COUNTRY CLEARANCE APPROVAL: U.S. EXPERTS

UNCLAS BEIJING 004637

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/K (CKELLY),ENERGY FOR NNSA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OTRA AMGT KNNP PREL MNUC KN CH
SUBJECT: COUNTRY CLEARANCE APPROVAL: U.S. EXPERTS
DELEGATION TO NORTH KOREA, DECEMBER 28 -- JANUARY 17

1.(SBU) Embassy Beijing welcomes and grants country
clearance for experts listed below to travel to Beijing, en
route to Pyongyang in connection with disablement
activities December 23, 2008 - January 17,2009. George
Anthony Anzelon,
Natraj Chandrasekar Iyer, Laura Rosenberger, Richard Lee
Nelson, Lin
Turner.


2. Political Control Officer:
Mark Lambert, Political Officer
Tel: (86-10) 8531-3764
Cell: (86)139-1056-2317
Fax: (86-10)8531-3525 (POL)
Unclass E-mail: LambertMB@state.gov

Admin Control Officer:

Perry Chen, Asst. GSO
Tel: (86-10) 8531-4181
Cell:(86-10) 135-0109-9283
FAX: (86-10) 8531-3008 (GSO)
Unclass E-mail: ChenPY@state.gov

Alternate
Michael Graham, GSO
Tel: (86-10) 8531-4341
Cell: (86)139-1035-9394
Fax: (86-10)8531-3008 (GSO)
Unclass E-mail: GrahamMA2@state.gov

Embassy or hotel driver will meet travelers at the
airport and take them to their hotel.


3. (SBU) Hotel reservations have been made at the
Hilton Hotel, #1 DongFang Lu, North Donsan Huan.
Telephone: (86-10) 5865-5000
Fax: (86-10) 6465-3051.
We will forward Hotel Reservation number to EAP/K by
unclassified email

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Security and Threat Assessment
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4. (U) Per Secstate 30297, U.S. contractors working on
disablement activities in the DPRK are required to provide
proof of medevac insurance to EAP/K.


5. (U) The threat level for all China posts is considered
low for crime and medium for terrorism.


6. (U) The Regional Security Office is not aware of any
specific threat directed against any U.S. person or
traveling delegation. Should such information be
developed, the Chinese security services are committed to
advise the Embassy of pertinent information and to provide
necessary security coverage.


7. (U) China experiences a moderate rate of crime,
including recent incidents ranging from petty theft to
murder. Pickpockets are particularly active in crowded
markets, and foreigners are often sought out as primary
targets. Petty theft from hotel rooms is uncommon, but
visitors are advised not to leave valuables lying loose or
unattended in their rooms. It is the policy of this
Mission that employees, their family members and official
visitors to China must not knowingly purchase counterfeit
or pirated products during their stay in China. Also,
foreigners may be approached in tourist areas by
individuals seeking to exchange U.S. dollars or to sell
pirated or fake products, such as compact discs, in
violation of intellectual property rights laws. These
transactions are illegal, violate Post policy, and must be
avoided.


8. (U) All U.S. citizen personnel serving under Chief of
Mission authority in a temporary duty status of 30 days or
more must complete appropriate overseas personal security
training prior to travel (04 State 66580). Employees who
have completed the Security Overseas Seminar Course at
State's Foreign Service Institute (FSI) after June 1, 2000,
meet this requirement. All other TDYers must either 1)
complete the approved four-day seminar at FSI entitled
"Serving Abroad for Families and Employees (SAFE)" or 2)
have their agency certify to the State Department Bureau of
Diplomatic Security that the employee has undergone
equivalent security training. The contact for this
certification is Assistant Director of Training, DS/T, at
telephone (703) 205-2617. Country clearance will not be

granted for any traveler with planned TDY in excess of 30
days if this information is not stated/certified. POC for
additional information is DS RSO, Beijing at:
ds rso Beijing@state.gov. (Note: Travelers from DHS/CBP,
DIA, FBI, DOD and the Peace Corp have been pre-certified by
their agencies with DS.)


