PRC SCHOLARS SAY XINJIANG SECURITY IS TOP PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 004479 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2028 TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG EDEV PINR PBTS CH ZK SUBJECT: PRC SCHOLARS SAY XINJIANG SECURITY IS TOP PRIORITY FOR CHINA-CENTRAL ASIA RELATIONS Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary: China seeks to improve political and economic relations with Central Asia primarily to ensure PRC domestic security, especially in the restive Xinjiang region given deep cultural and religious links between China's western ethnic minorities and Central Asia, according to PRC scholars. China has increased its soft power projection in the region, and a wide range of PRC Government ministries and state-owned enterprises are instructed to contribute to this effort. Beijing seeks to avoid friction with Russia over Central Asia, but this may be difficult given Russia's reassertion of influence in the region. Beijing views the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a vehicle for mitigating potential China-Russia friction in the region. End Summary. ¶2. (C) PolOff discussed trends in China's relations with the countries of Central Asia with Xia Yishan, senior research fellow at the MFA-affiliated China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) on November 21, and Chen Jiejun from the Ministry of State Security-affiliated China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) on November 20. Primary PRC Interest: Securing Xinjiang -------------- ¶3. (C) CICIR's Chen Jiejun argued China's primary interest in Central Asia is the need to ensure security and social stability in western China, particularly restive Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR),which shares many cultural and religious characteristics with Central Asian countries. China closely monitors its western border to fight against trans-national separatist and terrorist groups that seek refuge in Central Asia. Beijing believes that the cooperation of governments in Central Asia is critical for the success of this effort, Chen stressed. CIIS's Xia Yishan added that Xinjiang's multi-ethnic mix makes the Central Government's effort especially important; while ethnic Uighurs are the plurality in Xinjiang, the region is home to smaller groups of Tajiks, Kazakhs and others who feel a stronger cultural connection to Central Asia than to China's ethnic Han majority. Beijing perceives a need to generate goodwill among local people in Central Asia in order to counter news coming out of Xinjiang of convictions of ethnic �00A;minorities for separatist activities. Xia added that maintaining security in Xinjiang is critical for China's national security, as made clear by the threats to the Beijing Olympics that originated from China's west. Reaching Out to Central Asia -------------- ¶4. (C) CICIR's Chen said that Beijing seeks to fulfill its objective of security in Xinjiang and ensuring that Beijing can obtain the cooperation of governments in Central Asia through the projection of soft power and through efforts to portray China as a supportive partner. China has found that governments in the region are receptive to its overtures given their ongoing struggles to demonstrate legitimacy through meeting the basic economic needs of their populations. China has been increasing its support on a range of fronts, including educational exchange, scholarships, security cooperation, training programs for government officials, trade and infrastructure investment. Chen noted 1500 Kazakhs study in China each year through government incentive programs, up from virtually none just a few years ago. CIIS's Xia asserted that Central Asian leaders, particularly in Astana and Tashkent, are keenly aware of growing PRC interest in the region and seek to leverage their role in regional security to maximize benefits from China and create a counter-balance against Russia's traditional hegemony in the region. A Comprehensive Effort in Beijing -------------- ¶5. (C) China's MFA has the lead on the effort to improve relations with Central Asia, but the MFA appeals to top-level leadership to ensure other line ministries are supporting the goals that fall within their portfolios. CIIS's Xia said that numerous Chinese ministries and state-run enterprises are involved in the effort and have been directed by senior leadership on the region's importance for China's internal security. Beijing has placed particular emphasis on law enforcement cooperation, stationing liaison police officers in the region and sending law enforcement delegations. Bilateral and multilateral interactions are invariably aimed at "increasing mutual trust," which Chen suggested means developing an understanding among Central Asian governments BEIJING 00004479 002 OF 003 of the domestic and trans-national security considerations that drive Beijing's policy in the region. The Need to Avoid Friction with Russia -------------- ¶6. (C) Chinese policy in the region is carefully considered in order to avoid friction with Russia while expanding the space for Central Asian cooperation on security measures, according to Chen. In the effort to project Chinese influence in the region, China sees Russia as an important but unreliable partner, as seen in Moscow's willingness to risk instability through its actions in Georgia. Beijing fears that similar interventions in Central Asia would undermine China's efforts to control its population in Xinjiang by setting back prospects for a docile and cooperative Central Asian region. CIIS's Xia warned that, because of rising Chinese influence in Central Asia, the potential for Russia-China tension remains. He stressed China's belief that after withdrawing from the region in the 1990s, Russia is seeking to reassert hegemony, giving China's efforts to avoid conflict increased urgency. He acknowledged that China must take care to avoid friction with Russia even in its outreach to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan despite their geographic distance from Russia. Russia Relations Important for Global Issues -------------- ¶7. (C) The two regional powers' differing interests in the regional energy market underscore the potential for conflict, Xia said, especially given China's need to maintain energy supplies as a pillar of its rapid economic growth. Xia asserted that China seeks a voice with Russia to help it avoid conflict with the United States over NATO expansion, Georgia and other issues, given that renewed U.S.-Russia conflict would not be in China's interest. SCO as Tool for Deconflicting Russia, PRC Influence -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Xia pointed to the need to avoid friction with Russia as a primary purpose for the development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). He said that China continues to be the main driver for the SCO, with Beijing continually seeking to "pull Russia deeper" into the organization. The SCO having moved on from its origins as a forum for resolving border conflicts, Xia said that Beijing believes that by reaching consensus in the SCO on potentially controversial issues between the two countries, China can avoid being seen by Russia as an adversary even as it expands its influence in the region and deepens cooperation among Central Asian states. CICIR's Chen stressed that the strong emphasis in SCO rhetoric on enhancing mutual trust derives from this need to both reduce the potential for conflict with Russia and increase the cooperation Beijing receives on security issues. Economic Cooperation Driven by Security Needs -------------- ¶9. (C) According to CICIR's Chen, China also sees economic cooperation with Central Asia as a top priority, given the region's importance for the production and particularly transportation of energy resources. He stressed that economic problems in Central Asia have a direct impact on China, and Beijing perceives a strong interest in ensuring economic growth in the region through deeper economic links with China. While economic agreements are often seen as the "low-hanging fruit" of multilateral arrangements, Chen argued that these agreements are in fact seen by Beijing as critical pieces in securing China's western border and maintaining domestic security. This is in contrast to the perception among many observers that China's economic engagement with Central Asia is merely about opening more markets for Chinese manufacturing goods. Looking to China during Global Economic Crisis -------------- - ¶10. (C) With Central Asian governments fearing the effects of the current global economic turmoil, China has sought to convince governments in the region of its leading role in the international community, said Chen. China has emphasized the need for "new approaches," which has generated hope in Central Asia that China's efforts to insulate its domestic economy against the prospect of global recession will assist smaller neighboring countries in riding out the turmoil as well. Public and Private Efforts -------------- BEIJING 00004479 003 OF 003 ¶11. (C) Xia agreed that the expansion of Chinese trade and investment in Central Asia is a primary means of engendering mutual trust and earning Central Asian assistance in fighting trans-national separatist groups. He said that Beijing seeks to promote a mix of public and private investment in the region, often through state-led investments in infrastructure. Such projects are popular among local government officials and facilitate the flow of natural resources to China. Such economic measures, Xia said, also engender development in Xinjiang, reinforcing the security gains of stronger relations with Central Asia. Piccuta