CHINA BUILDING INDIGENOUS NUCLEAR PLANT CONSTRUCTION

UNCLAS BEIJING 003055 STATE FOR OES/SAT, EAP/CM, ISN/MDSP AND T, AND FOR ISN/NESS R. DELABARRE, P. COMELLA USDOE FOR INTERNATIONAL/FREDRIKSEN, YOSHIDA, BISCONTI, AND BALLOU USDOE FOR NNSA/SCHEINMAN, BIENIAWSKI, HUIZENGA, AND KROL USDOE FOR NE/SPURGEON AND MCGINNIS USNRC FOR ROSALES-COOPER USDOC FOR 4420/ITA/MAC KASOFF TOKYO FOR DOE ATTACHE CHERRY SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ENRG KNNP TPHY PREL CH SUBJECT: CHINA BUILDING INDIGENOUS NUCLEAR PLANT CONSTRUCTION CAPACITY, EDGING OUT WESTINGHOUSE REF: A. 2008 Beijing 1137, B. 2008 Beijing 1136, C. 2008 Beijing 2863 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: At a meeting convened by the DOE China Office, Westinghouse China provided an update on China's nuclear reactor program, including progress at the Westinghouse AP1000 sites, plans for new reactors, and an assessment of China's overall current and future capacity to build new nuclear power plants (NPP). Westinghouse representative Gavin Liu noted that because China's technical capacity is increasing, the longer it takes to start the next round of AP1000 reactors, the less scope will be available for Westinghouse. Following construction of the first two AP1000s, China should be able to indigenously produce most components for the next two plants except for the primary coolant pumps and instrumentation and control system. Three Chinese manufacturers have already acquired or are in the process of acquiring capabilities to produce heavy nuclear forgings including reactor pressure vessels, two of which will rival the capabilities of Japan Steel Works. Liu believes that China's forging and component manufacturing capacity will need to be dedicated to internal projects for the next two decades, after which China can turn to the export market. Although the CPR-1000, the Chinese-built reactor based on a copy of Framatome reactor technology at Daya Bay and Ling Ao, which has been broadly adopted throughout China and is becoming Westinghouse's main competitor, can be built quickly and efficiently, it uses decades-old technology and, according to Westinghouse, is 100 times less safe than the revolutionary passive design of the AP1000. End Summary. New QA/QC Standards for Importers -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Westinghouse is currently building four reactors at two sites in China, Sanmen and Haiyang, for a consortium led by the State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC). Other Chinese partners are the China National Nuclear Corporation and China Power Investment Corporation (CPIC). For the first two reactors, the 
control rod drive mechanism (CRDM),reactor coolant pumps, and instrumentation and control circuitry (I&C) will be provided by Westinghouse. Doosan of South Korea will provide the reactor pressure vessels (RPV) and steam generators (SG). Primary coolant piping will either be supplied by an Italian firm or one of three potential Chinese suppliers who are currently submitting samples for testing. Liu noted that since the contract was signed last July, China's nuclear regulator, the National Nuclear Safety Administration (NSNA),has implemented new standards for foreign firms to be licensed to import nuclear components into China. Foreign vendors must submit an application that includes proving they have successfully built the components in another country, but do not have to provide samples. (Comment: This new requirement is a response to problems with Russian-supplied equipment at Tianwan NPP, specifically with components that had never been manufactured before. End Comment.) Equipment Localization Plans -------------- ¶3. (SBU) A local Chinese manufacturer has been selected to build the steel containment vessels, but has not yet been able to obtain required construction certifications from NNSA. Liu believes the delay is a combination of the manufacturer having difficulty supplying sufficient samples of the steel and welds, and limited resources of the regulator. This is currently the only construction delay. Ansaldo Nucleare, originally one of Westinghouse's subcontractors, is now out of the picture, as they intended to source the containment vessel in China anyway. ¶4. (SBU) For the second two reactors, the customer is responsible for procuring most of the equipment (Westinghouse will still supply the primary coolant pumps and the I&C system). As part of the technology transfer portion of the contract, Westinghouse will provide technical drawings and specifications so that SNPTC can place orders locally for the equipment. Potential Bottlenecks -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Liu noted that China does not currently have the technical capability to manufacture cam pumps large enough to meet AP1000 specifications. China has the technology to build smaller cam pumps, used in nuclear submarines, Liu said, and is working on manufacturing larger pumps to eventually use in AP1000s, but will not be ready in time for the first four plants. The other main technology deficiency in China's nuclear industry is I&C. China currently has no one capable of integrating I&C technology to build a platform for NPP applications, Liu said. ¶6. (SBU) Liu believes the biggest potential bottleneck is human resources - coming up with enough trained personnel to build and operate all of these new plants, as well as regulate the industry. Although the civil construction and engineering industry in China has significantly improved, there is almost no cross-pollination with the nuclear construction industry, he said. (Comment: Although there currently is a limited field of experienced nuclear personnel in China, this will probably not be a showstopper, as China has demonstrated in the past a near infinite capacity to draw in and train new people as necessary, basically straight from high school. This was how China built up a civil aviation industry from scratch. End Comment.) Heavy Forging Capacity to Rival Japan Steel Works -------------- -------------- ¶7. (SBU) China has three manufacturers that are working to expand capabilities to produce heavy nuclear forgings - Shanghai Boiler Works (SBW) (ref A),Harbin Boiler Co., Ltd, and Dongfang Boiler Group. Dongfang is currently working exclusively for Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation (GNPC) to produce forgings for CPR-1000 reactors under construction all over China. Harbin and SBW have installed presses which will give them the capacity to make the largest forgings, rivaling even