IN A/S HOOK'S PRC MEETINGS, UNSC REFORM, 1267,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIJING 004572 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2023 TAGS: PREL PTER MNUC IR AORC SU SO KCRM UN CH SUBJECT: IN A/S HOOK'S PRC MEETINGS, UNSC REFORM, 1267, IRAN, PIRACY AMONG ISSUES DISCUSSED Classified By: Acting POLITICAL Section Chief Ben Moeling for reasons 1 .4 (B/D). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) State International Organizations A/S Brian Hook heard China's concerns about the direction of intergovernmental negotiations on UN Security Council reform during a cordial and productive visit December 4-8. Chinese MFA IO Director General Wu Hailong pressed the United States to support the intermediary approach to UNSC reform and said the African Union's maintaining its common position would be crucial in fending off the G4's diplomatic offensive. DG Wu and Assistant Foreign Minister Liu Jieyi strongly hinted that China would release its hold on Pakistani 1267 designations, which subsequently occurred. Conceding that Iran has not yet responded positively to the P5 plus 1 incentives package, AFM Liu said Iranian officials have not ruled out a negotiated solution to the nuclear issue and now is the time for a creative solution. A/S Hook pressed China voluntarily to increase its UN contribution, to participate actively in efforts to combat Somali piracy, to provide helicopters for UN peacekeeping efforts in Sudan and to support a comprehensive arms embargo on Sudan. DG Wu expressed strong concern that International Criminal Court action against Sudanese President Bashir would be counterproductive and destabilizing. A/S Hook also discussed Iraq and Afghanistan with Chinese officials. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) Assistant Secretary of State (A/S) for International Organizations Brian Hook visited Beijing December 4-8. A/S Hook held cordial discussions with Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister (AFM) Liu Jieyi and MFA International Organizations and Conferences Department Director General (DG) Wu Hailong. A/S Hook also met Beijing representatives of the World Health Organization (WHO),the UN Development Program (UNDP),the World Food Program (WFP) and the International Labor Organization (ILO),held a lively dinner discussion with Chinese UN Association President Ambassador Jin Yongjian, Chinese UN Association Vice President Pang Sen, Tsinghua University non-proliferation scholar Li Bin and Tsinghua University International Affairs expert Sun Zhe, and hosted a meeting of representatives of other P-5 embassies. G4 Plans for UN Reform -------------- ¶3. (C) DG Wu devoted nearly an hour to describing China's concerns about UN Security Council (UNSC) reform. DG Wu said that when Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) commence in February, the five permanent members of the UNSC (P5) must pay particular attention to the "framework and modalities." DG Wu predicted that Japan, India, Brazil and Germany (G4) would first push the UN General Assembly (UNGA) to adopt a resolution endorsing UNSC enlargement. The G4, DG Wu continued, would then quickly push for adoption of a framework resolution stipulating the structure of the expansion and identifying permanent and non-permanent members to be added. DG Wu said that the P5 must pay great attention to this "dangerous" strategy. DG Wu expressed specific concern that the G4 hoped to push the IGN in the direction of the "voting culture" of the previous informal UNGA Plenary session on UNSC reform rather than the "consensus" approach of the previous Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG). DG Wu said that any agreement on UN SC reform must be the result of wide consensus and not an UNGA vote. AFM Liu briefly reiterated DG Wu's concerns, saying that the UNGA President had "jumped the gun" on launching the IGN in February. Preference for Intermediary Approach -------------- ¶4. (C) To counter the G4's strategy, DG Wu recommended that China and the United States work together to continue the OEWG's previous efforts to work out a consensus-based framework and modalities for negotiations. DG Wu said that the P5 should insist on a package approach and thwart the G4's efforts to pursue reform "step by step" in the UNGA. He said the P5 should convene the next regular meeting of P5 Political Directors as early as possible in 2009. He hoped that meeting could reach consensus on the intermediary approach, which has significant support. Finally, DG Wu said China, Russia and the United States should work together to BEIJING 00004572 002 OF 005 influence UNGA President Miguel d'Escoto Brockmann and "urge him to be cautious." DG Wu asked A/S Hook to remind his successor to focus on the issue of UN reform and expressed concern about media reports that the new administration is considering changing the U.S. position on UNSC reform. U.S. Approach -------------- ¶5. (C) A/S Hook said that the United States endorses the "package approach" and believes that UNSC reform must be part of a general overhaul of the UN system. While not committing the United States to the intermediary approach, A/S Hook said that the United States supports a deliberate and predictable process that results in a wide consensus for comprehensive UN reform. He suggested that the United States might not be the best country to influence UNGA President d'Escoto, because d'Escoto seems to bear malice toward the U.S. Government. AU Position Decisive -------------- ¶6. (C) DG Wu stressed the importance of the African Union (AU) in the negotiations over UNSC reform. Should the AU abandon its common position, it would be a "disaster," he said, because the G4 would then be able to recruit individual African countries as supporters. Thus, DG Wu urged the United States to send a strong delegation to the late January 2009 AU Summit to lobby African nations to preserve the AU common position. So long as the AU maintains a common position, the G4 does not have critical mass to push the UNGA as a whole to adopt the G4 approach, he said. A/S Hook promised to raise this issue upon his return to Washington. No Japan -------------- ¶7. (C) A/S Hook suggested that changing the negotiating framework from the OEWG to Intergovernmental Negotiations would not erase fundamental disagreements among delegations as to who deserves a Security Council membership. For example, has China changed its position with regard to Japan as a permanent member, he asked. AFM Liu and DG Wu responded that the time is "not ripe" for China to support Japan's bid for permanent UNSC membership. AFM Liu noted that Chinese public opinion toward Japan "is still very sensitive." Retired Chinese diplomats Jin Yongjian and Pang Sen of the UN Association separately said categorically that China could not accept Japan as a permanent member of the UNSC until bilateral China-Japan RELATIONS improve greatly. Pang noted that the Chinese public is still very anti-Japanese, a feeling reciprocated by the Japanese public toward China. Jin said it would take a long time to develop sufficiently friendly RELATIONS to allow China to support Japan's UNSC bid. A/S Hook stressed U. ¶S. support for Japan's bid for a permanent UNSC seat. UNSCR 1267 Designations -------------- ¶8. (C) A/S Hook strongly urged both AFM Liu and DG Wu to support for designating four leaders of Laskar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) under UNSCR 1267. AFM Liu said "China is discussing with Pakistan the issue and the directions of the discussions have been positive." DG Wu said more explicitly that A/S Hook would "have some good news" after he returned to Washington. DG Wu urged the United States also to give favorable consideration to adding the names that China has proposed to the 1267 list. (Note: shortly after, China lifted its hold and the designations went forward.) Iran -------------- ¶9. (C) A/S Hook pressed AFM Liu at length on Iran and the future of the P5 plus 1 process. A/S Hook stated that Iran has failed to respond to the generous incentives package offered by the P5 plus 1 and said the time left to influence Iran's behavior is getting short. AFM Liu replied that the United States and China share the same strategic objective of preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. China has worked hard to persuade Iran to accept the P5 plus 1 roadmap and the "freeze-for-freeze" solution. AFM Liu said Iran has so far not said no to the incentives package, but conceded that Tehran "has dragged its feet in providing a clear cut BEIJING 00004572 003 OF 005 positive answer." Pressed on whether China accepts Iran's stated rationale for its nuclear work, AFM Liu stated that "the objective is not to score POLITICAL points but actually to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons." AFM Liu said Iran has shown some flexibility but seeks clarification of the roadmap. For example, does the roadmap require Iran to cease all nuclear activity or just centrifuge-related work? Would the international community lift only multilateral sanctions or would the United States and other countries remove bilateral sanctions as well? The Chinese Government does not believe Iran is simply buying time to pursue nuclear enrichment; there is the possibility of a creative solution. Hook told Liu that if Iran is sincere that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, it can resolve any doubt by accepting Russia's fuel guarantee. Liu was skeptical of the fuel guarantee option, stating that he would like to make the incentives package work. A/S Hook said so far Iran has only seemed to reply to pressure not to incentives, no matter how creative. UN Budget -------------- ¶10. (C) A/S Hook noted to AFM Liu that Russia pays a 1.2 percent rate toward the UN budget, well above its assessed contribution of 0.5 percent. A/S Hook urged China to consider voluntarily paying more than its assessed contribution. AFM Liu said that China would consider the proposal. French Ambassador Herve Ladsous and UK Charge d'Affaires Barbara Woodward later expressed to A/S Hook the opinion that, based on their experience, China would "never" pay above its assessed contribution. Somali Piracy -------------- ¶11. (C) A/S Hook urged China to participate actively in efforts to address the problem of piracy off the Horn of Africa. AFM Liu agreed that this is a major international issue and there is an urgent need to address it. China has been a victim of this piracy and thinks international cooperation on this issue is imperative. A/S Hook urged China to send a senior representative to the December 16 UN Ministerial on Somali piracy. AFM Liu replied that China's Permanent Representative to the UN would probably represent China at the meeting. (Note: China subsequently sent Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei.) Darfur Helicopters -------------- ¶12. (C) A/S Hook expressed appreciation to DG Wu for China's efforts to date, including its deployment of engineers. A/S Hook asked China also to provide six, 12, or 18 helicopters to the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). DG Wu replied