PRC MULLING OVER INTERNATIONAL SPACE FOR TAIWAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 002927

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2033
TAGS: PREL PARM UN CH TW
SUBJECT: PRC MULLING OVER INTERNATIONAL SPACE FOR TAIWAN

REF: A. GUANGZHOU 408

B. SHANGHAI 280

C. BEIJING 2218

D. BEIJING 2275

E. BEIJING 2435

F. BEIJING 2645

Classified By: Ambassador Clark T. Randt, Jr. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


Summary
--------------


1. (C) Mainland policy makers are devoting considerable study
and discussion to the question of Taiwan's international
space, recognizing that the issue will have to be addressed
in September if/when Taiwan makes its annual bid to rejoin
the UN. State Council Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Director
Wang Yi reportedly told a visiting U.S. expert that Taiwan
and the United States must take steps to ensure that
conditions are suitable for increased international space.
Some contacts expect considerable flexibility in allowing
Taiwan to participate in the World Health Organization (WHO),
while others argue that Beijing should maintain its strict
policy against participation in UN-affiliated organizations
that might suggest dual recognition or country status for
Taiwan. Beijing is mulling over what would be an appropriate
level of Taiwan representation at the late November APEC
Summit in Peru. Contacts acknowledge that the Mainland has
tacitly accepted Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou's proposal for
a diplomatic ceasefire, but note that it is difficult for
Beijing to reject countries who want to switch recognition.
Contacts expressed concern about Ma's August transits through
the United States.

Conditions Must Be Right
--------------


2. (C) According to a visiting U.S. expert who met with State
Council Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi on July 3,
Wang told her that the conditions for Taiwan's participation
in international organizations must be right and that Taiwan
and the United States will play a key role in creating the
appropriate environment. For example, Wang said, how Taiwan
approaches its annual UN bid in September and whom it chooses
to send to APEC will factor into the Mainland's approach to
the question of Taiwan's international space. The United
States can help create the proper conditions by handling
appropriately Ma's requested transits in August and arms
sales to Taiwan, he added. The U.S. expert told PolOff on
July 7 that Wang said the question of Taiwan's international
space is under serious study, echoing comments from other
officials and contacts (refs A-E).

Debate over Taiwan in International Organizations
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Embassy contacts differ on the question of how much
leeway the Mainland will grant for Taiwan's participation in
international organizations, but agree that the issue will
have to be addressed in September if/when Taiwan makes its
annual bid to rejoin the UN. Yuan Peng, Director of the
North American Institute at the Ministry of State
Security-affiliated China Institutes for Contemporary
International Relations (CICIR),told PolOff on July 22 that
"China intends to be flexible," on Taiwan's participation in
international organizations. He noted that it was "very
unfortunate" that the World Health Assembly (WHA) meeting
occurred on Chen Shui-bian's last full day in office, because
had the Assembly taken place even a week later, China would
have been prepared to make some "significant concessions."
China is interested in allowing Taiwan to expand its
participation in international organizations "as
appropriate." Beijing is worried, however, that in the
future, the current "friendly" KMT regime could give way to a
more independence-minded DPP administration, which could then
use any gains the KMT had made for Taiwan in international
space to push its independence goals. Still, Yuan Peng
predicted that in 2009 China will allow WHO observer status
for Taiwan.


4. (C) Tsinghua University Professor Chu Shulong similarly
told PolOff July 11 that observer status in the WHA under the
name Chinese Taipei next May would not be a problem.
However, participation in the WHO itself would require some
"new arrangement" because Taiwan would not accept Associate
Membership, which would require Taiwan to acknowledge that

BEIJING 00002927 002 OF 003


the PRC "controls" its foreign affairs (ref E) and the
Mainland could not accept Taiwan's full membership under any
name, because that would create "two Chinas" or confer
"country status" on Taiwan. Chu does not expect a Taiwan UN
bid this September to cause cross-Strait tensions. He
expects Taiwan to make a "pro forma" effort to join the UN
under the name Republic of China and that PRC will block the
bid in a low-key manner. Yuan Peng pointed out that "the KMT
also had a referendum on joining the UN, so China has always
known that people expect Ma to make another application."
Yuan Peng said that China will handle Taiwan's 2008 UN bid
"as usual."


5. (C) Looking at the bigger picture, Chu said that the
Mainland is "unwilling" to confront the key questions of
sovereignty and Taiwan's status. For example, there is no
discussion about Ma's proposal for "mutual non-denial."
(Note: On March 23, 2008, Ma, noting that formal joint
recognition between the two sides is impossible now, proposed
that the two sides not deny the existence of the other side.
"Mutual non-denial" (hubuforen) has become the shorthand for
this idea.) Nor is there discussion about Taiwan Vice
President Vincent Siew's formulation to "face reality" in
cross-Strait relations. Chu joked that since there is no
agreement about "what reality is," it is difficult to know
how to face it. For these reasons, Chu rejected fellow
Tsinghua professor Yan Xuetong's assessment (ref F) that
expansion of Taiwan's international space is already decided.
Chu insisted that Mainland authorities' consideration of
Taiwan's international space is "case-by-case," and they have
made no "overarching" decision on how to address with the
issue. Yuan Peng said that the current cross-Strait strategy
is a "three-step program," with the Three Links as the first
step, addressing the question of Taiwan's international space
as the second step and the issue of sovereignty reserved for
last. "We are only at the end of the first step," he told
PolOff. Consideration of the sovereignty step "is very far
away."


