CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS WHEELS NORTH: OBJECTIVE QURNAH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000044 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/13/2018 TAGS: PINS PGOV ECON IR IZ SUBJECT: CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS WHEELS NORTH: OBJECTIVE QURNAH REF: A) BASRAH 36; (B) BASRAH 35 AND PREVIOUS; (C) IQATF REPORT MAY 2008 BASRAH 00000044 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Howell Howard, Director, Regional Embassy Office Basrah, Dept. of State. REASON: 1.4 (a),(d) ¶1. (S//REL MCFI) SUMMARY: For the first time since the GoI launched Operation Charge of the Knights (CoK) in March, on May 13 CoK will focus its attention outside greater Basrah - targeting the JAM stronghold of Al Qurnah, 70 km to the northwest. Despite a long supply line and a low priority for Coalition air assets, Basrah's outgoing military commander MG Mohan was determined to mount the operation. It will be the first test for new commander BG Mohammed. As a noted JAM stronghold, Qurnah has been a refuge for militias fleeing Basrah city; little resistance is expected, as most JAM fighters have reportedly fled to Iran. Qurnah is the stepping stone to Maysan's capital Al Amarah, where JAM fighters may mount more determined resistance. Without a secured Iranian border, any gains in these cities will be hard to consolidate. END SUMMARY. QURNAH AND ITS TRIBES -------------- ¶2. (C//REL MCFI) About 70km northwest of Basrah City at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates, Al Qurnah sits astride one of two Main Supply Routes between Basrah and Baghdad as well as a key highway leading east to Iran. Qurnah's strategic value is heightened by the nearby Ramallah and West Qurnah (15km away) oil fields. A known depot for smuggling from Iran, it has become a Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM) stronghold. Qurnah proper has only 20,000 residents but the circa 16 tribes in the surrounding may number 200,000. ¶3. (C//REL MCFI) Qurnah's tribes have been split by intratribal conflicts between those loyal to JAM, those loyal to ISCI/Badr, and those loyal to the national government (with the latter two loyalties overlapping). The 200-plus oil wells and other oil extraction facilities make for a large number of armed men employed by the Oil Protection Service (OPS); according to several local Sheiks and a contact in one of the Western oil companies renovating the wells, all of the OPS are members of the Fadhila party (though many opportunistically profess JAM membership as well). Fadhila, JAM, Iraqi Security Forces, oil company security and tribes have been in conflict in Qurnah for months (septel). CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS 8 -------------- ¶4. (S//REL MCFI) CoK8 (Ref B),set to start May 13, is the first real test for the new commander of the Basrah Operations Center (BOC),BG Mohammed Jawad Hawadi (Ref A). Although BG Mohammad was appointed several weeks ago, outgoing commander MG Mohan remained in Basrah until a few days ago, running CoK with Mohammed in the background. Coalition Force (CF) generals in Basrah have so far been impressed with Mohammed's planning (at least as compared to General Mohan's). Elements of the 14th and 1st Iraqi Army (IA) Divisions will move from Basrah to al Qurnah and conduct a house to house clear and search operation, aimed primarily at confiscating medium/heavy weapons as they realize that JAM fighters have mostly fled. MND(SE) and MNC-I forces will support with Military Transition Teams (MiTT) and air cover as needed. ¶5. (S//REL MCFI) The operation raises several concerns: -- CF generals had advised against a premature operation so far from Basrah city supply lines that would demand CF air assets at a time when operations in Baghdad and Mosul have a higher priority. General Mohan nevertheless made a trip to Baghdad to advocate for the Qurnah operation. -- The plan appears to fail to account for the need to block escape of JAM fighters north into Al Amarah. -- As the few recent rocket attacks on the MND(SE) base at Basrah Air Station demonstrate, the IA may be shifting forces from Basrah city before the IA and local Iraqi Police (IP) have fully consolidated security for the city. -- MNC-I's Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) has fully committed its assets within Basrah city and cannot support CoK8 in the successful way CMOC has conducted city services delivery in Basrah. Humanitarian assistance has been key to engendering popular for the GOI in Basrah following military operations. -- The OPS's ability and loyalty are questionable: while the OPS have been placed under the MOI, it is unclear how this uniformed, armed group will act when the operation starts. BASRAH 00000044 002.2 OF 003 -- The main problem is that JAM and their weapons will probably not be there when the IA arrives. According to Qurnah tribal and western oil company contacts, JAM leaders and fighters have