CHANGING PRC VIEWS OF "OVERSEAS CHINESE"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 004375 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2028 TAGS: PREL PGOV SMIG EINV SCUL CH TW SUBJECT: CHANGING PRC VIEWS OF "OVERSEAS CHINESE" Classified By: Acting Political Section Chief Ben Moeling. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The Chinese Government claims 30-50 million "overseas Chinese" lend it political support by opposing Taiwan independence and supporting China on "patriotic issues." This past summer, PRC officials praised ethnic Chinese counter-demonstrators at Olympic Torch Run protests abroad as examples of the "patriotism" of overseas Chinese. Beijing scholars, however, scoff at such claims, asserting that overseas Chinese are little concerned with politics and focus instead on economic issues. Moreover, official views toward overseas Chinese are reportedly changing, with the government increasingly turning to them not as a source of inbound capital, but for advice on outward investment. While PRC authorities hope overseas Chinese will support Beijing's attempts to project "soft power," demographic and generational differences are likely to complicate that effort. Several PRC scholars advocate wholesale reform of China's overseas Chinese policy apparatus. End Summary. THE OVERSEAS CHINESE COMMUNITY -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The Chinese Government officially categorizes "overseas Chinese" into two groups: ethnic Chinese (hua ren) who are foreign citizens, and Chinese citizens holding permanent residence in other countries (hua qiao),State Council Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) Deputy Director General (DDG) Dong Chuanjie told PolOffs on November ¶21. Overseas Chinese are found in more than 100 countries, making a precise count impossible, but the Chinese Government estimates they number between 30 and 50 million. Beijing Union University Professor Chen Wenshou on November 17 estimated that in 2000, overseas Chinese numbered just under 40 million, with eighty percent resident in Asia, roughly 10 percent in North and South America, four percent in Europe, two percent in Australia and one percent in Africa. BEIJING'S HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENT WITH OVERSEAS CHINESE -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Chinese authorities historically have recognized the importance of the relationship between overseas Chinese and China, according to OCAO DDG Dong. He noted that the Qing Government established an overseas Chinese office in 1866, and the Republic of China established an overseas Chinese 
affairs bureau in the 1920s. After 1949, overseas Chinese received support and attention from senior PRC leaders, Dong said. During the Cultural Revolution, overseas Chinese affairs, like all other topics, became "extremely politicized," but since the OCAO was created in 1978 at the start of the reform era, China has focused on harnessing the economic resources of overseas Chinese to support China's development. "GUIDING PRINCIPLES" OF OVERSEAS CHINESE WORK -------------- ¶4. (U) DDG Dong recounted the "three guiding principles" of the OCAO's overseas Chinese work. First, the OCAO asks that overseas Chinese of foreign nationality be "faithful" to the countries whose citizenship they hold. Second, "transparency and legitimacy" must characterize the OCAO's interaction with overseas Chinese. When conducting international exchanges with overseas Chinese, he said, the OCAO must always follow international law, conventions and customs. Exchanges must also comply with the laws of the relevant home countries. Finally, Dong said that OCAO's work must "benefit the position of the overseas Chinese in their countries," "benefit the relevant country's development and stability," and "benefit bilateral relations between China and the relevant country." POLITICAL ROLE ...? -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Notwithstanding Dong's measured remarks, Chinese officials have often claimed that overseas Chinese play an "important political role" in China's foreign relations. For example, Assistant Foreign Minister Wu Hongbo said in a September 27 speech entitled, "overseas Chinese Work and 30 Years of Reform and Opening," that overseas Chinese have served important political purposes in China's foreign affairs, including China's work in "carrying out people-to-people diplomacy" and "dealing with Taiwan BEIJING 00004375 002 OF 004 affairs." Overseas Chinese, Wu said, "strengthen friendly relations between China and other countries," "promote exchanges and cooperation" between Chinese people and the rest of the world, and "support China's reunification cause" by "opposing (Taiwan) independence and promoting reunification." Similarly, in the aftermath of fierce counter-demonstrations by ethnic Chinese at sites of some Olympic Torch Run protests in 2008, the Foreign Ministry spokesman praised the "righteous voice" of overseas Chinese. ... OR NOT? -------------- ¶6. (C) Many foreign diplomats and Chinese scholars, however, dispute claims that overseas Chinese play an important political role in China's foreign relations. Overseas Chinese have played almost no political role in China's foreign relations in the last 30 years, Assistant Professor Cheng Fenglin (protect),an overseas Chinese scholar at China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU),flatly told PolOff in a recent meeting. Voicing skepticism at claims of politically minded overseas Chinese, Zhou Fangye (protect),Deputy Chief of the Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies in the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS),noted to PolOff on November 