HIGHLIGHTS OF WORKSHOP ON SIX-PARTY TALKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 004223 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2033 TAGS: PREL PGOV MNUC KN CH KS SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS OF WORKSHOP ON SIX-PARTY TALKS Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1. 4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Participants in an October 24 mixed government-academic-think tank workshop in Beijing on the Six-Party Talks generally viewed the Six-Party Talks as a useful mechanism to solve the nuclear issue, although some criticized North Korea-specific agreements that appear to be at odds with internationally recognized nonproliferation and disarmament norms. While one Russian researcher questioned North Korea's commitment to abandon its nuclear weapons program, Chinese disarmament officials urged the parties to be patient during the "long march" to the final abandonment phase. Another Russian scholar professed that Moscow remains committed to the Six-Party Talks process and is interested in the potential for the Talks to evolve into a forum on regional issues. He proposed an international uranium extraction center based in Russia that would allow North Korea to have access to fuel but would limit the risk of proliferation. A Japanese official warned that if the international community accepts the DPRK as a nuclear power, Japan will be forced to reassess its commitment not to develop nuclear weapons. Most in attendance rejected suggestions that the defunct Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) be reconstituted or the DPRK be provided a light-water reactor. End Summary. In Support of the Six-Party Talks -------------- ¶2. (SBU) PolOff attended an October 24 workshop in Beijing entitled "The Six-Party Talks and New Opportunities to Strengthen Regional Nonproliferation and Disarmament Efforts" and co-sponsored by The Stanley Foundation (an Iowa-based private foundation focused on peace and security issues),the National Committee of North Korea (a New York -based coalition of Americans interested in promoting engagement between citizens of the United States and the DPRK),the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA is a Chinese NGO affiliated with the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs),and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (a non-profit that conducts research on foreign policy and national security affairs, with offices in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Washington, DC). Participants included representatives from the Governments of China, Russia, Japan, the ROK and the United States and members of think tanks and universities. Representatives from the DPRK Government were invited to attend, but did not. ¶3. (C) Participants generally agreed that in the wake of North Korea's unilateral withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT),the Six-Party Talks remain the most useful framework in which to address the DPRK nuclear issue. Noting that in the absence of DPRK NPT commitments, the only international mechanisms applicable to the North Korean nuclear issue are UN Security Resolutions 1540 and 1718, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Six-Party Talks, CACDA Deputy Secretary General Teng Jianqun characterized the Six-Party Talks as the "only useful mechanism to solve the nuclear issue." This sentiment was shared by other scholars. Pointing out that the Six-Party Talks check North Korea's dangerous tendency to engage in nuclear proliferation, Moscow's Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) Professor George Toloraya contended that it is much better to have the Six-Party Talks manage the nuclear threat and maintain stability because the world should be "worried when North Korea is not at the negotiating table." North Korean Exceptions -------------- ¶4. (C) Several workshop participants expressed concern about North Korea-specific agreements, such as the U.S.-DPRK verification protocol, that appear to circumvent nonproliferation and disarmament norms. The lack of a central role for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the verification process is a mistake, contended Mark Fitzpatrick, the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Programme Director of the London-based International Institute for International Studies. Moreover, said IMEMO Director Alexander Pikayev, potential proliferators have noted that North Korea has gone unpunished for developing a nuclear weapons program and may believe that the international community is powerless to punish rule breakers. ¶5. (C) Chinese participants downplayed concerns over Six-Party agreements tailored to North Korea's "special BEIJING 00004223 002 OF 003 situation." Former Counselor of the PRC MFA Korean Peninsula Affairs Office Yang Xiyu said that the U.S.