ARATS PRESIDENT'S TAIWAN VISIT STILL ON; SCHOLARS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 004085 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2033 TAGS: PREL PARM MARR CH TW SUBJECT: ARATS PRESIDENT'S TAIWAN VISIT STILL ON; SCHOLARS DEBATE "DIFFICULT" CROSS-STRAIT ISSUES REF: A. BEIJING 4029 ¶B. BEIJING 3888 ¶C. TAIPEI 1508 ¶D. TAIPEI 1484 ¶E. TAIPEI 1479 ¶F. TAIPEI 1520 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Chinese leaders hope the November 3-7 trip to Taiwan by Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) head Chen Yunlin will mark a "significant breakthrough" in cross-Strait relations and have decided to proceed with the visit despite concerns over Chen's personal security, Embassy contacts say. Chen's Taiwan trip is expected to focus on economics and result in agreements on transportation, shipping, mail and food safety. Beijing observers say Chen's trip will take place against a backdrop of intensified study and debate of "more difficult" cross-Strait political and security issues, both on the Mainland and in Taiwan, including Taiwan's international space, military force reductions, confidence-building measures and a peace agreement, even though resolution of these nettlesome problems will take a "very long time." End Summary. CHEN VISIT: CONCERNED ABOUT SECURITY -------------- ¶2. (C) The PRC official news agency Xinhua confirmed on October 27 that the dates for ARATS chief Chen Yunlin's Taiwan visit will be November 3-7. Prior to the announcement, there was considerable discussion in Beijing about the timing and arrangements of the upcoming trip (refs C and D),even before the October 21 "assault" on ARATS deputy chief Zhang Mingqing in Tainan, Taiwan. Mainland officials are "quite concerned" over Chen Yunlin's personal security because of the "massive" protests planned by the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP),contacts have told us. Zhou Zhihuai (protect),the newly installed Vice Chairman of the National Society of Taiwan Studies (NSTS), told PolOff October 17 that a "majority" of Mainland scholars thought Chen Yunlin should "postpone" his visit because of security concerns and Taiwan demands that Chen apologize for the melamine-tainted milk scandal. (Note: ARATS issued a formal apology to SEF on October 27, saying that "Mainland China will not tolerate any harm to the HEALTH and rights of consumers on either side of the Taiwan Strait.") ¶3. (C) Despite this purported opposition to Chen's trip by many Mainland scholars, Zhou said that he advised Chen Yunlin to proceed "as planned" because a postponement would be seen as a "DPP victory" and might appear as if Chen were trying to duck protesters. Moreover, Zhou argued, the DPP will demonstrate against the visit regardless of its timing. If protestors "throw eggs" at Chen, the DPP and Taiwan will "look bad" because the Mainland has been a gracious host for senior Taiwan visitors to the PRC. The important thing, Zhou said, is to "take the first step" so that future visits by Chinese officials to Taiwan will "not be such a big deal." ¶4. (C) If there was ever any question as to whether Chen Yunlin's visit would go ahead as planned, the October 21 "assault" on ARATS's deputy Zhang Minqing guaranteed that Chen "had to go," according to Embassy contacts. A working-level TAO official predicted to PolOff on October 23 that the October 21 Zhang Mingqing incident will "definitely not" affect the timing of Chen's visit. Xu Shiquan, Deputy Secretary General of the NSTS, told a visiting American scholar on October 23 that Chen Yunlin "must go" to Taiwan following the Zhang Mingqing incident; otherwise, Chen will be accused of "lacking courage." Xu commented that the "pro-independence radicals" in Taiwan were "stupid" to provoke an incident with Zhang Mingqing, because their actions were "counterproductive" and actually "helped China" by turning Taiwan public opinion against the "extremist" independence advocates. ¶5. (C) CASS's Yu Keli told PolOff he is a "close friend" of Zhang Mingqing's and has spoken with him since Zhang returned from Taiwan. Zhang reportedly said he was pushed down twice but that he was not seriously injured. When asked whether BEIJING 00004085 002 OF 004 the assault was motivated by personal animosity toward Zhang, who previously served as TAO spokesman, or was meant to symbolize antagonism