CHINESE SCHOLARS ON PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, INDIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 002965 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2033 TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV MNUC CH PK AF IN SUBJECT: CHINESE SCHOLARS ON PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, INDIA AND THE SAARC REF: NEW DELHI 2012 Classified By: Deputy POLITICAL Section Chief Ben Moeling. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Chinese contacts agree that continuing political uncertainty and the resulting diffusion of authority in Pakistan have distracted Pakistan's leadership from addressing counter-terrorism and economic concerns. They say that the Pakistan Government's negotiation approach with tribal leaders in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is a "trap" that only hinders counter-terrorism efforts, and that traditional cross-border tribal ties among Afghani and Pakistani Taliban elements will limit coalition forces' efforts to defeat the Taliban militarily. China fears that extremist activity in Afghanistan and Pakistan will lend strength to separatist activities in western China. The implementation of the U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement will diminish China's influence in India. India's mistrust of China and other South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) members' hostility toward India limit China's efforts to assist integration efforts in SAARC. End Summary. Pakistan -------------- ¶2. (C) Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) South Asia scholar Ye Hailin said Pakistan continues on a "negative trend," with government leaders more and more "distracted" by self-interested jockeying among Pakistan's POLITICAL parties. Furthermore, he added, the current POLITICAL uncertainty in Pakistan has splintered authority among President Pervez Musharraf, Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, PM Yousef Raza Gilani and the Pakistan People's Party leadership and Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) leader Nawaz Sharif. ¶3. (C) CASS scholar Ye said he recently submitted a report to the Chinese Government that argues that the problems of loose Federal Government control in the FATA are "over 100 years old" and not easily addressed. He said the fundamental problem is that most of the 20 million Pashtuns in Pakistan are hostile to the United States and China and do not view the Taliban as a terrorist organization. He described the "soft then hard" (negotiations followed by military operations) approach as a "trap" for the Pakistani Government that encourages local tribes to seek concessions in the negotiation phase, and, after tribal leaders fail to keep their commitments, stokes tribal opposition to the Government during the military operations phase. "Every time there is a deal," Ye said, "the government claims it has achieved progress, then three months later, more violence." Claiming that Pakistani PM Yousef Raza Gilani is "not farsighted," Ye criticized the Pakistan Government's practice of negotiating with local tribal chieftains because it leaves intact the "social system" in the FATA that encourages support of the Taliban. Ye said that, for the Pakistan Government, the problem of control in the FATA is "not a lack of willingness, it is a lack of ability." Afghan-Pakistan cross-border activities -------------- ¶4. (C) Ye said cross-border links between Taliban elements in Pakistan and Afghanistan are "natural" because of similar social systems and customs and because the locals "don't respect the border." He said extremist elements have growing influence in both FATA and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) in Pakistan, and predicted that if elections were held again, the more secular Awami National Party (ANP) would not win a majority in the NWFP. Ye said Afghani President Hamid Karzai should support and "show more confidence" in the Pakistan Government. "The Taliban period is over" and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) does not have the influence it once had, he said. ¶5. (C) Ministry of State Security-affiliated China Institutes for Contemporary International RELATIONS (CICIR) scholar Yuan Peng said China recognizes that Pakistan is a "crucial country" for U.S. international strategic policy and counterterrorism efforts, but the United States should understand that China is even more concerned about instability in Pakistan than the United States is. The Chinese focus is on the East Turkestan Movement seeking BEIJING 00002965 002 OF 003 independence for the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. This movement gains strength from its association with fundamentalist and terrorist sources of support in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The situation in Pakistan, by China's estimation, is likely to deteriorate in the short to medium term, because a new American presidential administration will begin shifting focus from Iraq to Afghanistan. As the United States increases pressure on Afghanistan, China expects Pashtun militants will be driven south into FATA and the NWFP, thus increasing the factors that generate instability there. ¶6. (C) That, Yuan Peng said, will increase the pressure from the United States on Pakistan either to act strongly in these areas or allow the United States to do so. There is also the possibility of unilateral action by the United States inside Pakistan, which China feels would create much greater risk of political fallout, or even POLITICAL collapse, in Pakistan. CASS' Ye was less optimistic aboutthe coalition forces' military prospects. He suggested the coalition forces will never be able to defeat the Taliban insurgency militarily, adding that at some point POLITICAL negotiations with the Taliban will be necessary. U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement -------------- ¶7. (C) Ye said that the U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement reflects the current Indian Government's need for U.S. support as well as its desire to enhance its reputation. Ye echoed similar analysis in the Indian media (reftel) that no consensus foreign policy exists in India and that POLITICAL parties are now defining foreign policies that range from pro-American (the current government) to pro-China (the Left). Ye said "China will be the loser" if the agreement passes because the United States and India will draw closer together. Ministry of Foreign Affairs-affiliated Chinese Institute for International Studies (CIIS) South Asia scholar Zheng Ruixiang said that, on non-proliferation issues, China "does not like exceptions" and, if accepted by members of the IAEA and the NSG, a similar agreement should be applied to Pakistan. He warned that the agreement will start an arms race not only in Pakistan but "in the region," noting recent Indian tests of missiles that could reach China. China-India -------------- ¶8. (C) Ye said Chinese-Indian RELATIONS are increasingly close, but almost exclusively in the bilateral trade context. (Note: The Indian Embassy confirmed that bilateral trade volume for the first half of 2008 totaled USD 29 billion, already surpassing the 2007 total of USD 28 billion.) Commenting on the subsiding media stories on incursions on the Finger of Sikkim and other border areas, Ye stated that given the Olympics and China's other domestic concerns, it has "no time" to apply military pressure on India at the border. Ye stated that at the "global" level, despite joint pronouncements and cooperation in some international fora, China views India's rise as a dilution of China's global influence. He cited India's increased voting weight in the IMF and a possible future permanent seat in the UN Security Council. At the regional level, India mistrusts China's intentions, and hence cooperation in regional bodies such as SAARC is minimal. SAARC -------------- ¶9. (C) Ye stated that of all the regional coordinating bodies in South and Southeast Asia, SAARC has been "left behind" other regional groupings and is the "least coordinating." Despite "fantastic statements" articulating the group's intention to increase integration, SAARC members have taken no practical steps to realize this goal, adding that "this tendency will not change." Comparing SAARC with other regional bodies around the world, Ye noted that the EU functions through the leadership of France and Germany, and that ASEAN functions because none of the member countries has clear dominance over the others. In contrast, according to Ye, SAARC's membership includes "India and six countries hostile to it." (Note: Ye apparently was not including Afghanistan, the eighth member of SAARC.) ¶10. (C) CIIS' Zheng said that because SAARC has yet to BEIJING 00002965 003 OF 003 adequately define the role of observer countries, China has been limited in its efforts to promote integration within SAARC. In the past, China has proposed poverty reduction and exchange programs and has provided some financial support to SAARC. However, China realizes that India still harbors suspicions of China's intentions in South Asia, and therefore China will have to rely on bilateral rather than multilateral channels to develop its ties in the region. RANDT