CHINA'S MEDIA MESSAGE ON TIBET CONTROLLED BY HU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 001619 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2033 TAGS: PGOV CH SUBJECT: CHINA'S MEDIA MESSAGE ON TIBET CONTROLLED BY HU JINTAO, SHIFTING SLIGHTLY OVER TIME, CONTACTS SAY REF: A. BEIJING 1454 ¶B. BEIJING 1039 ¶C. OSC CPP20080407530001 ¶D. OSC CPP20080408507001 ¶E. BEIJING 1618 Classified By: Political Section Internal Unit Chief Dan Kritenbrink. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) China's media guidance for the Tibet unrest story is coming directly from President Hu Jintao through the Central Propaganda Department (CPD),according to a range of contacts. The guidance is often conveyed informally and has shifted somewhat over time in response to events and the effectiveness of the propaganda message. Since the beginning of April, the CPD has allowed somewhat more diversity and nuance in the mass media. Several contacts have been critical of the Party's media strategy, particularly of local Tibet Party media and the decision to deny Western media access to Tibet. There are some indications of CPD tolerance of more moderate media voices in response to international criticism of China despite recent media attacks on CNN and France. This past week, China's media has moved to rein in rampant nationalism, particularly anti-French sentiment (ref E). End Summary. Hu Jintao and Liu Yunshan in Charge of Media Guidance -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) The Party's media guidance for the Tibetan unrest is coming directly from President and Party chief Hu Jintao through the Central Propaganda Department (CPD),according to several well-placed contacts. The guidance reportedly contains few specifics, has changed over time and generally takes the form of "suggestions" rather than formal guidelines. According to veteran journalist and editor Fang Jinyu (strictly protect) on April 14, the CPD's guidance was coming directly from Hu, who was dictating the media message as part of his "personal" management of the leadership's response to the crisis. Chinese Academy of Social Science scholar Dong Lisheng (strictly protect),told POLOFF on April 15 that CPD Chief Liu Yunshan was taking his Tibet media cues directly from Hu Jintao and that Politburo Standing Committee member Li Changchun, whose portfolio includes ideology, propaganda and the media, was not involved. Separately, well-connected journalist Chen Jieren (strictly protect) told PolOff April 20 that Liu Yunshan was "directly in charge" of China's propaganda policy on Tibet, including the decision to whip up anti-Western sentiment following the torch relay debacle in Paris and London. ¶3. (C) Tsinghua University journalism professor and editorial writer for several prominent dailies, Zhou Qing'an (strictly protect),said on April 10 that little specific media guidance has been issued on Tibet, although all editors know that the only news stories they are permitted to run must come from the state-owned news agency Xinhua. The CPD has made "suggestions" but has issued few formal "guidelines" (gui ding). For example, Zhou said the CPD has signaled that it does not approve of independent editorials and commentaries on Tibet in mass media, although reporters can provide background or historical context on Tibet in some cases. He said these "suggestions" sometimes come in the form of phone calls to editors. As for news coverage, Zhou and virtually all our contacts reiterated there is no need for the CPD to provide guidance, as everyone knows that Xinhua stories are the only news they are permitted to run. ¶4. (C) Zhou said a meeting of propaganda and media officials had been held in March to "suggest" to media that they publish stories countering Western news reports on Tibetan unrest. Zhong Weizhi (strictly protect),the editor-in-chief of the privately-funded Economic Observer, separately told PolOffs on April 16 that the CPD had encouraged media to print criticism of Western media, but that the Observer had ignored the suggestion. Huang Shan (strictly protect),an editor at the influential privately funded economic magazine Caijing, told POLOFF on April 14 that his friends at Party-controlled magazines have been "ordered" to produce cover stories on Tibet under "very strict" guidelines from the CPD (ref A). (Note: Several news weeklies have recently published cover stories supporting Party policies in Tibet or criticizing the "Dalai clique's" attacks on Chinese diplomatic missions or disruptions of the Olympic Torch Relay.) Both editors said their respective publications have decided "not to touch" the story for now because it is "far too sensitive." BEIJING 00001619 002 OF 003 Shifting Guidelines, Some Wiggle Room -------------- ¶5. (C) CPD guidelines on Tibet have shifted over time in response to breaking events and propaganda authorities' calculations of the effectiveness of the Party's media line, according to several contacts. Wang Wen (strictly protect), editor at the People's Daily-affiliated Global Times and Tsinghua's Zhou Qingan, for example, said the CPD in early SIPDIS April had reversed its guidance on treatment of Western media reporting after judging that the propaganda assault was yielding negative results. Wang stated that on April 1 the CPD issued guidance to end the anti-Western media barrage and it promptly ceased (at least temporarily, at that time). Zhou said his sources told him that Party leaders received feedback from media advisors in late March that a simultaneous attack on the Dalai Lama and Western media is a bad idea. He, too, noticed that shortly thereafter the attacks on Western media stopped (before resuming later). (Note: Intense Chinese media attacks on selective foreign media organs, such as CNN, have recently revved up again in response, e.g., to a CNN commentator's negative comments about China's leadership.) ¶6. (C) Several contacts noted that other, more subtle, changes have occurred in the CPD's media strategy since the initial barrage of harsh reports on the Tibet riots. In particular, contacts agreed, the appearance in April of articles that seemed inconsistent with the bombastic rhetoric of mainstream Party media reflected a slight loosening of the CPD's strictures on Tibet reporting (e.g., in two liberal southern papers, Southern Metropolis and Southern Weekend, which criticized the Party's restrictions on reporting in Tibet, called for a more nuanced view of the Tibetan community and for talks with the Dalai Lama. See ref A). Deng Yuwen (strictly protect),senior editor and writer at the Central Party School's official paper Study Times, told PolOff on April 15 that he thought there is "room for diversity" under the Propaganda Department's evolving guidance. His paper