SAFA AL SAFI ON COALITION FAILURES, GOI FUND FOR BASRAH,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BASRAH 000040 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/29/2018 TAGS: PGOV PINS KJUS ECON EAID IR IZ SUBJECT: SAFA AL SAFI ON COALITION FAILURES, GOI FUND FOR BASRAH, TRIBES, AND MORE REF: A. BASRAH 31 ¶B. BAGHDAD APRIL 20 O/I BASRAH 00000040 001.2 OF 004 CLASSIFIED BY: Howell H. Howard, Director, U.S. Regional Embassy Office, Basrah, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C/REL MCFI) SUMMARY: Acting Justice Minister Safa al-Safi met with CMOC and REO Basrah Directors in Basrah on April 24. Safi roundly criticized Coalition reconstruction efforts as ineffective and corrupt. He showed little understanding of the PRT role or a provided list of past projects. Safi was clear that the Charge of the Knights (CoK) and his GOI oversight were going to improve project execution in Basrah. He appears to have developed a project list for Prime Minister Maliki's USD 100 million grant to Basrah, but is waiting for his committee of Deputy Ministers to arrive and act on the list. Safi refuses to use these funds for rounding out the Basrah Prison project or to build the needed housing that he claims the Coalition should fund. The GOI's tribal initiative is operational for project selection, and he claims CoK detainees are treated legally. Safi expressed disinterest in returning to Baghdad to manage passage of the elections law. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C/REL MCFI) Acting Justice Minister Safa al-Safi met with MNC-I's Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) Director and REO Basrah Director on April 24 at the Basrah Palace. Also attending were RDML Edward Winters, COL Ian Cave from MND-SE and an ORA representative. Prime Minister Maliki charged Safi with oversight of the GOI's USD 100 million aid package for Basrah and with oversight of a tribal initiative (Ref A). The meeting was dominated by Safi's wide-ranging criticism of PRT, UK and U.S. development projects, a theme echoed in previous meetings with CMOC Director and the UK Consul General/PRT. COK EFFECT ON CORRUPTION AND PROVINCIAL RELATIONS -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C/REL MCFI) Safi was keen to stress that the Charge of the Knights had changed everything in Basrah. Provincial budget execution would remain a key to reconstruction, but now corruption would decrease. Relations between the governor and PC were already better and would improve more (with Safi's help). The governor still needed to be more inclusive and transparent; Safi noted that the heads of Basrah districts and subdistricts told him that the governor had never met with them. Safi was still meeting with the governor every day and criticized the governor as a Fadhila party pawn. (Governor Wa'eli arrived while this meeting was in progress.) REO Director objected to Safi's implication the Coalition had helped Governor Wa'eli's notoriously corrupt brother to escape justice. (Note: Wa'eli's brother went with a Fadhila delegation to Saudi Arabia. End note.) REVIEW OF PRT/CG MEETING AND 2007 PROJECT EXECUTION -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C/REL MCFI) CMOC's CAPT Burns provided a voluminous list of projects from that were done with the USD 1.2 billion provide by the US from 2003 through 2007. After thanking Burns, Safi launched into a long-winded and somewhat inaccurate critique of the Basrah PRT and the Basrah Development Commission (BDC). The BDC was not going to be useful, he said, as it was established in violation of its own principles and without Iraqi input. ¶5. (C/REL MCFI) Safi noted that he had met with the UK Consul General and a PRT (DFID) representative the night before, and he displayed the 2007 Project Report that the PRT had prepared for the Provincial Reconstruction Development Committee (PRDC). Safi had clearly spent much of the day combing through the report and said he did not understand how the PRT organized projects, how contractors were chosen, or how project completion was verified or enforced. (Note: The 2007 Report that the CG and DFID gave to Safi was a list of all projects executed in 2007 from all donors. Of the USD 553 million totaled in that report, the PRT's share represents around USD 70 million. The PRT prepared this report to aid the PC's PRDC in project planning. The PRT has never tried to, and cannot, track the execution of projects by other donors. Safi was lambasting the PRT for what the report made clear were other donors' contracts. In the CG/PRT meeting, Safi