that China has forwarded this request to the People's Liberation Army (PLA),which has replied that China lacks the capability to provide helicopters. DG Wu noted that China had found its domestic airlift capacity inadequate during the recent Sichuan earthquake. Thus, he said, he doubts that China will respond positively to this request. Comprehensive Sudan Arms Embargo? -------------- ¶13. (C) A/S Hook noted to AFM Liu that Chinese arms are still flowing to Darfur. Hook suggested that it is time to consider a comprehensive arms embargo. AFM Liu replied that China exercises the "utmost restraint" on Sudan arms sales. China requires the Government of Sudan to provide end use certifications and has reduced its arms sales to Sudan. AFM Liu said that he "is not aware of any recent new sale" of arms to Sudan. A/S Hook raised the issue again with DG Wu during a working lunch, and asked that China reduce or eliminate its arms sales to Sudan. Hook stated that China could make an important contribution by announcing that it would end arm sales to Sudan. DG Wu said that China would continue to consider arms sales to Sudan on a "case-by-case" basis and echoed AFM Liu's remarks that China exercises the "utmost restraint." A/S Hook said that any government that uses false UN markings on its military aircraft cannot be trusted to abide by end-use certifications. DG Wu replied that the reports of Sudan's use of UN markings on military planes are "unproven." BEIJING 00004572 004 OF 005 A/S Hook countered that the reports have indeed been proven and expressed astonishment that anyone believed otherwise. Sudan POLITICAL Situation -------------- ¶14. (C) DG Wu said that the situation in Sudan is now "more relaxed." He said the Government of Sudan (GOS) has shown "determination and sincerity." He listed a number of developments that illustrate the Sudanese Government's good will, including: the announcement of a cease-fire, the agreement on UNAMID deployment, improved Sudan-Chad relations, the establishment of a Special Tribunal on Darfur to speed up accountability for crimes against humanity and the establishment of an election commission for the upcoming 2009 elections. DG Wu said the international community should support Joint Chief Mediator Bassole and encourage the rebel groups to participate in negotiations on a lasting political solution. ICC indictment -------------- ¶15. (C) DG Wu expressed concern that the pending International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment against Sudanese President Bashir could jeopardize progress in Darfur. DG Wu said that peace and stability in Darfur is "even more important" than "judicial justice." ICC Chief Prosecutor Ocampo has told China that he expects the ICC magistrates to issue an arrest warrant for Bashir in January or February 2009. DG Wu said such an action "may waste efforts of the past few years." DG Wu suggested that the UNSC invoke Article 16 of the ICC Statute to prevent the indictment and that the United States help secure a "soft landing" for this issue. A/S Hook replied that the United States is not a party to the ICC, but noted that the ICC indictment has had a positive effect by pressuring Bashir into improved cooperation with the United Nations. DG Wu said issuing an arrest warrant will be counter-productive. DG Wu noted that the African Union and the Arab League both support UNSC action to suspend the Bashir indictment. Afghanistan -------------- ¶16. (C) DG Wu said from China's perspective the security situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating. He said the drug problem "is more serious" than in previous years, noting the drugs enter China via both Central Asia and Pakistan, and the terrorism situation in Afghanistan is "still challenging" with terrorist incidents are on the rise. DG Wu inquired about the veracity of reports that the United States is now willing to negotiate with the Taliban. A/S Hook replied that the United States is willing to talk to former Taliban members who now forswear terrorism, but not to current Taliban terrorists. Zimbabwe -------------- ¶17. (C) A/S Hook told AFM Liu that China's decision to veto the Zimbabwe resolution was a mistake, as negotiations are clearly not working. AFM Liu disputed A/S Hook's assertion that Zimbabwe negotiations have not gone anywhere, and responded that the international community should let Zimbabwe's internal negotiations proceed without further intervention. The opposition has not stopped negotiating with Mugabe, he said, and both sides have been flexible. The two sides are now discussing the details of the makeup of the government with disagreements centering on specific ministerial posts. This fine detail does not require UNSC involvement. In any case, Mugabe has told the South Africans that he may step down in two years. A/S Hook told AFM Liu that we may want to take the issue of Zimbabwe to the Security Council again. AFM Liu said China opposes a UNSC resolution on Zimbabwe, and that such a resolution risks shutting the doors to all further negotiations, resulting in chaos. A/S Hook noted that it is unreasonable to expect the opposition to negotiate when Mugabe's regime continues to detain and jail them. Iraq -------------- BEIJING 00004572 005 OF 005 ¶18. (C) DG Wu inquired about the new U.S. Administration's plans to withdraw from Iraq and expressed concern that a hasty withdrawal could be destabilizing. A/S Hook said he could not speak for the new administration, but noted that President-elect Obama had said any withdrawal from Iraq would be "deliberate." Randt