BANI TAMIM SHEIKH: SUMMERTIME AND THE LIVIN' AIN'T EASY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000076 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/4/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ SUBJECT: BANI TAMIM SHEIKH: SUMMERTIME AND THE LIVIN' AIN'T EASY BASRAH 00000076 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Ramon Negron, Director, Regional Embassy Office Basrah, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b) ¶1. (C) Summary: On August 25, Bani Tamim Sheikh Mansour Tamim told the REO Director that the security situation in Basrah was worsening and largely blamed Iran, saying that the Iranians had infiltrated the Iraqi Police (IP). He also critized acting Justice Minister Safi al-Safa's allocation of the $100 million in emergency reconstruction funds. Concerning elections, Mansour asserted that people were fed up with the inefficacy and rampant corruption of the local government and wanted change. Mansur dismissed Governor Wa'ili's current attempt to form a Basrah region as a self-serving effort that would be disastrous to Iraqi unity. End Summary. Security Situation Worsening... -------------- ¶2. (C) In a meeting held August 25 at the Basrah Regional Embassy Office, Sheikh Mansour Tamim of the Bani Tamim tribe decried the worsening security situation. Claiming that Special Group (SG) members were starting to return from Iran, Mansour said that they were responsible for the recent increase in attacks and assassinations. Mansour said SGs were targeting government, political, and religious officials, and that they had plans to attack alcohol vendors, music stores, and public gatherings. Though he offered no proof, Mansour asserted that this was part of a deliberate, low-level campaign designed to disrupt the normalcy that has returned to Basrah. Pointing the finger at Iran, Mansour asserted that the Iranian smuggling of weapons and funds into the province has resumed in full-force. In addition, he contended that despite efforts to reform the Iraqi Police (IP) after the Charge of the Knights operation, the SG and JAM maintain a significant presence in the Iraqi Police (IP),acting through sympathizers, agents, and corrupt policemen. While Reconstruction Lags... -------------- ¶3. (C) Scoffing at the progress of reconstruction in the province, Mansour directed most of his venom at acting Justice Minister Safa al-Safi, stating that most of the contracts from the $100 million emergency reconstruction fund had been directed to Safi's business associates and family members, and that his tribe and others had not been consulted during the process. He also claimed that the work performed on some of the projects was shoddy and unprofessional, pointing to the slipshod renovation of a clinic in one of his strongholds near the Shatt al-Arab as an example. (Note: While some contracts have been awarded, we are not aware that any of Safi's projects have been completed. End note.) Elections and Local Government -------------- ¶4. (C) Mansour said he has a bad relationship with the Governor and the Provincial Council (PC) and admitted that he and his newspaper, al-Ashar, are regular critics of the local government. Claiming that people were upset with the lack of services as well as what he claimed to be rampant corruption within the local government. Mansour dismissed the current provincial leadership as motivated by their own self-interests, while also claiming that many members of the PC "were puppets of the Iranians." Regions Formation Law and Federalism -------------- ¶5. (C) Mansour dismissed Governor Wa'ili's campaign to create a federal region in Basrah as a power grab to control Basrah's economy and resources., Mansour thinks the campaign does not enjoy popular support and doubts that it could succeed, claiming that it would be disastrous for Iraqi unity. Commenting admiringly on his recent trip to the United States, where he had a firsthand look at a federalist system, Mansour revealed his preference for a similar arrangement. However, he said that it would take considerable time, education, and efforts for Iraqis to truly understand federalism. If done prematurely and haphazardly, he opined, federalism would fail in Iraq and lead to sectarian dislocation and conflict. ¶6. (C) Comment: Mansour paints a dim picture of the security situation. But his description is more closely aligned to -- as seen by Coalition intelligence and Basrawis alike -- the worst BASRAH 00000076 002.2 OF 002 case scenario for Basrah during the next six months, rather than the current situation. While there have been some targeted assassinations recently, with an average murder rate of 20 per month among Basra's 2.5 million, it would be a stretch, to say the least, to conclude that there is a pattern of worsening security in Basrah. Likewise, it is worth noting that many of our Iraqi contacts tailor their message to a `US audience' by using Iranian influence -- with catch-all terms like `Iranian puppets' -- to explain why a given person/organization/political party is particularly bad. Our contacts, however, are usually reluctant to expound on their general accusations with more specific evidence. With regard to federalism vs. regionalism, Governor Wa'ili's campaign is bound to be popular if he is able to make a scapegoat out of the central government in the eyes of Basrawis. However, most Basrawis, like Mansour, seem to take issue with the existing dysfunctional Basrah-Baghdad relationship, rather than the current structure of that relationship. Besides, it will be hard to convince Basrawis, even if the province were able to use more of its own resources unencumbered by Baghdad, that their local government would necessarily deliver more. NEGRON