PRC/IRAN: SCHOLARS SAY PRC INFLUENCE LIMITED AS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 003588 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2033 TAGS: PREL PARM ENRG PTER MNUC IR CH SUBJECT: PRC/IRAN: SCHOLARS SAY PRC INFLUENCE LIMITED AS P5-PLUS-1 EFFORTS ENTER "NEW PHASE" REF: BEIJING 1111 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: China believes international efforts to deal with Iran's nuclear program have entered a "new phase" in which an increasingly confident Iran is rethinking the significance of its nuclear development, according to a PRC scholar who recently met with observers in Tehran. Chinese leaders will increasingly monitor the intention behind Iran's nuclear development, but will continue to look to the United States for leadership on the dual-track approach to dealing with the nuclear issue. The split in the P5-plus-1 over Georgia will be an obstacle to progress on the Iran issue, but China does not feel forced to take sides given that a primary PRC interest in the Middle East remains energy cooperation. Another Chinese scholar stressed that PRC influence with Iran remains limited and that the United States, in seeking Chinese cooperation on Iran, must consider Chinese efforts to balance foreign policy concerns with "core interests" such as Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) PolOff discussed Iran-China relations and the P5-plus-1 process with Li Guofu, Director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the MFA-affiliated China Institute for International Studies (CIIS) September 8, and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Middle East Studies Director Zhang Xiaodong on September 2. Li recently returned from a week-long visit to Tehran in August, where he reportedly met with scholars from the Iranian MFA-affiliated Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS) and other researchers. "A New Phase" of Iranian Self-confidence -------------- ¶3. (C) CIIS' Li Guofu reiterated teoft-heard Chinese analysis of U.S.-China cooperation in dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue: the United States and China share the strategic goal of preventing Iran from creating nuclear weapons but sometimes disagree on the approach to realizing this goal. However, Li asserted that the international community's efforts to deal with the Iranian nuclear issue recently entered "a new phase," necessitated by Iran's recent attempts to demonstrate cooperation with the IAEA and by increasing Iranian confidence. In his previous trips to Iran, Li said, Iranian leaders focused on the sacrifices needed to develop and maintain its nuclear program in the face of international resistance in order to demonstrate Iran's status as a major power and its ability to stand up to the United States. In conversations during his August visit to Tehran, however, contacts said the Iran leadership, in the face of pressure from the international community -- especially given the upcoming change in administration in the United States -- is now looking beyond the development of the nuclear program. ¶4. (C) The new debate among the Iranian leadership centers on the significance of the nuclear program in negotiating for diplomatic recognition from the United States on its own terms, Li asserted. The current Iranian position reflects new confidence in its ability to pursue its nuclear program, as well as a sense that the West must work with Iran in international efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and Iraq and to advance counter-terrorism goals. Li argued that Iran's position with the IAEA has become more nuanced, attempting to project an image of cooperation to gain the confidence of the international community. The Iranians also seek to maintain strategic ambiguity about the nature of their nuclear program, in particular the time that it would take to weaponize their nuclear technology based on their current level of development, according to Li. Chinese Perceive Shift, Focus on Intention -------------- ¶5. (C) Li suggested that while the Chinese leadership recognizes this "turning point" in Iranian attitudes, the PRC will not take a more active role in driving the P5-plus-1 negotiations over the nuclear program. The expectation from the Chinese side, according to Li, is that the United States must continue to play a leading role toward a peaceful resolution. However, Chinese leaders will be watching closely to discern the intentions behind Iran's nuclear development, understanding that with advances in the development of the nuclear program, the question of Iran's plans for using the technology is of increasing importance. Split over Georgia Creates Challenges BEIJING 00003588 002 OF 003 -------------- ¶6. (C) Li said that Chinese leaders have taken note of frictions between Russia and much of the rest of the international community over Georgia, Kosovo and Central Asia, and understand that the Iranians view this discord as an opportunity to delay progress on negotiations over the Iran nuclear issue in the short term. Still, he suggested that the Chinese leadership is also aware that Russian aggression in the Caucasus, if unchecked over time, would alarm Tehran and might therefore create new pressure to strike a deal. ¶7. (C) Li stressed, however, that the split between Russia and most of the rest of the international community over Georgia will not force Chinese leaders to make a choice between the two sides in the context of addressing Iran's nuclear program. He underscored that, in the meantime, Iran's petroleum resources constitute the only critical strategic interest for China, and thus Chinese negotiators will seek to preserve this interest as their primary goal. Li pointed out that confrontation between the United States and Iran is, of course, not in China's interest, and China will remain engaged in the P5-plus-1 process to avoid such a scenario, but will remain primarily focused on maintaining energy cooperation in Iran. China's Influence with Iran Limited -------------- ¶8. (C) CASS' Zhang, taking a slightly sharper tone, said that Chinese leaders still believe the United States ultimately seeks regime change in Iran, and this position is unacceptable to the PRC. The U.S. approach leaves China feeling "uncomfortable," but Chinese leaders have decided to continue engaging on the diplomatic track even with this position in the background. In turn, China is misperceived in the West as somehow "supporting" Tehran, which, Zhang insisted, is not the case. He stressed that Chinese leaders believe that their influence with the Iranians, despite generally good relations between the two countries, remains extremely limited. Zhang said that Iranian leaders continue to be unsatisfied with China's lack of support for their position, but understand that China is not willing to risk direct confrontation with the United States over Iranian regime change, an issue that is not directly in China's national interest. PRC Seeking U.S. Understanding on Iran Interest... -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Zhang emphasized that, unlike other issues that test U.S.-China relations, the sides' differing approaches to the Iranian nuclear issue are not separated by ideology, nor by a fundamental rift over national interests as related to Iran. Chinese leaders seek to create an understanding among U.S. policy-makers of China's interests, particularly the need to maintain access to energy supplies as fuel for economic growth (reftel). Zhang said what he fears most is a "politicization" of the Iranian nuclear issue within the context of the broader U.S.-China relationship. China, Zhang insisted, has no overarching geo-strategic plan for its engagement with Iran. He suggested that some Chinese leaders feel that China is unfairly singled out for cooperating with Iran in ways that many other countries do. ...And Appreciation of Domestic Interest -------------- ¶10. (C) Zhang stressed that U.S. understanding of China's position on the Iranian nuclear issue needs to take into account China's broader definition of its national interest. He urged the United States to balance the Iranian nuclear issue with other issues critical to China, particularly support for Taiwan. He strongly suggested, for example, that additional arms sales to Taiwan could be a set-back to efforts by the P5-plus-1 to deal with Iran's nuclear program. He flagged "core Chinese interests" of Tibet and Xinjiang as other areas that require strategic balancing by the United States in relation to efforts to deal with the Iranian nuclear program. PRC Perceives "Positive" Signs on Both Sides -------------- ¶11. (C) CIIS' Li stated that the United States has recently emphasized incentives to bring the Iranians back to the negotiating table, and Chinese leaders have taken note of this "positive" development. Li added that while the Iranians have not indicated any new flexibility on uranium BEIJING 00003588 003 OF 003 enrichment, China believes that Iran is now at least intimating that a change of position on enrichment is possible. ¶12. (C) BIO NOTE: Li reported that he plans to travel to Tehran again after the U.S. election in November to hear views on the election results from Iranian observers. RANDT