the capabilities of Japan Steel Works. SBW, which has received nuclear certifications from NNSA and has produced forgings for Daya Bay, Ling Ao, Ling Dong, and Qinshan, has installed the largest press in the world at 16,500 tons. Harbin installed a 16,000 ton press produced by China First Heavy Machine Works in Qiqihar and is currently working to receive nuclear certification from NNSA. (Note: Harbin has reportedly been practicing producing nuclear grade forgings, but none have made the grade yet. End Note) SBW can provide four complete reactor forging sets per year (reactor pressure vessel, steam generator, and turbine),Dongfang can supply two to three, and Harbin expects to be able to supply two per year. Liu noted that no one transferred this technology to China; they figured it out on their own. The nuclear forging capacity will have to be dedicated to local projects for the next ten to twenty years, Liu believes, after which China can look to the export market. Evolution of the CPR-1000 -------------- ¶8. (SBU) GNPC's CPR-1000, which has been selected for seven sites for a total of 22 reactors so far, is basically a carbon copy of the Framatome reactors imported at Daya Bay, with upgrades to the I&C system and some other minor improvements, Liu said. The Framatome reactors are actually copies of 1960s-era Westinghouse reactor technology transferred to the French. While there was no specific technology transfer clause in the Daya Bay or subsequent Ling Ao contracts, GNPC learned how to replicate the plants through a series of separate projects with the French, including software sales and training, Liu said. China practiced by building Qinshan II, a 600 MW plant, a 2-loop downscale of the 3-loop Daya Bay plant. ¶9. (U) CPR-1000 sites planned or under construction: -- Ling Dong, Guangdong Province - 2 NPP -- Qinshan II, Zhejiang Province - Units 3 and 4 (600MW) -- Hongyanhe, Liaoning Province - 4 NPP -- Ningde, Fujian Province - 4 NPP -- Yangjiang, Guangdong Province - 4 NPP -- Fuqing, Fujian Province - 4 NPP -- Fangjiashan, Zhejiang Province - 2 NPP China currently has 11 reactors operating with a total capacity of almost 9 GW electric, all located along the eastern coastline. The four AP1000s, two EPRs, and 2 planned VVERs (no contract yet) will add another 9.2 GW of capacity. With the 21.2 GW of capacity from CP-1000 reactors above, the total announced capacity operating or under construction is over 39 GW, close to China's original plan to have 40 GW operating by 2020. The 12 planned inland reactors will edge the total nearer to the 60 GW championed by National Energy Bureau Minister Zhang Guobao. CPR-1000 Has Become the AP1000 Competitor -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Although the Westinghouse AP1000 was selected following an international bidding process and is frequently compared to Areva's EPR, Liu says that Westinghouse sees the CPR-1000 as its main competitor in China. The CPR-1000, which achieved market dominance before the completely indigenous CNNC-designed CNP-1000 even emerged from the R&D phase, effectively killing it off, can be built quickly and efficiently using localized components. The Chinese regulator, burned by problems at Tianwan (ref B),has advocated slow adoption of new (i.e. AP1000) technology. Even though the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) announced that GenIII technology (code for the AP1000) should be used when three inland sites of four reactors each were approved following the winter snow storms that paralyzed much of southern and central China in early 2008, Liu is concerned that most, if not all, of those plants could end up choosing CPR-1000 technology since there is no transparency in the decision-making process. Because of the uncertainty, the three utilities are planning for either technology. ¶11. (SBU) In addition to concerns about the selection process, Westinghouse is worried that the longer it takes for a technology to be chosen, the less scope there will be for international partners because China is rapidly acquiring indigenous capability. Furthermore, continuing delays coupled with the long lead time for many AP1000 components could result in local government officials pushing hard for CPR-1000 reactors, since faster implementation would allow them to take credit sooner for decreasing pollution, now a key component of their performance evaluations. Who's in Charge of Nuclear Energy? -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Although the responsibilities of the new National Energy Bureau (NEB) have been detailed, it is not yet a functioning entity, Liu said. There is no clear decision-making process established yet, and none of the Vice Premiers have been assigned the energy portfolio to date. The official process is that NEB and NDRC together make recommendations which are sent to the National Energy Commission of the State Council for final decision; how this will work out in reality remains unclear, especially in light of the apparent leadership vacuum. Furthermore, although former China Atomic Energy Authority Chairman Sun Qin and about ten of his employees have moved to NEB (ref C),Liu is not aware of any actual nuclear power experts in that group. (Note: CAEA's nuclear power expert was Dong Baotong; we have not yet determined where he ended up in the reorganization. Westinghouse was also unaware of his current department affiliation. End Note.) ¶13. (SBU) Comment: It has been six months since the NDRC approved the 12 inland NPPs and announced they should use GenIII technology, and five months since NEB Minister Zhang Guobao announced China should increase nuclear power to 5% of the national mix (or 60 GW operating, 30 GW under construction),and there still is no decision on when to start on the inland NPPs and which technology to utilize. The major government restructuring and devastating May 12 Sichuan earthquake are likely largely to blame for the delay, but the impact is every day decreasing the likelihood of quicker AP1000 implementation and reducing the potential scope for Westinghouse involvement. Furthermore, as the CPR-1000 increases market share, China is assuring that rather than building a fleet of state-of-the-art reactors, they will be burdened with technology that by the end of its lifetime will be 100 years old. Finally, by bypassing the passive safety technology of the AP1000, which, according to Westinghouse, is 100 times safer than the CPR-1000, China is vastly increasing the aggregate risk of its nuclear power fleet. End Comment. RANDT NNNN