HIGHLIGHTS OF WORKSHOP ON SIX-PARTY TALKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 004223

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2033
TAGS: PREL PGOV MNUC KN CH KS
SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS OF WORKSHOP ON SIX-PARTY TALKS

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.
4 (b/d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Participants in an October 24 mixed
government-academic-think tank workshop in Beijing on the
Six-Party Talks generally viewed the Six-Party Talks as a
useful mechanism to solve the nuclear issue, although some
criticized North Korea-specific agreements that appear to be
at odds with internationally recognized nonproliferation and
disarmament norms. While one Russian researcher questioned
North Korea's commitment to abandon its nuclear weapons
program, Chinese disarmament officials urged the parties to
be patient during the "long march" to the final abandonment
phase. Another Russian scholar professed that Moscow remains
committed to the Six-Party Talks process and is interested in
the potential for the Talks to evolve into a forum on
regional issues. He proposed an international uranium
extraction center based in Russia that would allow North
Korea to have access to fuel but would limit the risk of
proliferation. A Japanese official warned that if the
international community accepts the DPRK as a nuclear power,
Japan will be forced to reassess its commitment not to
develop nuclear weapons. Most in attendance rejected
suggestions that the defunct Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO) be reconstituted or the DPRK
be provided a light-water reactor. End Summary.

In Support of the Six-Party Talks
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2. (SBU) PolOff attended an October 24 workshop in Beijing
entitled "The Six-Party Talks and New Opportunities to
Strengthen Regional Nonproliferation and Disarmament Efforts"
and co-sponsored by The Stanley Foundation (an Iowa-based
private foundation focused on peace and security issues),the
National Committee of North Korea (a New York -based
coalition of Americans interested in promoting engagement
between citizens of the United States and the DPRK),the
China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA is a
Chinese NGO affiliated with the PRC Ministry of Foreign
Affairs),and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (a
non-profit that conducts research on foreign policy and
national security affairs, with offices in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, and Washington, DC). Participants included
representatives from the Governments of China, Russia, Japan,
the ROK and the United States and members of think tanks and
universities. Representatives from the DPRK Government were
invited to attend, but did not.


3. (C) Participants generally agreed that in the wake of
North Korea's unilateral withdrawal from the Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT),the Six-Party Talks remain the most useful
framework in which to address the DPRK nuclear issue. Noting
that in the absence of DPRK NPT commitments, the only
international mechanisms applicable to the North Korean
nuclear issue are UN Security Resolutions 1540 and 1718, the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Six-Party
Talks, CACDA Deputy Secretary General Teng Jianqun
characterized the Six-Party Talks as the "only useful
mechanism to solve the nuclear issue." This sentiment was
shared by other scholars. Pointing out that the Six-Party
Talks check North Korea's dangerous tendency to engage in
nuclear proliferation, Moscow's Institute for World Economy
and International Relations (IMEMO) Professor George Toloraya
contended that it is much better to have the Six-Party Talks
manage the nuclear threat and maintain stability because the
world should be "worried when North Korea is not at the
negotiating table."

North Korean Exceptions
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4. (C) Several workshop participants expressed concern about
North Korea-specific agreements, such as the U.S.-DPRK
verification protocol, that appear to circumvent
nonproliferation and disarmament norms. The lack of a
central role for the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) in the verification process is a mistake, contended
Mark Fitzpatrick, the Nonproliferation and Disarmament
Programme Director of the London-based International
Institute for International Studies. Moreover, said IMEMO
Director Alexander Pikayev, potential proliferators have
noted that North Korea has gone unpunished for developing a
nuclear weapons program and may believe that the
international community is powerless to punish rule breakers.



5. (C) Chinese participants downplayed concerns over
Six-Party agreements tailored to North Korea's "special

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situation." Former Counselor of the PRC MFA Korean Peninsula
Affairs Office Yang Xiyu said that the U.S.-DPRK agreement on
verification "gives life to the Six-Party Talks" and helps
maintain momentum at a very uncertain period. While he
predicted technical difficulties during the verification
process, especially related to access to undeclared sites, he
expressed belief that North Korea will be cooperative on
providing access to declared facilities and programs. CACDA
Executive Vice President Li Changhe said that the parties
should be focused on how to "strike a balance between
negotiation and penalty" and not on how to implement
potentially counterproductive sanctions.