toward the Mainland and cross-Strait rapprochement, Yu replied that the incident was the result of Tainan city councilman and DPP member Wang Ting-yu's desire for a "publicity stunt" to enhance his quest for a Legislative Yuan seat. Yu commented that he has "many friends in the DPP" and that he "did not feel threatened" during his visits to Taiwan in 2000, 2005 and September 2008. ¶6. (C) The October 25 protests in Taiwan (ref F) and other planned demonstrations will not affect Chen Yunlin's trip, Yu Keli averred. The actual number of demonstrators in Taiwan on October 25 was closer to 400,000 rather that the 600,000 claimed by the DPP, Yu said. He opined that "most people in Taiwan" support cross-Strait rapprochement, but they have yet to see results "in their pocketbooks" from Ma's cross-Strait policies. Yu assessed that Ma's poor approval ratings are due to Taiwan's economic woes -- most of which are caused by global factors "beyond Ma's control" -- and not Ma's policies toward the Mainland. CHEN WILL FOCUS ON THE ECONOMY . . . -------------- ¶7. (C) Chen Yunlin's visit will follow the script laid out by the two sides for the next round of ARATS-SEF talks as reported ref D. The sides are expected to sign agreements on charter cargo flights, direct maritime shipping, direct postal service and food safety. According to October 27 reporting from Xinhua, they also plan to revise June's charter flight agreement to include daily flights, more Mainland airports and a new direct air corridor. According to Xinhua, the two sides also agreed during a preparatory meeting in Shenzhen October 27 to hold expert-level talks on the challenges posed by the international financial crisis. ¶8. (C) Tao Wenzhao (protect),a senior fellow at CASS's Institute of American Studies, asserted to PolOff on October 14 that the substance of Chen Yunlin's trip will likely be overshadowed by the significance of the visit itself. China places "great importance" on the upcoming Chen Yunlin visit to Taiwan, Tao emphasized, which Beijing hopes will represent a "major breakthrough." Chen will be the senior-most PRC official responsible for cross-Strait issues to visit the island, Tao said, pointing out that when TAO Deputy Director Sun Yafu attended former SEF chairman Koo Chen-fu's funeral in 2005, Sun engaged in no substantive exchanges. ¶9. (C) CASS's Tao and NSTS's Zhou said they are "unclear" whether Chen's visit will result in agreement on the mutual establishment of representative offices, which was raised during the June ARATS-SEF talks. Tao said he thinks the holdup on establishing representative offices is "on the Taiwan side." Zhou commented that such offices would be very useful in facilitating increased travel between the two sides, but "sensitivity" remains about allowing SEF to issue Republic of China travel documents in Mainland cities. Both scholars said they expect "preliminary discussions" on Taiwan's international space to take place at this round, even though the Taiwan media has claimed that no political issues will be on the agenda. . . . BUT SCHOLARS TURN TO POLITICAL, SECURITY ISSUES -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) While official cross-Strait discussions in the ARATS-SEF channel continue to focus on economic agreements -- in accordance with the so-called "first easy, then hard" approach -- Embassy contacts say there has been an expansion of discussions on more difficult political and security issues, both within China and via various cross-Strait exchanges. NSTS's Zhou Zhihuai remarked that "no ONE is interested in economic issues anymore." Instead, "everyone is talking" about the "tough" issues such as a diplomatic ceasefire, Taiwan's international space, a possible PLA military drawdown, confidence-building measures and the proposed cross-Strait peace agreement. Zhang Tuosheng (protect),Director of the Institute of Foreign Policy Studies at the PLA-affiliated think tank China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies (CFISS),told PolOff October 20 that there has been an increase in the scope and frequency of cross-Strait scholarly exchanges since President Chen Shui-bian left office in May (see ref E),noting that these discussions are increasingly focused on the more BEIJING 00004085 003 OF 004 sensitive issues in the cross-Strait relationship. Guo Zhenyuan (protect),senior researcher at the