-DPRK agreement on verification "gives life to the Six-Party Talks" and helps maintain momentum at a very uncertain period. While he predicted technical difficulties during the verification process, especially related to access to undeclared sites, he expressed belief that North Korea will be cooperative on providing access to declared facilities and programs. CACDA Executive Vice President Li Changhe said that the parties should be focused on how to "strike a balance between negotiation and penalty" and not on how to implement potentially counterproductive sanctions. Denuclearization: The Long March? -------------- ¶6. (C) Russian researcher Pikayev, along with others, questioned North Korea's commitment to eventually abandon its nuclear weapons program. North Korea is unlikely to give up its only "trump card" easily, he said. It is not clear, said Pikayev, if Pyongyang truly intends to denuclearize or if it continues to participate in the negotiations only to receive economic, political and diplomatic benefits. CACDA's Teng Jianquan, on the other hand, described the denuclearization process as a "long march" and speculated that it could take ten years and billions of dollars. Teng's CACDA colleague, Vice President Gong Xianfu, said that reaching the final abandonment stage will be a "long, arduous" process. The key to progress, he emphasized, is continuing bilateral contact between the two primary players -- the United States and the DPRK. ¶7. (C) In order to achieve denuclearization, it is important for the five parties to coordinate their messages and approaches to North Korea, urged Georgetown University fellow and South Korean MFA official Song Young Wang. CACDA Vice President Ye Ru'an disagreed, contending that it would be "unwise" for the five parties to have a unified strategy against North Korea. While there should be consensus among the members of the Six-Party Talks, North Korea would be furious about any "secret dealings" among the other five. The View from Russia -------------- ¶8. (C) Russia is committed to the Six-Party Talks, said Russian researcher Alexander Pikayev. Despite the recent downturn in U.S.-Russian cooperation on nonproliferation and security issues, Pikayev said, bilateral cooperation on North Korea had not been affected by disagreements over the Russia-Georgia conflict. (Note: Pikayev said Moscow very much appreciated Pyongyang's expression of support for Russia's position in the Georgia conflict.) In addition to the Six-Party Talks role in managing the nuclear threat, said Pikayev, Moscow is also interested in the potential for the Six-Party Talks to evolve into a forum to discuss regional issues. Pikayev speculated that Russian participation in the Six-Party Talks may intensify with Russia set to host the 2012 APEC leaders meeting in Vladivostok. In addition to Vladivostok's proximity to the Russian-DPRK border, he noted that the city imported North Korean labor to construct the APEC facility. On a separate note, Moscow is willing to help North Korea diversify its economy, Pikayev said. He maintained that economic development in North Korea, such as the development of a proposed gas pipeline through the Korean Peninsula, would help lay the foundation for the eventual liberalization of North Korea. ¶9. (C) IMEMO Professor George Toloroya contended that North Korea cannot attain energy security without relying on nuclear energy. One possible solution that would satisfy North Korea's energy needs and limit the risk of proliferation would be the development of an international fuel-production center in Russia, he proposed. Russia, which has the capacity to enrich large amounts of uranium, would allow interested powers (i.e., North Korea) to be shareholders in this fuel production center. Shareholders would not be able to enrich uranium themselves, and all spent fuel would be returned to Russia, said Pikayev. Japanese Self-Restraint -------------- ¶10. (C) Despite possessing the potential to develop nuclear weapons, Japan is "unwilling" to develop them because to do so would not serve Japan's national interests, according to Japan Institute of International Affairs' Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Nonproliferation Director Takaya Suto. It is Japan's self-restraint on this issue that serves to prevent other countries in the region from becoming nuclear powers, he maintained. However, international acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear power would change BEIJING 00004223 003 OF 003 Japan's cost-benefit analysis and its commitment to not develop nuclear weapons, he warned. Recommendations -------------- ¶11. (C) Joel Witt, Columbia University Senior Adjunct Fellow, offered three recommendations for the Six-Party process: 1) Expand the range of issues discussed with North Korea to include non-nuclear issues; 2) Begin a broader nonproliferation dialogue with North Korea and urge the DPRK to end missile exports and sever ties to Syria and Iran; and 3) Immediately start the Korean Peninsula peace process in order to send an unambiguous political signal to North Korea that the United States is ready to move forward and normalize relations with North Korea. Witt suggested stepping up the frequency and range of U.S.-North Korea exchanges, to possibly include mil-to-mil exchanges and MIA recovery missions. Separately, Nuclear Threat Initiative's International Program Director Corey Hinderstein proposed that the Six Parties jointly pursue confidence-building activities that would redirect North Korean scientists to non-nuclear weapons fields such as medicine, agriculture and isotope isolation. ¶12. (C) Although there was some discussion during the workshop of reconstituting KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) or providing North Korea with a light-water reactor (LWR),most participants rejected these proposals as technically, economically or politically unfeasible. Korea Institute for National Unification Senior Research Fellow Cheon Seongwhun stated that the ROK public would not support the revival of KEDO nor would it support a "KEDO type of expense." Russia would also be reluctant to construct an LWR in North Korea, added Toloraya. RANDT