admitted he did not know the purpose of the PRT until the DFID rep explained it to him. End Note.) BASRAH 00000040 002.2 OF 004 SAFI ALLEGES CORRUPTION -------------- ¶6. (C/REL MCFI) Safi hammered on a theme of mismanaged donor contracts that were then subcontracted several times. He repeatedly stated that Iraqi contractors could do all of these projects for much less. In addition to millions spent to little effect, there had to be corruption somewhere, possibly even with the PRT. When the REO Director protested the allegation, Safi persisted that PRT corruption was a possibility and in any event there was no oversight to catch any corruption. Moreover, he said that it was hard to know U.S. project evaluation criteria; it should be Iraqis evaluating all contracting and project execution. Safi complained in a previous meeting with CMOC that the Coalition's high contract awards were making it hard for the GOI to award contracts at reasonable levels. ¶7. (C/REL MCFI) Safi spent much time pulling out examples (that were likely typographic errors) from the 2007 project list as evidence of corruption. With all of the projects aimed at water quality, for example, Safi said that all of his contacts had told him that water quality was still bad everywhere. Unaddressed delinquencies in contract execution were also a problem. Safi complained that no action had been taken against any of the contractors who had not fulfilled their obligations. REO Director asked if the MOJ had ever investigated an Iraqi contract for corruption anywhere in the country, and Safi admitted that the MOJ had not. But, he said, his DepMin committee would now hold contractors in Basrah accountable. ¶8. (C/REL MCFI) Note: In his previous meetings with CMOC and the UK CG, Safi recommended that his GOI committee should evaluate and prioritize each donor project using the GOI's better understanding of what Iraq needs to avoid duplication but also ensure that contract awards were appropriate. The GOI, Safi said, should also oversee the execution of all projects and be allowed to take remedial legal action. Safi has already expressed displeasure at proactive U.S. military efforts to hire cleanup crews during CoK. End Note. THE PM'S $100 MILLION FOR BASRAH -------------- ¶9. (C/REL MCFI) Safi reacted suspiciously when the REO Director asked how plans were going for expenditure of the PM's $100 million fund for Basrah. He stressed that he solicited input with every possible group of people. (Note: Admiral Winters confirmed that Safi has had a steady stream of tribal and other groups meet with him at the palace. End Note.) Safi was evasive, but implied that he had completed his list of projects, that there were too many of them, and that his Deputy Minister committee would have to vet them when it arrived in a week or ten days. (Note. We later heard the DepMins were to arrive April 27. End note.) Safi's current list of priorities included health, municipalities (power and sewage),education and youth/sport. The MoJ said the committee would arrive in a week to ten days but the money (USD 100 million) had already arrived. COALITION SHOULD FUND HOUSING -------------- ¶10. (C/REL MCFI) The Justice Minister renewed his suggestion that the Coalition fund housing for Basrawis. He waxed eloquent about a UK housing project in the 1950s that was still in good repair. People called this the British project, and he said if the U.S. did the same, all Basrawis would see a favorable gift. REO Director asked why GOI funds should not pay for this, which would give the Iraqi face that Safi found so important. Safi said it was not easy for the GOI to fund housing for Basrah, because if the central government started funding housing all over the country it would break the GOI's budget. When REO Director spoke of oil revenues, Safi retorted that Iraq's output was only 2.5 million bbl/day and that the Coalition should invest $1.5 billion to increase oil production. BASRAH PRISON PROJECT -------------- ¶11. (C/REL MCFI) REO Director updated Safi on the status of the State-funded renovation of the Basrah Prison. Safi stressed the importance of involving Iraqis by putting the notice of tender in Iraqi newspapers. He chided the U.S. for not consulting with BASRAH 00000040 003.2 OF 004 the GOI and asked that State coordinate with his DG of Corrections in Basrah as well as his Deputy Minister Bushar [sic]. Safi rebuffed suggestions that his USD 100 million package could be used to fund some of REO Director's proffered list of projects, which were not covered in the project's scope of work. He