13 that although Chinese media reports referred to Olympic Torch Run counter-demonstrations as "spontaneous," overseas Chinese protestors were in fact "certainly all paid by Chinese Embassies and Consulates." Retired Peking University Professor and overseas Chinese scholar Liang Zhiming (protect) separately told PolOff on November 13 that overseas Chinese have had "no role" in opposing Taiwan independence. Political motives and ideology effectively do not influence the behavior of overseas Chinese in Indonesia, Indonesian Embassy Officer Santo Darmosumarto commented on November 12. Citing AFM Wu's speech, Santo said the Chinese Government engages in "spin" to suggest that economically motivated behavior by overseas Chinese indicates political support for China and opposition to Taiwan independence. Even though relations between the Indonesian Government and overseas Chinese in Indonesia have been "troubled," those problems had not resulted in pro-China political leanings among Indonesia's ethnic Chinese population. Contacts that Indonesian Chinese may establish with politicians in China are solely for the purpose of assisting business or investments, Santoso said. IT'S THE ECONOMY -------------- ¶7. (C) Separately echoing Santoso's remarks, Beijing Union University's Chen said the significance of overseas Chinese to the PRC in the last three decades has been almost entirely economic. Citing various statistics, Chen noted that Southeast Asian Chinese communities account for lopsided portions of economic power in Southeast Asia. The importance of capital flows from these wealthy overseas Chinese communities to the success of China's post-1978 economic development cannot be overstated, according to CASS's Zhou. Foreign direct investment from overseas Chinese sources was "crucial" throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, before firms and investors from the United States, Japan and Korea increased the scale of investment, added CFAU's Professor Cheng. Western trade sanctions in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre would have crippled China's foreign trade and derailed reform and opening, asserted Beijing Union Professor Chen, had China's leaders not strengthened relations with overseas Chinese investors in Southeast Asia. In Chen's view, overseas Chinese capital at that juncture "saved" China's economic reforms. CHANGING ROLE OF OVERSEAS CHINESE -------------- ¶8. (C) Chinese scholars say the roles of overseas Chinese in the coming decades will change substantially from those of the past 30 years. Overseas Chinese will likely play a "much less important" role in China's economy, said CASS's Zhou. At this stage in China's development, foreign direct investment from overseas Chinese sources is not nearly as important as in the 1980s and 1990s. Rather, overseas Chinese will increasingly play a role in support of China's "Going Out" strategy of investing overseas, both Zhou and Beijing Union's Chen said. In addition, the political, cultural and social values of overseas Chinese will be "much more important" to China over the next two to three decades, Zhou argued. The Government's overseas Chinese work, he predicted, will focus on incorporating overseas Chinese in efforts to promote China's soft power. As China expands the BEIJING 00004375 003 OF 004 scope of its global engagement, persuading foreign governments and publics to "trust China" and understand its peaceful intentions will be a major task for overseas Chinese in the coming years. While overseas Chinese have a long history of introducing Chinese culture and customs throughout the world, Zhou added, this role will take on "new significance" in the next decade. ¶9. (C) Beijing Union's Chen added that the PRC Government's future overseas Chinese work will be "very different" from that of the past 30 years. China will see the major cultural dimension of the overseas Chinese role as supporting the development of China's international image. Beijing will look to overseas Chinese to serve a public diplomacy role promoting the establishment and expansion of Confucian Institutes, Chinese schools and overseas Chinese media, Chen said. Disagreeing with Zhou's view stated above, Chen argued that overseas Chinese are unlikely to play a significant political role in the coming two to three decades. On the contrary, many of the newer overseas Chinese will be influenced by Western ideals of democracy and liberty, and the Chinese Government will therefore seek to minimize opportunities for the overseas Chinese to exert political influence in Chinese society. As the number of overseas Chinese who return to China in coming years increases, the Chinese Government will seek to ward off potential political activism by encouraging and monitoring the returnees' reintegration into Chinese society, Chen stated. NEW CHINESE EMIGRATION -------------- ¶10. (C) Both the sources and destinations of Chinese emigration are changing greatly. As China expands trade and investment ties, a new wave of Chinese emigrants are departing China for regions and countries that were previously home to few Chinese, including Africa, Latin America and the Russian Far East. Chinese migration into these new areas will surely pose problems, says CFAU's Cheng. Cultural clashes, economic tensions between poor locals and comparatively wealthy Chinese immigrants and other manifestations of resentment will accompany the new and growing Chinese presence in some countries, he said, citing recent kidnappings of Chinese workers in Ethiopia and murders of Chinese oil workers in Sudan as examples. Growing resentment poses a dilemma for the Chinese Government. On the one hand, Cheng said, China must act to protect its