Denuclearization: The Long March?
--------------


6. (C) Russian researcher Pikayev, along with others,
questioned North Korea's commitment to eventually abandon its
nuclear weapons program. North Korea is unlikely to give up
its only "trump card" easily, he said. It is not clear, said
Pikayev, if Pyongyang truly intends to denuclearize or if it
continues to participate in the negotiations only to receive
economic, political and diplomatic benefits. CACDA's Teng
Jianquan, on the other hand, described the denuclearization
process as a "long march" and speculated that it could take
ten years and billions of dollars. Teng's CACDA colleague,
Vice President Gong Xianfu, said that reaching the final
abandonment stage will be a "long, arduous" process. The key
to progress, he emphasized, is continuing bilateral contact
between the two primary players -- the United States and the
DPRK.


7. (C) In order to achieve denuclearization, it is important
for the five parties to coordinate their messages and
approaches to North Korea, urged Georgetown University fellow
and South Korean MFA official Song Young Wang. CACDA Vice
President Ye Ru'an disagreed, contending that it would be
"unwise" for the five parties to have a unified strategy
against North Korea. While there should be consensus among
the members of the Six-Party Talks, North Korea would be
furious about any "secret dealings" among the other five.

The View from Russia
--------------


8. (C) Russia is committed to the Six-Party Talks, said
Russian researcher Alexander Pikayev. Despite the recent
downturn in U.S.-Russian cooperation on nonproliferation and
security issues, Pikayev said, bilateral cooperation on North
Korea had not been affected by disagreements over the
Russia-Georgia conflict. (Note: Pikayev said Moscow very
much appreciated Pyongyang's expression of support for
Russia's position in the Georgia conflict.) In addition to
the Six-Party Talks role in managing the nuclear threat, said
Pikayev, Moscow is also interested in the potential for the
Six-Party Talks to evolve into a forum to discuss regional
issues. Pikayev speculated that Russian participation in the
Six-Party Talks may intensify with Russia set to host the
2012 APEC leaders meeting in Vladivostok. In addition to
Vladivostok's proximity to the Russian-DPRK border, he noted
that the city imported North Korean labor to construct the
APEC facility. On a separate note, Moscow is willing to help
North Korea diversify its economy, Pikayev said. He
maintained that economic development in North Korea, such as
the development of a proposed gas pipeline through the Korean
Peninsula, would help lay the foundation for the eventual
liberalization of North Korea.


9. (C) IMEMO Professor George Toloroya contended that North
Korea cannot attain energy security without relying on
nuclear energy. One possible solution that would satisfy
North Korea's energy needs and limit the risk of
proliferation would be the development of an international
fuel-production center in Russia, he proposed. Russia, which
has the capacity to enrich large amounts of uranium, would
allow interested powers (i.e., North Korea) to be
shareholders in this fuel production center. Shareholders
would not be able to enrich uranium themselves, and all spent
fuel would be returned to Russia, said Pikayev.

Japanese Self-Restraint
--------------


10. (C) Despite possessing the potential to develop nuclear
weapons, Japan is "unwilling" to develop them because to do
so would not serve Japan's national interests, according to
Japan Institute of International Affairs' Center for the
Promotion of Disarmament and Nonproliferation Director Takaya
Suto. It is Japan's self-restraint on this issue that serves
to prevent other countries in the region from becoming
nuclear powers, he maintained. However, international
acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear power would change

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Japan's cost-benefit analysis and its commitment to not
develop nuclear weapons, he warned.

Recommendations
--------------


11. (C) Joel Witt, Columbia University Senior Adjunct Fellow,
offered three recommendations for the Six-Party process: 1)
Expand the range of issues discussed with North Korea to
include non-nuclear issues; 2) Begin a broader
nonproliferation dialogue with North Korea and urge the DPRK
to end missile exports and sever ties to Syria and Iran; and
3) Immediately start the Korean Peninsula peace process in
order to send an unambiguous political signal to North Korea
that the United States is ready to move forward and normalize
relations with North Korea. Witt suggested stepping up the
frequency and range of U.S.-North Korea exchanges, to
possibly include mil-to-mil exchanges and MIA recovery
missions. Separately, Nuclear Threat Initiative's
International Program Director Corey Hinderstein proposed
that the Six Parties jointly pursue confidence-building
activities that would redirect North Korean scientists to
non-nuclear weapons fields such as medicine, agriculture and
isotope isolation.


12. (C) Although there was some discussion during the
workshop of reconstituting KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization) or providing North Korea with a
light-water reactor (LWR),most participants rejected these
proposals as technically, economically or politically
unfeasible. Korea Institute for National Unification Senior
Research Fellow Cheon Seongwhun stated that the ROK public
would not support the revival of KEDO nor would it support a
"KEDO type of expense." Russia would also be reluctant to
construct an LWR in North Korea, added Toloraya.
RANDT