9. (U) All/all official visitors are required to obtain a
pre-departure, country specific counterintelligence
briefing from their parent agency before departing for
China. Visitors should contact the security office of
their parent agency. If the parent agency is unable to
give the briefing or needs assistance/guidance, the visitor
should contact the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Division
of Counterintelligence (DS/ICI/CI) at 571-345-7641, 3966,
or 3968 to schedule a briefing. HQ DS/CI is located at
SA-20, 1801 Lynn St., Rosslyn, Virginia 20522-2008.
Department of State personnel should contact the DS/ICI/CI
directly to schedule a briefing. Official visitors may also
be required to attend a Post-specific security briefing
upon their arrival in country. The type of briefing is
contingent on the length of the planned visit. Upon
arrival in Beijing, all TDY personnel should contact the
Regional Security Office at 6532-3831, ext. 6036, to
determine level of briefing required.


10. (U) Visitors are reminded to take necessary precautions
in safeguarding sensitive material and information. All
non-USG facilities must be considered technically
compromised and may not be used to discuss, process, or
store classified information. Telephone calls, e-mail, and
Internet usage are routinely monitored and hotel rooms
searched.


11. (U) All TDY U.S. citizen employees of the U.S.
Government, civilian or military, who are under the
authority of the Chief of Mission are subject to the
reporting requirement stated in 12 FAM 262 regarding
contact reports, i.e. any initial (non-business related)
contact with a national from a country with a Critical
threat (counterintelligence) post, as listed on the
Department's Security Environment Threat List (SETL),must
be reported. In general, employee reporting should occur
within one business day after such contact has occurred.
If unable to report within this time frame, or unsure about
the need to report at all, employees should contact the RSO
or PSO as soon as practicable. If the RSO/PSO is
unavailable, notify the Management Officer or the Deputy
Chief of Mission.


12. (U) Per 12 FAM 262, this reporting requirement
generally applies whenever:

(1) Illegal or unauthorized access is sought to classified
or otherwise sensitive information.

(2) The employee is concerned that he or she may the target
of actual or attempted exploitation by a foreign entity.

(3) That national attempts to establish recurring contact
or seems to be actively seeking a close personal
association, beyond professional or personal courtesies.


13. (U) Travelers should be aware that previous visitors
have reported that their unattended computers have been
subjected to tampering. The efforts may be directed toward
obtaining information on the computers, but problems
ranging from viruses left on their systems to hard drives,
that are no longer functional, have been reported. Hotels
and private Chinese Internet providers have in some cases
given hotel guests "free" thumb drives for use with their
computers. The source and quality of these devices are
unknown. Such devices could contain malicious codes and
viruses and should not be used on government computers.
Official visitors are reminded that non-inspectable
electrical/electronic equipment, i.e., cellular telephones,
laptop computers, personal digital assistants (PDAs),etc.,
may not be brought into the controlled access areas of the
Chancery. If a visitor intends to travel with USG-owned
computers and equipment for use within the Chancery, please
contact the Regional Security Officer at 86-10-6532-3831
ext. 6058, or GormanB2@state.gov or MooreBM@state.gov, for
information and guidelines.


14. (U) Additionally, all classified and sensitive
materials must be secured at the Embassy upon arrival in
country. All classified material must be brought into
China via diplomatic pouch.


15. (U) Travelers must contact the Embassy or nearest

Consulate General upon arrival in China and provide
telephone and address information while in country.


16. (U) Passports and visas are required. Americans
arriving/transiting without valid passports and Chinese
visas are not permitted to enter China and may also be
subject to fines. Visas are required to transit China on
the way to and from Mongolia or North Korea. Those
visitors traveling to China on a single-entry visa should
be reminded that trips to Hong Kong or Macau Special
Administrative Regions are treated as a visit outside
Mainland China. If the traveler is planning to return to
Mainland China after a visit to one of these two
destinations on the same single-entry visa, they will be
denied entry. Visitors facing this dilemma will be
required to apply for a new visa at the Chinese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Office in Hong Kong to gain re-entry into
Mainland China.
Randt