SUNNI CONCERNS IN BASRAH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000077 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/18/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREF PHUM IZ SUBJECT: SUNNI CONCERNS IN BASRAH BASRAH 00000077 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Ramon Negron, Director, Regional Embassy Office Basrah, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b) ¶1. (C) Summary: While anti-Sunni violence has all but stopped, many Sunni Basrawis continue to feel victimized by the Shi'a majority. The high unemployment rate in Basrah and the relatively low number of development projects in Sunni areas fuels Sunni perceptions of discrimination, although their lack of political representation may be the real culprit. Many of the Sunnis who fled the province to avoid sectarian violence are eager to return, but the bleak economic outlook, more than security concerns, continues to keep them away. End summary. Continuous Sunni Decline -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Basrah's Sunni population has steadily declined since the 1970's, when they made up about 60 percent of the province. By 2003, their numbers had been reduced to about 30 percent. Once favored by Saddam Hussein, Basrawi Sunnis became targets of Shi'a extremism after the fall of the regime. Many of them left Basrah to escape sectarian violence. Victimized and distrustful, Sunnis consequently boycotted local elections in ¶2005. The destruction of the Golden Mosque in Samarra in 2006, which resulted in several days of countrywide violence that was particularly bad in Basrah (REF A),represents the nadir of Sunni-Shi'a relations. Today, Sunnis represent approximately 15 percent of the provincial population. Of the four Sunni tribes left in Basrah province, the largest is the Ghanimi tribe, lead by Sheikh Adnan Majeed al-Ghanim, with approximately 20,000 - 25,000 members. (Information on provincial Sunni tribes will follow in SEPTEL.) No Longer Persecuted, But Feeling Left Out -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Recent security gains have improved life for all minorities in Basrah. Few Sunnis report themselves victims of sectarian violence today. Nevertheless, many Sunnis continue to perceive themselves as second-class citizens, with unemployment topping the list of complaints. In a province where half the population is out of work, Sunnis fare proportionately worse than their Shi'a counterparts on the job market. As a result of their 2005 election boycott, they lack local political representation, which has done much to limit their job opportunities. �0A;¶4. (C) During a July interview (REFTEL B),Dr. Abd al-Kareem al-Khazraji, head of the Sunni Arab Endowment for the southern region, expressed concern that Sunnis were overlooked for professional jobs. He complained about the politics involved, pointing out that the Ministry of Higher Education, for example, was controlled by the Da'wa party and as a result they only selected Da'wa members for their professional positions. Likewise, Sheikh Al-Ghanim complained to the REO recently that since 2003, none of his tribal members have been able to find work in the army, police, or government. Al-Ghanim brought this problem to the attention of Basrah Provincial Council Chairman, Mohammad Sa'doun Siher al-`Ubadi, in May and supplied him with the names of 1,000 individuals looking for work. Although Al-`Ubadi, a Da'wa member himself, promised to find jobs for the individuals, none have found work to date. Similarly, Dr. Sheikh Al-Dusari, of the Iraqi Islamic Party, told REO in August that he presented a list of seven officers looking for jobs to the Iraqi Chief of Police. The list was forwarded to the Ministry of Interior but there has been no response. Fewer MND-SE Development Projects in Sunni Areas -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Sunni leaders have also voiced complaints that their neighborhoods are overlooked with regard to development projects. A REO review of all available MND-SE Coalition projects for Basrah province shows relatively fewer projects in the three largest Sunni areas of the province - Abu Al-Khaseeb, Al-Zubayr, and the town of Umm Qasr - compared to the rest of Basrah. Furthermore, there have been no projects recorded in Al-Jamhuriya, the only predominantly Sunni neighborhood in Basrah city. Economy Keeps IDPs From Returning -------------- -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Displacement is another major issue for Sunnis. Al-Ghanim estimated that since 2003, around 10 percent of the Sunni population has emigrated from Basrah. The wealthier of these have moved to countries throughout the Middle East and beyond. The less fortunate families find themselves today in Mosul, Al-Shirgat and Baiji areas of Salahuddin province, and BASRAH 00000077 002.2 OF 002 Ramadi. Between 5,000 and 10,000 families want to return to Basrah, according to Awad al-Adnan of the National Dialogue Front, who has followed the issue closely. No Representation, No Funding -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Lacking representation in the Provincial Council (PC), Sunni leaders often feel the government discriminates against them. Al-Khazraji discussed his request to the PC for reconstruction funds. While the PC has funded the reconstruction of many Shi'a mosques, his request for funds to reconstruct a Sunni mosque was denied. In an August interview, Deputy Governor Luai al-Battat, a Shi'a himself, confirmed that while the PC's Religious Committee provides reconstruction funds for mosques in general, they have not included funds for minority religious centers, such as Sunni mosques and churches. Al-Battat explained that since 2005 project funds have been divided among four PC members, all of whom are Shi'a. He said he looked forward to a time after the elections when the PC would have no religious figures. ¶8. (C) Learning from the past, Sunnis appear to have their eyes on the next elections. Provincial elections director Hazim Jodah reports that large numbers of Sunnis verified their voter registration information during July and August. The Iraqi Islamic Party is poised to gain a large percentage of the Sunni vote, as is the National Dialogue Front, which has been very active in recent months. Of the many independent candidates registered with the province, none have specifically identified themselves as Sunni so far. ¶9. (C) Comment: Even though Basrawi Sunnis have suffered in recent years, many of them have told the REO that tense relations between Sunnis and Shi'as are a thing of the past. Many of those who fled sectarian violence earlier want to return, but they are scared to come back. Interestingly, they have started to fear less coming back to violence than coming back to no shelter or jobs. Furthermore, we find that Sunnis are more often discriminated against for not being a part of the political establishment, rather than based on their religion. In an environment of patronage politics, they may be responsible for their own demise. Since Coalition and PRT projects are coordinated with government authorities and representatives, who are all Shi'a and heavy patronage practitioners, it would follow that such projects inadvertently may have disproportionately benefited Shi'as. This problem should somewhat rectify itself, as Sunni groups plan full participation in the next elections. It is in their interest that the elections be held as quickly as possible. End comment. NEGRON