BANI MALIK SHEIKS ON COK, GROWING IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000052 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/30/2018 TAGS: PGOV PINS IR IZ SUBJECT: BANI MALIK SHEIKS ON COK, GROWING IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN SOUTHERN IRAQ BASRAH 00000052 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Howell Howard, Director, Regional Embassy Office Basrah, Dept. of State. REASON: 1.4 (d) ¶1. (S/rel MCFI) Summary: In a May 22 meeting at the REO, Sheikh Salam Maliki, leader of the Bani Malik tribe, and his brother, Sabah Maliki, expressed dissatisfaction with the ongoing Charge of the Knights (COK) operation in their tribal area, Qurnah. Both claimed the government had yet to fulfill the promises of financial and material support after their tribe had pledged to support COK. Though acknowledging that the security situation in Qurnah had improved, both men expressed fears that the militias would ultimately return. Sabah claimed that the Iranians would work through ISCI/Badr to influence the upcoming elections. Both also said that many of their followers are reluctant to participate in the upcoming elections, as in Basrah the 2005 provincial elections was fraudulent and they did not expect the 2008 election to be any different. End Summary. ¶2. (S/rel MCFI) During a frank discussion held May 22 at the Basrah Regional Embassy Office, Sheikh Salam Maliki, the leader of the Bani Malik tribe, and his brother, Sabah Maliki, relayed their criticisms of the ongoing COK campaign in Qurnah, which is in their tribal area. Though admitting that the security situation has improved in Qurnah and acknowledging the performance of the Iraqi Army (IA),they also asserted that the sudden departure of the militias had been a contributing factor. Both were especially dismissive of the police (IP),stating that not only did the police lack direction and leadership, but they also suffered from a lack of supplies and equipment. Claiming that many of the militants who fled to Iran were now regrouping and retraining, the two men appeared concerned that militants could soon return, and lamented the poor performance of the ISF in securing the borders between Iran and Iraq. (Note: some intelligence reports label Sabah as a Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM) commander. End Note.) ¶3. (C) Stating that the GOI had promised to incorporate their tribal battalion into the ISF, both men seemed extremely frustrated with the GOI's unfulfilled promises, stating that to date, their men had not received salaries, equipment, or weapons. Noting that he had met with the Prime Minister (PM) during the hectic first days of the COK and had received a personal pledge of support from him, Sheikh Salam appeared visibly disappointed. Despite a ministerial order from the MOI and an administrative order from Basrah Police headquarters, nothing had been given to his men, and he was skeptical that he could hold his force together much longer. ¶4. (C) Both men were also critical of the GOI's distribution of the promised $100 million emergency reconstruction fund, which they deemed essential to maintaining security. He laid the blame solely on the shoulders of Safa al-Safi, Acting Justice Minister and in charge of the fund. Sheikh Salam is the chairman of the North Basrah Tribal Regional Support Council (set up by al-Safi),and he claimed that he had personally given Safi a list of projects; to date nothing had been implemented or even announced. His more vitriolic brother, Sabah, went further, alleging that Safi has no intention of distributing the money. (Note: al-Safi has yet to produce a list of projects that he and his Committee of Deputy Ministers will execute in Basrah. Al-Safi is reportedly turning management of the fund over to the ISCI/Badr-allied head of the Basrah Business Center. End Note.) ¶5. (S) Recounting his trip some weeks ago to Egypt, an obviously emotional Sabah al-Maliki said that following the murder of his son, which occurred after Sabah had publicly criticized the growing Iranian influence in southern Iraq, he and a group of influential tribal leaders petitioned the Arab League and the United Nations for assistance. Subsequently invited to Egypt by the Arab League to discuss this issue, the group met with the Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa and several high-ranking Egyptian officials. While in Cairo, they urged the Arab League and the Egyptians to play a more visible role in Iraq to counter Iran's presence, and they also asked the Arab League to provide election monitors for the upcoming provincial elections. The Arab League officials said that they would take this idea up with the UN and the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. ¶6. (S) Unable to hide his contempt for Iran and ISCI/Badr, which he labeled as Iranian proxies, a fiery Sabah ranted that the Iranians will do whatever possible to influence the upcoming elections. Not only will ISCI/Badr attempt to intimidate independent candidates, but he also argued that they would use local clerics and religious leaders to sway voters, particularly the uneducated. In addition, he alleged (but could not substantiate) that ISCI/Badr has already infiltrated the IHEC office in Basrah (GEO). (Note: most REO contacts describe the Basrah GEO director as connected to Badr, although many paint BASRAH 00000052 002.2 OF 002 him as nevertheless reasonably neutral so far. End Note.) Both men warned that if something were not done to counter the Iranians, Basrah and the rest of the south would become ISCI/Badr strongholds. Ending the meeting on a disappointing note, both said that because many of their followers believed the last (2005) elections were fraudulent, they were reluctant to participate in the upcoming provincial elections. They did not expect these ones to be any different. ¶7. (S/rel MCFI) COMMENT: The two Maliki brothers had refused to talk to each other some months, feuding over a personal dispute that they would not specify. We had been trying to get them in together to help them patch things up, and they finally relented. REO Director asked the new Police Chief on May 29 (Septel) about the lack of provisions for the tribal battalion; he agreed that it was a problem, but said he could not solve it. The chief asked that the Embassy try to persuade the Minister of Interior to allocate salaries and equipment for the Basrah tribal battalions. These tribal leaders echo two themes we have heard over and over in Basrah: doubt about long term benefits of COK and a prediction that Iran will dominate the Basrah provincial election. HOWARD