THE NEW BATTLE FOR BASRAH: CONTROL OF THE PROVINCE'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000064 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/22/2018 TAGS: EINV EPET ENRG ECON KCRM IZ SUBJECT: THE NEW BATTLE FOR BASRAH: CONTROL OF THE PROVINCE'S ECONOMIC FUTURE BASRAH 00000064 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Ramon Negron, Regional Coordinator, Regional Embassy Office, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (d) ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: Nearly four months after the Charge of Knights operation, Governor Muhammed Waeli acknowledged that the central Qernment has improved security in the province and praised the Iraqi Security Forces' ongoing efforts to bring steady quality of life improvements for Basrawis. The relative calm in the province has allowed local and central government officials to focus more on economic development and foreign investment. That shift in focus has given way to a new battle; one between local officials and the central government for control of Basrah's economic future. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Waeli has consistently accused Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki of using the success of Charge of Knights to advance his political and economic agenda. Since early April, Maliki has removed Director Generals at almost every state-owned enterprise operating in the province, replacing most of them with members of the Dawa and Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI) parties. The most contentious personnel change was the removal of South Oil Company (SOC) DG Jabbar al-Lua'ybi in late-May. Despite protests over his removal, Waeli said Jabbar has given up the fight to remain SOC DG and plans to move to Baghdad to serve as an advisor to the Ministry of Oil. Waeli said Minister of Oil Hussein al Shahristani has narrowed the search for Jabbar's permanent replacement to two individuals: Abd al Sahib Kuti (ISCI) and Diyaa Jaffer (Dawa). Other recent DG appointments include Amir Abd al Jabar (Dawa) replacing Abd al-Kareem Jaber al Sa'idi (Independent) as DG for Oil Transportation, and Ali Hussien Kudayir (Dawa) replacing Abd al Kareem as DG for South Gas. ¶3. (C) During a June 22 meeting with Econoff, Waeli expressed concern that a large percentage of the USD 100 million allocation for reconstruction and development projects following the Charge of Knights would be lost to mismanagement and corruption, adding that Safa al Safi, Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs, had already pre-approved his own contractors. Waeli said the USD 100 million was taken from the provinces' USD 290 million budget for 2008 with the understanding that the funds would be replaced. (Note: Finance Minister Bayan Jabr said in April, when Maliki announced the special reconstruction allocation, that the USD 100 million would be made immediately available from the Basrah provincial budget but that Basrah would be reimbursed with USD 100 million in supplemental appropriations later in the year. End note.) However, Waeli is now worried that the funds will not be replenished, which would prevent the provincial government from executing its own efforts to address much-needed infrastructure development and humanitarian assistance for its citizens. Waeli suspects that the allocation was a tool to give Maliki the ability to exercise authority over the provincial budget. Moreover, with an eye on the upcoming provincial elections, Waeli believes that Maliki and Safi will present successful development and humanitarian initiatives as their own in an effort to undermine local officials and gain greater political control of the south. ¶4. (C) Following the meeting with Waeli, REO met with Abdul al-Hafez al-Ati, head of the Basrah Business Center and one of Safi's principal advisors on project implementation. Abdul had trouble explaining exactly what the center does. It has no charter and no clear funding source. When asked how his organization raises money to operate, Abdul simply said, "we don't need money, we work for the love of Basrah." Abdul explained that Safi appointed a "Support and Rebuild Basrah CommiQe," which is located inside the Basrah Business Center. According to Abdul, the committee was tasked with making initial decisions regarding the overall vision for how the USD 100M would be spent. ¶5. (C) Abdul said that after the broad vision for the grant was developed, the committee began working on details for specific projects. In early-June, 150 projects were approved. However, according to Abdul, the committee somehow had already identified prospective contractors (3 for each of the 150 projects) with full proposals, including costs, before the projects were approved and announced. When questioned further about the sequence of events, Abdul admitted the contractors were pre-selected. Now that Safi has approved the projects, Abdul said the committee will direct the procurement and implementation phases. ¶6. (C) Since mid-June, some Provincial Council members have claimed that they have been working with Safi and his committee toward executing the