MFA-affiliated China Institute of International Studies, (CIIS),told PolOff October 15 that in July he made his first visit to Taiwan in nine years, having been labeled as a "hawk" and "blacklisted" by the Chen Shui-bian administration. While in Taiwan, Guo said there were "no limits" on the topics of discussion. CASS's Yu Keli separately agreed, commenting that from 2005 to 2008 the "atmosphere" was not conducive to cross-Strait academic exchanges. Now, especially since the Olympics are over, the two sides are "making up for lost time," Yu said, noting that he left for his most recent trip to Taiwan just two days after the Beijing Paralympics ended in mid-September. ¶11. (C) While discussion of cross-Strait political and security issues has apparently increased, resolving these nettlesome issues will nevertheless take a "very long time," according to Niu Xinchun (protect),Deputy Director of the Center for Taiwan-Related Studies at the MSS-affiliated China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). In an October 10 meeting with PolOff, Niu said China's "roadmap" on cross-Strait relations is clear: first deal with economics, then politics and finally military and security issues. When people say cross-Strait relations have "improved," Niu argued, they are referring to economic relations, because to date "we have not solved a single cross-Strait political problem." So far, there has been no progress on political issues because there is "no domestic consensus to do so," either in China or Taiwan, Niu said. Therefore, the strategy is to develop close economic relations while "buying time" to develop a domestic consensus on both sides of the Strait, Niu concluded. On the issue of reducing PLA forces across from Taiwan, Sun Keqin (Niu's boss and Director of CICIR's Center for Taiwan-Related Studies) said China "needs time" to consider the issue, claiming that Beijing is still studying the question. Nevertheless, even though cross-Strait relations have made "progress," they have "not stabilized," Sun said, pointing out Ma's domestic political difficulties and the "growing strength of the DPP, which makes the PLA "extremely cautions" about force posture changes. DEBATING TAIWAN'S INTERNATIONAL SPACE -------------- ¶12. (C) The question of Taiwan's international space is also a subject of discussion in Beijing, according to some Embassy contacts. CASS's Tao Wenzhao told PolOff the crux of the problem is that China cannot sponsor Taiwan's participation in international organizations because that would be seen as claiming sovereignty over the island. At the same time, if Taiwan joins an international organization on its own, it looks like an independent country. CICIR's Niu Xinchun echoed these comments, saying the fact that Taiwan still considers itself an "independent, sovereign entity" is the "greatest complication" for the international space issue. One problem is whether Taiwan should be allowed to participate as an observer only in the World HEALTH Assembly (WHA),or whether Taiwan should also participate in the activities of the World HEALTH Organization (WHO). According to a Canadian Embassy counterpart in Beijing, a TAO official this month told the Canadians that a solution to Taiwan's participation in the WHA/WHO will be reached by May 2009, suggesting that the solution could also serve as a "model" for Taiwan's participation in other international organizations. CASS's Tao Wenzhao expressed to PolOff the hope that a "creative and wise" way can be found to resolve Taiwan's WHA/WHO participation by next May. ¶13. (C) CASS's Yu Keli refused to comment directly on the possibility of a breakthrough on the international space question before May, but he acknowledged that the two sides are discussing the issue, and he would not rule out the "possibility of significant progress." Noting that Taiwan's WHO participation was a topic of discussion between President Hu Jintao and former KMT Chairman Lien Chan as early as 2005, Yu said President Hu instructed scholars to research the international space issue with an eye toward finding a "wise" solution. Yu expressed annoyance at President Ma Ying-jeou for publicly raising expectations for a resolution by May. Ma's approach, Yu argued, goes against the spirit of "setting aside disputes" (gezhi zhengyi). For instance, when Taiwan was considering changing its approach to joining