citizens abroad. On the other hand, Beijing is very sensitive to the possibility that any actions or statements could adversely affect the peaceful international image it is seeking to build. The serious damage to China's foreign relations brought about by past efforts to intervene on behalf of overseas Chinese in countries such as Indonesia serves to further restrain the Chinese Government today. ¶11. (C) Regardless of destination, the sociological and cultural profiles of the new Chinese emigrants are quite different from that of previous generations, scholars said. The older generation largely traces its roots to concentrated areas in the southern coastal provinces of Fujian and Guangdong. Confucian traditions deeply influenced these older emigrants, as shown by the strong sense of connection that many have to the home areas of their ancestors. Even today, said Cheng, many villages in Guangdong and Fujian receive generous support and care from wealthy overseas Chinese with ancestral links to the areas. The new emigrants, by contrast, reflect the changes in Chinese culture and society in recent decades, with many being highly educated urban dwellers hailing from cities across China, particularly from the more developed provinces and municipalities in East China. The waning influence of traditional Chinese culture in urban areas leaves new emigrants with a different sense of Chinese identity and a weaker connection to the "land of their ancestors." "The new emigrants don't even think like their predecessors," CASS's Zhou said, adding that the new emigrants have a strong "global" and "international" mindset not a "Chinese" mindset Maintaining ties with these new emigrants will therefore require "skillful diplomacy" on the part of the Chinese Government, he asserted. EFFECT OF ONE-CHILD POLICY -------------- ¶12. (C) The one-child policy has further exacerbated the generation gap among Chinese emigrants, Zhou added. Having come from the Chinese tradition of large, complex families, earlier Chinese migrants displayed traditional "collective" values, which stressed the importance of familial ties and a BEIJING 00004375 004 OF 004 person's role in broader society. As products of the one-child policy, both CFAU's Cheng and Zhou said, the new Chinese migrants are strongly "individualistic" and prioritize personal achievement at the expense of service to community or society. "In the old days," said Zhou, summarizing the relevant cultural changes, "the things that connected people in China were 'shared blood' and 'shared hometowns'." Today, "mutual interests" and "contracts" are the important factors for establishing and building relationships. Beijing Union's Chen said the new migrants are also far more "universal" and "international," and far less "traditionally Chinese" in their thinking than were the old emigrants. Chen added, however, that a "new Chinese nationalism" is emerging to fill the vacuum left by the disappearance of a traditional sense of Chinese identity among the new migrants, and this nationalism will only intensify among the new overseas Chinese. INTERNAL DISAGREEMENTS -------------- ¶13. (C) Complicating the future of Beijing's overseas Chinese work in the next two to three decades, say scholars, are fundamental disagreements between the OCAO, China's principal overseas Chinese policy organ, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on the proper role of overseas Chinese in the PRC's foreign affairs. One key difference centers on the question of nationality, retired Peking University Professor Liang Zhiming (protect) told PolOff. With the 1955 signing by Zhou Enlai of a dual nationality treaty between China and Indonesia, China adopted the position that overseas Chinese possessing citizenship of another country cannot be citizens of China. China's 1980 Nationality Law further codified this position. Nonetheless, different views persist between MFA and OCAO. From an MFA perspective, said Liang, if the Chinese Government were to view overseas Chinese as anything other than foreign citizens, tensions and problems in China's foreign relations would quickly follow. But regardless of Chinese laws on nationality and citizenship, many officials at the OCAO and other overseas Chinese policy organs, as well as officials in Fujian and Guangdong, according to Beijing Union's Chen, equate Chinese ethnicity with "loyalty" to China. Preventing resolution of these MFA-OCAO disagreements, said Chen, is the "equal rank" that the two entities hold within the Government. Although the MFA may occasionally influence overseas Chinese policies, the OCAO is ultimately responsible for deciding policy, Chen stated. REFORM OF OVERSEAS CHINESE POLICY? -------------- ¶14. (C) In light of the challenges facing overseas Chinese work in the coming years, said Beijing Union's Chen, a growing number of scholars and officials are advocating a reorganization of the Government's overseas Chinese policy apparatus. In Chen's view, Beijing's fundamental problem is the absence of an overarching policymaking body for overseas Chinese work. Instead, he explained, the work is divided among several entities, a structure that reflects the situation in 1978, the year of the OCAO's creation. Today's policymakers, he said, do not adequately understand the complexities of the overseas Chinese situation, nor how that situation has changed in the last three decades. Some scholars and officials, Chen said, support a reform of the overseas Chinese policy apparatus that would remove the OCAO from the State Council's jurisdiction and re-establish it as an independent body, while at the same time consolidating other Government entities that also work on overseas Chinese issues. RANDT