.S.-China relations and hopes to see a strong and
prosperous China. These basic U.S. policy goals will
continue, DASD Sedney concluded.

DRAMATIC CHANGES, REMAINING STATE OF HOSTILITY
-------------- -


6. (C) There have been "dramatic and rapid changes" in
cross-Strait relations since May (when Ma Ying-jeou
was inaugurated),Deputy Director Sun replied. For
example, the "three links" are "basically" resolved.
Sun pointed out, however, that for cross-Strait direct
flights, there is currently a northern route and a
southern route, but not one that crosses the mid-line
of the Strait. This is because the cross-Strait state
of hostility that began in 1949 has not ended. The
military situation on both sides is a reflection of
this "ongoing state of hostility." For much of the
past 60 years, Taiwan held the upper hand in the
military balance across the Strait, Sun said,
admitting that over the past few decades "there has
been a change." Despite this change, Sun insisted,
"with U.S. help, Taiwan can maintain a military
balance."

CHINA SEEKS TO END HOSTILITIES, REACH PEACE AGREEMENT
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Sun said PRC policy is to end the state of
hostility across the Strait and reach a peace
agreement. Ending the state of hostility was first
proposed in 1991 by Taiwan, and then-President Jiang
Zemin accepted the idea in 1995 when he proposed that,
on the basis of the one-China principle, the two sides
should end the state of hostility, Sun argued. In
October 2007, President Hu Jintao (in his political
report to the 17th Party Congress) added the goal of
reaching a peace agreement. In 2004, Sun said, Hu
proposed establishing military confidence-building
measures (CBMs) across the Strait, and that offer
still stands. The two sides have made a great deal of
progress, but in fact discussions on politics,
international space and military issues have not
started.


8. (C) Sun defended the current cross-Strait approach
by the PRC, arguing that the agenda is focused on
economic developments because these are areas where
success can be achieved and where there exist fewer
disputes. If, on the other hand, the two sides first
focused on the "difficult problems" of politics,
international space and military issues before
conditions were ripe, it could be "counterproductive"
and lead to a "worsening of the situation." China
therefore wants to "set aside disputes" and "keep
problems under control" so as to avoid another
"breach" in cross-Strait relations. Although
consultations on these sensitive issues have not
started, Sun argued, the problems "will be solved
someday." Both sides need to make great efforts to
resolve issues because "the situation was not created
by one side only." Also, the two sides must strive to
create the proper conditions for solving cross-Strait
problems. Each side must take the other's concerns
into account. Without elaborating, Sun said that

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"Taiwan is making demands of the Mainland." Sun
admitted that, "we should be able to have cross-Strait
exchanges on military issues," perhaps starting at a
low level or through "academic talks." This would
help "build trust" and move in the direction of ending
the state of hostilities. Sun admitted, however,
that, "We don't know how to start."

U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS: CENTRALITY OF TAIWAN ISSUE
-------------- ---


9. (C) Turning to U.S.-China relations, Sun observed
that the "military standoff" across the Strait has
been an issue in the U.S.-China relationship for the
past 60 years. Although bilateral relations have
improved and the two sides have achieved a "basic
level of trust," our fundamental positions on Taiwan
remain unchanged. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are the
"most substantial area of dispute" between the United
States and China. Sun predicted that "we will
probably continue to have disputes over this issue
(U.S. arms sales to Taiwan)." Nevertheless, both
sides share "common ground" in wanting to reduce
tension across the Strait.


10. (C) China is already familiar with U.S. positions
on withdrawing PLA missiles and on WHO observership
for Taiwan, Sun continued. If the United States
repeats its position too often, however, Sun warned,
China will feel that if it takes those steps, it is
doing so in response to U.S. pressure. Therefore,
pressing China "too hard" on these issues could be
"counterproductive." Sun suggested that a "better
way" is to trust that China is "sincerely" trying to
end hostilities, reach a peace agreement and implement
military CBMs. DASD Sedney again urged China to take
"significant steps" to reduce military deployments
aimed at Taiwan.


11. (C) DASD Sedney cleared this message.
Randt