the UN this year, there was some initial communication between the two sides, Yu said, but then Taiwan "independently" went forward, BEIJING 00004085 004 OF 004 having Nauru and Gambia request Taiwan's participation in the activities of UN-affiliated organizations. Because of this step, the PRC was forced to respond negatively, Yu said. China has tacitly accepted the "diplomatic ceasefire" unilaterally proposed by Ma in the interest of "setting aside disputes," Yu said. If the battle over recognition were to continue, Yu remarked, Taiwan would soon have less than 20 diplomatic allies. ¶14. (C) CIIS's Guo Zhenyuan and NSTS's Zhou Zhihuai said they support some form of WHA participation for Taiwan but oppose participation in WHO because as a UN-affiliated organization, it is composed of sovereign states. Guo and Zhou both said that even if a decision is made to allow Taiwan some form of participation in WHO, it should be seen as a "special case" rather than as a "model" for participation in other UN-affiliated organizations. Guo opposes the "rush" to resolve the issue by the next time the WHA meets in May 2009, arguing that even though there should be a "sense of urgency" to take advantage of the "historic opportunity" presented by Ma's presidency, at the same time, there should not be a timetable and the decision should not be made "hastily." Asked about a TAO statement that reportedly suggested a "comprehensive solution" to the international space issue, both Guo and Zhou admitted that there are "active internal debates" about the questions of when to move on the WHA/WHO decision and about whether China should adopt a "case-by-case" approach or propose a "model" to resolve Taiwan's international space concerns. Neither observer offered a prediction as to possible actual outcomes. HU TRYING TO ACHIEVE A "DYNAMIC STATUS QUO" -------------- ¶15. (C) Scholarly contacts reiterated that President Hu Jintao remains the "final arbiter" of China's Taiwan policy. For example, even though NSTS's Zhou Zhihuai was doubtful that Taiwan will be allowed to participate in the WHO, he admitted that the "ultimate decision" rests with Hu. CFISS's Zhang Tuosheng, addressing the question of whether Hu Jintao's proposals of a peace agreement and a cross-Strait peace and development framework are essentially an effort to codify the status quo, emphasized that President Hu wants to achieve a "dynamic status quo," where the two sides are interacting positively and moving closer together while the underlying reality of separation remains. China's ultimate goal nevertheless remains unification, and adjustments to Taiwan policy are still meant to push trends in that direction, Zhang said. Dai Jian (protect),Zhang Tuosheng's colleague at CFISS, commented that Hu Jintao shifted toward a long-term continuation of the status quo beginning in 2005 when he dropped demands for a timetable on reunification. Dai argued that the PRC leadership's primary concerns are dealing with domestic challenges and growing the economy, meaning they want to avoid conflict across the Strait. ¶16. (C) CASS's Yu Keli praised Hu Jintao's knowledge of Taiwan, telling PolOff that, among the central leadership, Hu Jintao has by far the "best grasp" of Taiwan-related issues. Yu said he has had several opportunities to brief Hu on Taiwan since 2003, praising Hu for his "insightful" questions and "deep interest" in the issues. Yu strongly supports Hu's March 2005 "four nevers" speech (never sway from the one-China principle, never give up the goal of peaceful reunification, never change the principle of having faith in the Taiwan people and never compromise in opposing Taiwan independence). Scholars have followed Hu's "four nevers" policy direction since 2005, Yu said. Vice President Xi Jinping, by contrast, does not have a good understanding of Taiwan issues, Yu claimed. Xi's years of experience in Fujian Province make him familiar with economic issues related to Taiwan investment. Xi has a good understanding of Hong Kong, which is in his current portfolio, but Xi still "does not yet fully understand" the full scope of Taiwan issues, Yu asserted. Politburo Standing Committee Member Jia Qinglin has a "somewhat better" understanding than Xi of Taiwan issues, Yu said, noting that Jia currently has the Taiwan portfolio and also previously held leadership positions in Fujian. PICCUTA