USD 100M grant. However, Abdul said that while Safi and his committee have consulted the council on a number of issues, Safi has not included the council in the decision-making and implementation process. Akil Talib, BASRAH 00000064 002.2 OF 002 Provincial Council member and close advisor to Waeli, confirmed that the council has been left out of the process. In a meeting with the PRT, he said he believes Safi will use the grant to support his political agenda and provide employment opportunities for contractors and workers loyal to ISCI. ¶7. (C) Since nearly one third of Basrah's budget is being directed by Safa al Safi, and with no assurance that the money will be replenished as initially announced, the Provincial Council is struggling to respond to critical water and power shortages with the money that currently remains. The lack of clean water, months after Charge of Knights, serves as an illustrative example of the limited progress made - at least partly - as a result of this awkward budget situation. ¶8. (C) The shortage of clean water began in mid-May 2008 when production at Basrah Petrochemicals, the sole producer of chlorine gas for Iraq, began to slow due to equipment deficiencies and the lack of funding. In early June, the central government reported that it only had three days of chlorine reserves. As a result, the Central Ministry of Municipalities in Baghdad began supplying Basrah with chlorine. However, Basrah Petrochemical's decreased chlorine output, combined with the central government's modest supplement of chlorine tablets, fails to meet the 100 tons of chlorine per month currently needed to chlorinate water for Basrah City and Al Zubyar. In recent weeks, drought conditions and the lack of adequaQwaste removal services have further complicated efforts to provide clean water to the citizens of Basrah. In addition to health concerns, low water levels in the Tigris and Euphrates rivers have damaged the region's agricultural production and have slowed gas liquification operations. ¶9. (C) During the first quarter of 2008, Basrah enjoyed nearly twenty-four hours per day of electricity. Since early-May, Basrawis have reported receiving as little as six hours per day of electricity. According to an Associated Press article, Iraqi electricity officials blame Iran in large part for the electricity shortages, saying Tehran has cut supplies by more than half since the Charge of Knights operation was launched on March 25. Waeli did not attribute the electricity problems to a single source, but he warned that the security situation is fragile and maintaining calm in the city will depend on the local government's ability to provide basic services for its citizens. ¶10. (C) Fearing the permanent absence of the USD 100 million from its budget, the Provincial Council is attempting to gain greater authority over the humanitarian and development initiatives that exist outside Maliki's grasp. Mohamed Sa'adoun Al Obadi, Chairman of the Provincial Council, recently sent a letter to the British-led PRT demanding that the council be included in the approval process for all coalition-funded projects in Basrah. Waeli said council members are simply focusing on their self-interests and do not have the authority to make such demands. Curious about why the PRT did not raise the issue directly with him, Waeli said the PRT "chooses to climb through windows when it can simply walk through the door," explaining that he alone has the authority to allow the PRT to continue implementing projects without confronting potential obstacles from the Provincial Council. He said the Provincial Council should play a role in monitoring coalition-funded initiatives, but should not be involved in approving projects or selecting contractors. Waeli stressed that the PRT and REO should bring any future grievances directly to him. (NOTE: The PRT governance team is aware that having the Provincial Council involved in the implementation of reconstruction projects is an anomaly, and they plan to move toward normalizing institutional roles after provincial council elections later this year. END NOTE.) ¶11. (C) COMMENT: We believe it is not only plausible but likely that the contractors who will ultimately be awarded the projects have already been pre-determined. It is clear project selection lacked transparency and was never meant to be inclusive. Safi has complete control over decision-making and, as a result, Waeli and other local officials have legitimate concerns that Maliki and Safi will use the USD 100Qrant to advance their political agenda. While the grant approval and implementation process lends itself to corruption, there may be a silver lining. The Governor and the Provincial Council have consistently failed in executing the city's budget. As a result, Maliki and Safi have a real political incentive: if they deliver they get the credit - at the same time they make Waeli and the Provincial Council look bad. While many believe contracts and employment opportunities may be skewed toward Basrawis loyal to ISCI and Dawa, the end result of the projects will probably benefit the larger populace. END COMMENT. HOWARD