6. (C) Xu Shiquan, Secretary General of the Taiwan Studies
Association, told PolOff on July 15 that he believes that the
PRC should not alter its policy on allowing Taiwan
international space. China can never accept concessions that
would give Taiwan the status of a country or allow dual
representation, Xu averred. Therefore, if Taiwan wants to
participate in the WHO or other UN organizations, it must
accept "subservient" status. Xu expects that China would
allow Taiwan to participate in the WHA as an observer, but
argued that Taiwan should do so under the name "China,
Taipei" (Zhongguo Taipei) instead of Chinese Taipei (Zhonghua
Taipei). He expressed hope that the Ma administration will
use the result of the March 22 referendum to refrain from
another UN bid this September.


7. (C) Asked about PRC willingness to discuss UN membership
as part of then-President Jiang Zemin's eight points issued
in 1995, Xu replied that the issue could be discussed, but
PRC policy should not change. (Note: In an eight-point
statement issued in January 1995, Jiang said that under the
one China principle, anything can be discussed.) Xu allowed
that the PRC could be more flexible in non-official
organizations like APEC and the International Olympic
Committee. For official international organizations not
affiliated with the UN, the PRC should decide on a
case-by-case basis and not allow precedents, such as Taiwan's
participation in the Asian Development Bank, to apply to
other international organizations. At the same time, Beijing
should respect Taiwan's position that arrangements for its
participation in these organizations should not imply that
Taiwan belongs to the PRC, Xu said.


8. (C) Chu said that there is "new thinking" about Taiwan
sending senior officials to other international events. For
example, when APEC meets in Peru in late November, some in
the Mainland argue that because APEC is explicitly a group of
"economies" instead of countries, Ma should be allowed to
participate, partly to reward him for explicitly rejecting
Taiwan independence. Such a decision would ultimately rest
with President Hu Jintao, but Chu claimed that there is
"thinking along these lines." CICIR's Yuan Peng said the
"much, much better" atmosphere in cross-Strait relations will
affect China's attitude toward Taiwan's APEC participation.
He said he believes that KMT Honorary Chairman Lien Chan will
lead Taiwan's APEC delegation this year, which creates "the
possibility of handshakes" between the Chinese and Taiwan
delegations, since Lien has already visited Beijing and met
Chinese leaders. Xu Shiquan remarked that Taiwan should "not

BEIJING 00002927 003 OF 003


stir up trouble" for China by trying to send the President,
Vice President, or Premier to APEC, and suggested that
Straits Exchange Foundation Chair P.K. Chiang would be a
suitable choice.

Diplomatic Ceasefire in Effect
--------------


9. (C) Several Embassy contacts say that China has tacitly
accepted Ma's proposal for a "diplomatic ceasefire." CICIR's
Yuan Peng said that the diplomatic recognition game is in a
"time-out period." Neither Taiwan nor the PRC is looking to
make any "chess moves" right now, and both would like to
maintain a "freeze" on changes in other countries' diplomatic
recognition, Yuan claimed. The problem with this approach,
he complained, is that no one seems to have told the
countries involved about the freeze, meaning Beijing must
deal with Taiwan's diplomatic partners who would like to
transfer diplomatic recognition to the PRC. Yuan said that
it is difficult to reject suitors whom the PRC has been
courting for a long time, though he did not say which
countries have been in contact with China about a change in
recognition.


10. (C) Xu Shiquan, Secretary General of the Taiwan Studies
Association, told PolOff July 14 that the Mainland recognizes
that Taiwan's remaining diplomatic allies are very important
to the Ma administration and that a diplomatic switch would
harm the positive momentum in cross-Strait relations. For
this reason, Xu proposes "rules of conduct" for the
diplomatic ceasefire. They include switching to a passive
posture -- rather than actively pursuing diplomatic
recognition -- and ceasing "checkbook" diplomacy. Xu
allowed, however, that both sides could continue to deliver
pledged aid to current diplomatic allies. Xu opined that
Taiwan's diplomatic partners are not really important to the
Mainland and that PRC trade offices in those countries can
manage most of China's interests. He noted, however, that
some in the Foreign Ministry still want to score a "big
success" in getting more countries to switch recognition.

Ma Transits
--------------


11. (C) Chu Shulong noted that Beijing is concerned about Ma
Ying-jeou's August transits of the United States. He
accepted that Ma might be received at a higher level than
Chen Shui-bian was in his last two visits, but said Beijing
still hopes that there will be no official reception. He
said that Ma may eventually request a visit to Harvard, which
would be a problem because it would remind Chinese leaders of
then-President Lee Teng-hui's visit to Cornell in 1995,
though he claimed that Beijing opposed Lee's visit more for
the content of his speech at Cornell than for the fact of the
visit. Ma would likely be much more moderate, as he was in
his June interview with the New York Times, so Beijing might
not react as strongly to a speech by Ma. Xu cautioned
against any "upgrade" in U.S.-Taiwan relations that would be
implied by allowing Ma to meet with senior U.S. officials.
RANDT