retorted that USD 10 million was a lot for the prison and the U.S. ought to be able to finance everything needed to round out the Prison--if we used Iraqi contractors. GOI TRIBAL INITIATIVE -------------- ¶12. (C/REL MCFI) When REO Director asked about the dissolution of the tribal committee, Safi retorted that there had never really been a tribal committee. He instead described his organization of around 450 sheikhs into 15 (we have heard 16) Tribal Support Councils for Regions (TSCs); each TSC has elected its own leaders. Within each TSC there are committees for services, security, financial administration and reconciliation. When asked how he selected the sheikhs, Safi replied that he had consulted widely; if there were different sheikhs identified in a given area, he chose both in order to build consensus. The PM's office would manage the TSCs (not Safi, who said he was asked but did not have the time); GOI funds (not out of the USD 100 million) would pay for offices and stipends. Safi asserted that no tribes were excluded and that one of the councils even had a Sunni president. For reconstruction projects, the TSCs would make proposals for use of the USD 100 million funds through the districts. PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS -------------- ¶13. (C/REL MCFI) Safi dismissed the REO Director's suggestion that Safi's presence was needed in Baghdad for passage of the elections law and for nuancing UNAMI comments, saying there was no need to return to Baghdad soon. He was managing the election law by telephone from the Basrah Palace, and besides it was not the place of the executive branch to interfere in the work of the Council of Representatives. Moreover, there was a MOJ committee working on the election law. Safi refused to supply a MOJ point of contact for the Embassy, saying that he was the person to contact. Safi predicted that the COR would not agree to an open list and that the law would probably end up being half open list and half closed list. In this way the parties retained some authority but independent candidates would be able to get on the ballots. DETAINEES -------------- ¶14. (C/REL MCFI) REO Director enquired as to reports that some detained in the course of CoK had been mistreated. Safi explained that a MOI team in Basrah, led by a Deputy Minister of Interior, investigates each suspect's case. If grounds existed, the case was referred to the court system in Basrah, with no military trials. Safi was initially vague in answering REO Director's question as to an alleged list of arrest targets that the PM had brought to Basrah; he then allowed that 60 targeted persons had been captured but that many others had fled. Investigative judges, he claimed, had issued arrest warrants for any persons on the list. MOVING THE PARTIES OUT OF GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS -------------- - ¶15. (C/REL MCFI) REO Director asked Safi why Sayed al Shahada (SAS) had not yet moved out of its headquarters (the former governor's house),noting that there might be an appearance of favoritism. Safi related that SAS was protesting that it had invested much in refurbishing the headquarters and that he had agreed to give SAS one more week and then he would take action. (Note: PM Maliki issued an order prior to CoK that all parties had to evacuate government-owned buildings. [Ref B] Dawa and OMS were in such buildings and have moved out. End Note.) COMMENT -------------- ¶16. (C/REL MCFI) Safa al Safi continues to show a fervent hostility towards UK and PRT reconstruction efforts, with plenty of criticism for U.S. efforts as well. While it appears he has diligently surveyed popular opinion and needs, his understanding of reconstruction issues is flawed. We assess Safi's oversight BASRAH 00000040 004.2 OF 004 of contracting for his USD 100 million fund as possibly too great a challenge, let alone his ambition to oversee all Coalition projects. His desire for an Iraqi face is in contrast to his insistence that the U.S. should pay for any add-on to the Basrah prison and fund housing development and oil infrastructure. Safi appears to be scrutinizing Basrah in a way that the GOI has not done anywhere else in the country. Safi's inexperience with reconstruction, when combined with the difficulty that the Deputy Ministers may have in running reconstruction by committee, may lead to increased GOI resentment over the relative success of the PRT and CMOC. CMOC, the PRT, REO, USAID and the UK FCO will work together to engage Safi as a team and resist Safi's efforts to divide the Coalition. HHOWARD