issued its first article on the Tibet unrest on April 14, a commentary that called for "reflection" on the lessons learned from the incident. Although the article supported the Party's condemnation of the "Dalai clique" and portrayed the protesters as "beaters, smashers, looters, and burners," it said that only a very small minority of monks had participated in the riots and that Tibetan monks had historically shown great patriotism, sacrificing themselves in conflicts with imperialist powers. It concluded that the recent events revealed a lack of knowledge among young monks and showed the need for educating them in Chinese and Tibetan history. ¶7. (C) Editor Fang Jinyu separately said he too thought there had been a slight shift in the media guidance that allows for somewhat greater diversity. Fang claimed, on the basis of "personal knowledge," that in late March the CPD "harshly criticized" some aspects of Tibet coverage by Central Party media, including People's Daily. According to Fang, the CPD criticized the media for not being tough enough on the Dalai Lama on the one hand and not being nuanced enough in treating the broader Tibetan community on the other. The criticism reportedly faulted the media for neglecting the specifics of the Dalai Lama's history, specifically the Tibetan rebellion of 1959 that resulted in his fleeing Tibet. The CPD allegedly also urged the media to make distinctions between ordinary Tibetans and dissidents, religious believers and political activists and advocates of violence and advocates of peaceful means. ¶8. (C) More recently, following the controversy over the running of the Olympic Torch Relay, particularly in Paris and London, the CPD reportedly made another push to ramp up sentiment against the "bias" of the West in general and foreign media in particular, before again deciding to tone things down. Journalist Chen Jieren told POLOFF April 16 that central authorities were "playing with fire" by whipping up nationalist sentiment as a way of garnering support for the Party and demonstrating "resistance" to Western countries. This past weekend of April 18-20, as anti-Western, especially anti-French, sentiment peaked, central authorities reportedly decided to move to curtail patriotic fervor. As a result, official media this past week have stressed the need for "rational" patriotism and have even engaged in something of a pro-Carrefour campaign, as the French supermarket giant had been the primary target of anti-French protests (ref E). Critical Voices in Media Circles -------------- ¶9. (C) Several of our contacts have been critical of the way BEIJING 00001619 003 OF 003 Party media handled the crisis, particularly local Party media in Tibet. Zhou Qing'an of Tsinghua University said the scurrilous personal attacks on the Dalai Lama and other inflammatory Cultual Revolution-era rhetoric in the Tibet Daily,the official organ of the Tibet Party Committee was deeply offensive to Tibetan religious sensibilities and simply amplified ethnic passions. Zhou said he will visit Tibet at the end of April as part of a fact-finding team and will meet with TAR officials about media strategy. He also plans to criticize the decision to close Tibet to all journalists following the March 14 riot. Wang Wen was also critical of the Party's Tibet media, especially the "very leftist" statement by Party Secretary Zhang Qingli, which was carried in local media. ¶10. (C) Wang was also critical of the decision to deny early Western media access to Tibet, arguing that allowing Western media on the scene would have provided support to the contention that China was acting in a restrained manner and not covering things up. He opined that the Party still does a poor job of managing the global media environment. Initially international opinion leaned toward China, he said, because it was clear that Tibetans initiated the violence against the Hans. However, the Party's media blackout and the Dalai Lama's conciliatory statements shifted international opinion toward sympathy with Tibet. Despite the mistakes in handling the media message to the outside, Wang maintained, China's internal propaganda strategy has worked. The errors and distortions in Western media coverage actually gave the Chinese press more credibility. China may have lost the battle on international opinion, he said, but it has won the war by strengthening domestic support for its Tibet policy. ¶11. (C) According to Zhou, Foreign Ministry press officers are frustrated at the strictures imposed on what they can say about Tibet in answer to questions at press conferences. Despite the flood of questions, they are required to constantly reiterate the same official line on every issue. Recent Moderate Articles Call for Balanced Approach -------------- -------------- ¶12. (C) There are indications that the CPD is allowing some moderation in the media response to issues raised by the Olympic Games, such as criticism of China, including by pro-Tibet activists. Despite the mainstream media's recent attacks on CNN and France in conjunction with disruptions of the Olympic Torch Relay, two Embassy contacts have authored unusually moderate articles advocating a more balanced approach to media coverage of international criticism. An article by Wang Chong in China Youth Daily on April 13, called for China to show more "great power confidence" in its approach to the ongoing Olympic Torch Relay despite efforts to disrupt it. The article counseled Chinese citizens to not "consider differences with the West as weaknesses" and to not "over-react to foreign criticism and distortion." Wang told PolOff that state-run CCTV had mentioned his article in a new program that reviews major press articles of the day. He also said the piece had drawn some criticism from readers but that the response was mostly positive. ¶13. (C) On April 14, the Economic Observer published an editorial that was similar in tone and substance, calling for China to accept the reality that membership in the "mainstream" international community brings scrutiny and criticism and urging "objectivity and open-mindedness." It encouraged a "mature mentality" and "tolerance," even toward "false reports on Tibet," and it warned against the "populist politics" and "ultra-nationalism" that led to the ruin of pre-war Germany and Japan. The editorial concluded with a call to "counter international ridicule" by creating a "clean and democratic government" and a society where "multi-ethnic communities live harmoniously." Editor-in-chief Zhong told PolOff that the editorial did not require any pre-clearance from Party officials and as yet has not been criticized by propaganda authorities, perhaps another indication of the CPD's tolerance for at least some more moderate media pieces on Tibet. PICCUTA