PRC SCHOLARS CONCERNED ABOUT INDIAN REACTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 004475

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2028
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER CH PK IN AF
SUBJECT: PRC SCHOLARS CONCERNED ABOUT INDIAN REACTION
AGAINST PAKISTAN IN WAKE OF MUMBAI ATTACKS

REF: A. ISLAMABAD 3772

B. NEW DELHI 3091

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Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4
(B/D).

Summary
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1. (C) PRC South Asia scholars have expressed concern to us
that retaliation by India against Pakistan for the recent
Mumbai terror attacks would create instability in the region
and significantly hamper U.S. counter-insurgency efforts in
Afghanistan and along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. In
recent meetings with PolOff, scholars suggested the United
States take measures to restrain India from taking action
that could result in a regional conflagration. Many scholars
said the terror attacks reinforce their perception that
Pakistan President Zardari has little control over Pakistan's
security services. The Chinese scholars told us that Zardari
faces difficulties taking action against possible
perpetrators of the attack because the Pakistani general
public and elements of Pakistan's security apparatus will
perceive he is acting to appease either the United States or
India. The scholars suggested the PRC Government's ability
to defuse India-Pakistan tension is limited, particularly as
China "re-balances" its relations with India and Pakistan.
They also said that continuing cross-border raids into
Pakistan by Afghanistan-based coalition forces undermine
Zardari's position and that excessive coalition military
action in Afghanistan hampers international efforts to create
conditions for stable development. End Summary.

India Should be Cautious
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2. (C) Urging India to be cautious in its response to the
Mumbai terror attacks, Ministry of Foreign Affairs-affiliated
China Institute for International Studies (CIIS) South Asia
scholar Rong Ying told PolOff December 1 that Indian
officials must distinguish the actions of the Pakistan
Government from those by elements in Pakistan who oppose
rapprochement with India. Rong expressed concern that the
"very sensational" India media promotes anti-Pakistan
sentiment and may stoke communal violence in India. He
expressed hope that "cooler heads will prevail."

Pakistan More Supportive
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3. (C) Rong said that in contrast to the Pakistan
Government's earlier indifference to the 2001 Indian
Parliament bombing, Zardari and other Pakistani political
leaders' expressed response to the Mumbai attacks has been
sympathetic and supportive. Rong said that Pakistan has "a
genuine interest in cooperation" and attributes the more
positive posture to Pakistan's own struggles with terrorism.
Rong said assistance to Pakistan from the international
community, through channels such as the Friends of Pakistan,
is particularly crucial at this time. Members of the
international community, particularly the United States, must
also attempt to rein in any Indian moves toward aggressive
action against Pakistan.

Negative Effect on Regional Stability
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4. (C) Ministry of State Security-affiliated China Institutes
for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) South Asia
scholar and counter-terrorism expert Fu Xiaoqiang told PolOff
December 4 that Indian reactions to the Mumbai terror attack
could undermine regional stability. Professor Fu warned that
if India follows through on reported plans for AIR strikes
against Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) or other targets in Pakistan,
the Pakistani Army will retaliate. Fu gives credence to
Pakistan media reports quoting an unnamed senior Pakistani
army official as calling Taliban leaders Baitullah Mehsud and
Mullah Fazullah "patriots" and noting that elements in
Taliban-controlled Northern Waziristan have offered to defend
Pakistan's border with India. Such a development would
seriously hamper U.S. counter-insurgency efforts on the
Pakistan-Afghanistan border, Fu said.

Zardari's Position Difficult
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5. (C) Zardari, however, has a "difficult sell" convincing
the Pakistani public to support actions against Pakistani
nationals over the Mumbai bombing, particularly those
identified by India, said CIIS's Rong. The Pakistani public
and some members of the security service may perceive such
Pakistani Government's actions as appeasement of the United
States or India. Though arresting LeT suspects known for
their militancy may not provoke domestic opposition, moving
against individuals who have stature and influence in the
Islamic community because of their social work and efforts to
propagate Islam, such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa (an alias for LeT)
leader Muhammad Saeed, would be more problematic for the
Pakistani Government, according to CICIR's Fu.

