SHIA INDEPENDENT SHEIKHS REFLECT ON POST-COK BASRAH,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000048

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/26/2018
TAGS: PGOV ECON IR IZ
SUBJECT: SHIA INDEPENDENT SHEIKHS REFLECT ON POST-COK BASRAH,
SADRISTS, AND NEIGHBORING STATES INFLUENCE ON ELECTIONS

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CLASSIFIED BY: Howell Howard, Director, Regional Embassy Office
Basrah, Dept. of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)


1. (C/REL MCFI) Summary: In a meeting held on May 19 at the
Regional Embassy Office in Basrah, Sheikh Amir Faiz of the Bani
Amr tribe and esteemed Shia cleric, Sayyid Adil al-Musawi, said
that the Charge of the Knights (COK) operation was a historic
event which brought security to Basrah but cautioned that the
slow pace of reconstruction could jeopardize its success. Both
indicated that the Sadrists had lost popular support since COK
and that they were suffering from a lack of leadership. The two
also said that Basrawis have grown disenchanted with the
established political blocs, and that independents stood a good
chance in the upcoming provincial elections. Though Sheikh Faiz
revealed that the Iranian Consul had already offered to support
his candidacy, the two warned the U.S. not to focus solely on
Iranian efforts to influence the elections, as Iraq's other
neighbors will also try to interfere as well. Both said that the
U.S. could play an important role in ensuring that the elections
remain as free and fair as possible by assisting the GOI in
training and increasing the number of election monitors,
identifying appropriate election centers, and funding voter
education campaigns. End Summary.

COK: SUCCESS OVERSHADOWED BY RECONSTRUCTION DELAYS
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2. (C/REL MCFI) During a meeting held May 19 at the Regional
Embassy Office (REO) in Basrah, Sheikh Faiz and Sayyid Musawi
discussed the improved post-COK environment in Basrah. Claiming
that it had been a "benchmark operation," Sheikh Musawi stated
that it had brought security to Basrah, and the residents of
Basrah had developed a new respect for the GOI, the Prime
Minister (PM) and the security forces (ISF). He said that COK
had freed Basrawis from the endemic lawlessness and violence of
the past few years, and that people were extremely happy with
this turn of events. With obvious happiness, he shared how the
markets were now teeming with people and residents felt safe
enough to go out at night and enjoy themselves. Sheik Faiz
agreed, stating that the COK operation had historic
significance, and that Basrah was now a much better place.


3. (C/REL MCFI) Both men cautioned, though, that the slow pace
of reconstruction activities threatened to derail the progress
gained by COK. Sheikh Musawi recalled that when the PM was in
Basrah, he promised that the GOI would take Basrah's
reconstruction seriously, and though they do not doubt his
sincerity, nothing has come to fruition. They alleged that Safa
al-Safi, whom the PM had tapped to oversee reconstruction
activities in Basrah, planned to use the $100 million emergency
reconstruction fund to further the his own political agenda
prior to the upcoming Provincial Council Elections. Sayyid
Musawi and Sheikh Faiz claimed that Safi, a native Basrawi, was
in the process of establishing his own independent political
party which he hoped to field in the upcoming elections.
Warning that any further delays in commencing reconstruction
activities could empower the Sadrists and other opponents of the
GOI, Sayyid Musawi said that the PM needed to reconsider Safi's
role in the process. Sheikh Faiz went further, stating that the
PM should recall Safi to Baghdad and establish an independent
commission to oversee reconstruction, whose membership could be
drawn from the existing Provincial Council and prominent
Basrawis.

SADRISTS: DOWN AND OUT, FOR NOW
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4. (C/REL MCFI) Discussing the Sadrists role in Basrah's
political arena, Sayyid Musawi posited that the movement was
suffering from a leadership vacuum. Because of this, it was
difficult to gauge their intentions or even the direction that
the movement wanted to take. If this continued, Sayyid Musawi
opined that Sadr's followers would join other political groups,
with the obvious beneficiary being Fadhila. He also warned that
the continuing delays in reconstruction could sour the newfound
respect that Basrawis have for the GOI, and ultimately could
benefit the Sadrists, and by extension, Fadhila. Weighing in,
Sheikh Faiz said that in the past, the Sadrists' anti-CF stance
garnered them appeal among many Basrawis. Now that Coalition
Forces had withdrawn to the Basrah Air Station (Note: some UK
and U.S. troops are currently at the Basrah Palace. End note.)
and it is clear that the British forces will eventually depart,
that appeal has diminished. Additionally, when the Sadrists'
central leadership appeared in complete disarray during COK,
more people deserted the movement, and Sheikh Faiz said that
their popular base was a fraction of what it once was. Most
importantly, Sheikh Faiz said that many in Basrah have an
unfavorable opinion of the Sadrists; simply put, they have lived
under them, and did not want to repeat that. He predicted that
the Sadrists would decline to participate in the elections if

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given the opportunity, as their electoral performance in Basrah
could prove embarrassing. In his estimation, Fadhila stands to
benefit, as he believes many former Sadrist supporters would
vote for them.

ELECTIONS: INDEPENDENTS, INTRIGUES, AND U.S. ROLE
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5. (C/REL MCFI) Commenting on the upcoming provincial elections,
Sheikh Faiz claimed that the people of Basrah had grown
extremely frustrated with the inefficacy and corruption of the
major political blocs, and that independent candidates have a
good chance in the upcoming elections. He also acknowledged
that he planned to run as an independent on his own list, the
Unity and Justice Assembly. Sayyid Musawi was more circumspect,
agreeing that the time was ripe for change, but also expressing
fears that given the importance of Basrah, Iraq's neighbors
would attempt to influence the outcome of the elections "through
money and fatwas." Both cautioned the U.S. against thinking
that only the Iranians would be involved, stating that many of
Iraq's neighbors would also attempt to dictate the outcome. They
also stated that the neighboring states are more likely to
support existing political blocs, asserting that Iran had lined
up firmly behind ISCI/Badr, and the Sadrists, if they
participate, while Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were supporting
Fadhila. (Note: Fadhila officials visited Saudi Arabia some
weeks ago. End Note.) Illustrating the degree of Iranian
interference that has already emerged, Sheikh Faiz recounted
that the Iranian Consul had urged him to join one of the more
established political blocs, such as ISCI, Badr, or even the
Sadrists, and hinted at his willingness to support his
candidacy. Sheikh Faiz declined the offer.


6. (C/REL MCFI) Stating that the U.S. could help ensure that
these elections are as free and fair as possible, Sayyid Musawi
requested that the U.S. assist the GOI in increasing and
training the number of election monitors to prevent fraud from
occurring at polling stations. He also suggested that the U.S.
and others work with election officials to identify appropriate
locations for election centers, so that whenever possible, they
are in as neutral a location as possible and not in party bloc
strongholds. Most importantly, he would like to see an
effective voter education campaign that focuses attention on the
importance of the elections, arguing that these elections, more
than any other, will shape Iraq's future for years to come.
HOWARD