largely fled Qurnah for Kuwait, Qatar and Qura, Iran. They know that the IA is coming -- Deputy Minister of Interior Khalef announced plans for the Qurnah operation on television April 26. They have cached their medium to heavy weapons and plan to filter back to Qurnah when the IA heat dies down, then prepare to stage from Qurnah for a return to Basrah city. -- This advance warning will also likely increase the ISF casualty count. Oil company contacts have reported OPS members emplacing IEDs against IA and CF convoys. ¶6. (S//REL MCFI) On the positive side, some sheikhs from tribes such as the Bani Malik have been actively cooperating with ISF and plan to finger JAM hideouts as the IA roll in, although the presence of many JAM members in its ranks raises questions about loyalty and security. Oil companies have successfully used tribal members as security elements to combat militia attacks (septel). During CoK in Basrah city, tribal members in Qurnah fought against JAM; recently the ISF have conducted limited but successful arrest operations in Qurnah. Qurnah has one of the few functioning tribal ISF auxiliary battalions, although, again, some intelligence reporting indicates that many battalion members are JAM. IQATF surveys have found residents to be tired of JAM domination of Qurnah city and environs and welcome ISF cleaning up the town - although, with citizens dissatisfied at the total lack of reconstruction projects in Qurnah, and electricity and other services worse than in Basrah, the pent-up demand for municipal services may be difficult for the GoI/ISF to meet without the sort of concerted effort thus far lacking in Basrah. NEXT STOP - AL AMARAH, MAYSAN? -------------- ¶7. (S//REL MCFI) Most commentators acknowledge that the next security prize after Basrah city is Al Amarah, which MND(SE) forces have avoided since a Sadrist governor and provincial council took office in 2005. Although the Maysan PRT has had recent success in engagement with local government out of the PRT base in Talil, they are unable to visit Maysan. Oil company and other private security movements have frequently been ambushed. In press conferences ISF leaders have signaled their intention to tackle Amarah after Qurnah. By some accounts (as in Basrah city),this and previous announcements such announcements of imminent operations have confused and tired JAM as they prepare for a battle that is then delayed. ¶8. (S//REL MCFI) The 10th IA Division has recently established a tactical operations center on the border of Basrah and Maysan provinces. Reports conflict as to whether the ISF attempt to take Amarah will be a battle or as easy as Qurnah is expected to be. Some reporting ascribes to JAM the intent to make Amarah a last stand - the local government supports JAM and proximity to Iran makes resupply easy. Polls of local residents (Ref C) and REO conversations with local sheiks suggest that many JAM/Special Group fighters have fled to Amarah from Basrah or Qurnah; other reports suggest that JAM/SG fighters fleeing Sadr City are also converging on Amarah. Whether JAM/SG makes their last stand, encouraged by local government support, or fade to Iran to return when the IA moves on is an open question. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (S//REL MCFI) The Qurnah operation will mirror the questions arising from the largely completed Basrah city operations. Will the IA do perfunctory searches and move on without holding ground? In Basrah, large weapons caches were found but it is unclear if those caches really made a dent in insurgent capabilities. In Basrah as in Qurnah, the idea is to target one general grouping of non-ISF armed people: Sadrists/JAM. In Basrah, Fadhila and ISCI/Badr were not targeted and apparently still have their medium/heavy weapons. In Qurnah, Fadhila's grip on the OPS makes it the other power that may survive armed and as a future threat to the ISF. With both Basrah and Qurnah, if the Iranian borders cannot be secured, there is nothing to stop the widely predicted JAM/SG flight to Iran and subsequent return while IA forces are dispatched to other trouble spots in Iraq. Under current conditions, it appears that Basrah province will continue indefinitely to require the presence of two IA divisions. ¶10. (S//REL MCFI) Security in Qurnah has an importance far beyond its historic/cultural value and the well-being of its residents. In the area there are many more oil facilities to renovate (over 400 wells) and new exploration to conduct. Militia attacks on oil companies (as recently as May 6) have not halted work, but as the GOI is engaged in tenders for new oil contracts in the area, security will be a concern. Oil companies know how to operate in a risky environment, but they BASRAH 00000044 003.2 OF 003 have their limits; we speculate that if Iranian forces want to disrupt future income and investment in Iraq, arming and funding militia fighters in nearby Qurnah after the IA pulls out would be a good strategy. HOWARD