LeT-ISI Links Expose Divisions in Pakistan
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6. (C) Noting media reports indicating the involvement of LeT
in the attacks, CICIR's Fu said former members of
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) have "personal links" to
LeT, though he insisted that LeT has no direct ties to the
current Pakistani Government. While uncertain of any links
between LeT and the security services, Beijing University
South Asia scholar Han Hua told PolOff December 3 that
questions about Pakistani official involvement in the Mumbai
terror attacks, whether through the Army or ISI, demonstrate
Zardari's limited control over these institutions.

U.S. Cross-Border Attacks Unhelpful
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7. (C) Han speculated that the security services take issue
with a number of Zardari's positions, including his November
22 announcement of a no-first-strike nuclear weapons policy
and especially his perceived acquiescence to U.S.
cross-border attacks on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
CICIR South Asia scholar Hu Shisheng separately likewise told
PolOff in a conversation preceding the events in Mumbai that
U.S. military cross-border attacks into Pakistan are
undermining Zardari's position. The United States "is not
giving him a chance" to address the security situation on
Zardari's own terms, Hu said. Beijing University's Han said
the Pakistani military "feels threatened" by
India-Afghanistan and U.S.-Afghanistan cooperation, but said
the Army "will not take action against the government" unless
India escalates military tensions.

China's Influence Limited
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8. (C) Beijing University's Han said China's short-term
foreign policy goal is to prevent war between India and
Pakistan. China may also urge Pakistan to cooperate fully in
the investigation of the attacks. Han stated that China and
the United States have common goals in region and that a
stable Pakistan-India relationship is necessary to build a
stable Afghanistan. CICIR's Fu said that though Pakistan is
China's "all-weather friend," China is trying to balance its
relationships with India and Pakistan. This rebalancing of
relations means that China has limited influence in
preventing conflict between Pakistan and India, Fu said.

China-India Bilateral Relations "Workable"
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9. (C) Beijing University's Han said bilateral disputes
between China and India continue on border issues, energy
exploitation and "regional supremacy," but the Mumbai terror
attacks perhaps provide an opportunity for the two sides to
work more cooperatively. Whatever the eventual outcome of
the current crisis, India and China will continue to have a
"workable relationship," she said.

Border Dispute Thorny
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10. (C) On the ongoing China-India border dispute, CIIS South
Asia scholar Zheng Ruixiang told PolOff in a conversation
preceding the Mumbai terror attacks that though he understood
Indian FM Mukerjee's early November speech affirming Indian
sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh was aimed at a domestic
audience, making this claim specifically in Dawang is
"unique" and particularly sensitive for China because
Dawang's status is not solely a result of the British

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colonial legacy (i.e., the 1914 McMahon line dividing
colonial India and China, which China does not recognize),
but also a result of India's forceful expulsion of Chinese
and Tibetan authorities from the area in the early 1950s.
India-China border talks will continue, Zheng said, but he
does not foresee an early resolution to the dispute.

Too Much Military Activity in Afghanistan
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11. (C) CIIS's Zheng noted that though Chinese companies wish
to invest in Afghanistan, the "chaos" of the situation has
created a "negative investment environment." Reflecting the
skepticism of Chinese companies regarding the authority of
the Afghan Government, Zheng recalled the oft-repeated
observation that Afghan President Karzai is known as the
"mayor of Kabul" because of his lack of authority outside the
capital city. CIIS' Rong said China is not "sitting on the
fence" in Afghanistan and fully supports President Karzai's
government, but "too much (coalition) military" activity is
creating a chaotic living environment for the local
population and resentment against coalition forces,
conditions that prevent Afghanistan from achieving stability.


12. (C) CIIS' Rong suggested that consultations with regional
countries could lead to a solution to Afghanistan's problems,
though he added that any regional consultation mechanism
should be separate from existing regional groupings like the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization. CICIR's Fu agreed,
stating that the Taliban will not be defeated militarily,
and, hence, negotiations are appropriate. He suggested that
one measure to build confidence between Pakistan and
Afghanistan would be for the Afghanistan Government to accept
the Durand line (the term for the 1,610-mile-long border
between Afghanistan and Pakistan established in the late 19th
century, which Afghan President Karzai has called "a
historical injustice") as the permanent border demarcation.
Piccuta