C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000038

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/27/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINS PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: HYYANIYAH HEARTS AND MINDS WITH CMOC

REF: A) BASRAH 35 AND PREVIOUS (B) BASRAH 31

CLASSIFIED BY: Howell Howard, Director, REO Basrah, Department
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)


1. (C/REL MCFI) SUMMARY: MNCI's Civil Military Operations Center
(CMOC) has planned a weeklong rejuvenation of Basrah City's poor
and JAM-infested Hyyaniyah. On April 29, Iraqi Army and
Coalition Forces will secure the area, to be followed by Iraqi
teams to deliver services and repairs. The CMOC organized the
operation so as to train provincial and security planners to
replicate restoring services in the wake of militia departure.
Acting MOJ Safa al-Safi has not been involved. CMOC is showing
how U.S. military rapid response can set the stage for the
longer term. CMOCs are also planned for Talil, Baghdad and
Mosul. END SUMMARY.


2. (C/REL MCFI) MNCI's Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC),
embedded with MND-SE for several weeks during the GOI's Charge
of the Knights (CoK)(Ref A), has planned a combined rejuvenation
project for the low-income, militia-ridden Hyyaniyah district of
Basrah City. CMOC planners, with the approval of the provincial
government, have developed a weeklong operation to improve
Hyyaniyah with a Coalition-supported Iraqi face. After days of
planning, CMOC on April 28 will hold a meeting with the Deputy
Governor and his technical directors, Provincial Council,
Ministry Directors General, Iraqi Security Forces and Coalition
Forces to get final approval for the operation. A press
conference will follow.


3. (C/REL MCFI) Hyyaniyah was the last district of Basrah City
to be cleared in block by block operations that ended a few days
ago. IA and Coalition Forces (CF) encountered little resistance,
recovering significant weapons caches but finding few
militiamen. While it is likely that many Jaysh al Mahdi leaders
and fighters have temporarily (they hope) fled to Iran or other
neighbors, and significant stores of weapons probably remain
hidden, for the time being Hyyaniyah is quiet, with the
population reportedly content that IA and CF have cleaned up the
town. Still, Hyyaniyah remains poor with even poorer delivery
of services.


4. (C/REL MCFI) Beginning April 29, Iraqi Army (IA) and
Coalition Forces (CF) will enter and secure the district,
manning checkpoints. Combined IA and CF (UK and U.S.) forces
will stand by with air cover, surveillance, quick reaction and
rescue forces. Governate service providers will follow
immediately with teams to collect garbage, service electrical
infrastructure, and repair water systems. Health providers will
accompany to assess health and humanitarian needs. UK and U.S.
CF will include MiTT teams to advise and organize air support,
IQATF to assess population wants and needs, and Civil Affairs
officers to help with execution of service delivery.


5. (C/REL MCFI) The CMOC played a key role in offering to the
Governor and Provincial Council its organization of the
operation. While the PRT has had success in training the PC and
governate staff for infrastructure project management, the
CMOC's military, operational approach has been invaluable in
showing the provincial government how to mobilize resources.
For example, CMOC has helped to plan with governate officials
the deployment of the garbage trucks; i.e., with x number of
garbage trucks in the city, how many can be spared for this one
week operation? Where to deploy them during the operation? Where
are the dumpsites and how long will the round trip take?


6. (C/REL MCFI) COMMENT: Acting Minister of Justice, Safa
al-Safi, Prime Minister Maliki's point man for jump-starting
post-CoK service delivery in Basrah (Ref B), has not been
involved in this operation. With his generally negative outlook
on CF (including grudging thanks but essential displeasure at
CF-funded cleanup efforts that have already occurred elsewhere
in Basrah) and his insistence on an Iraqi face for
reconstruction, Safi may well not like being cut out of this
operation. But even he should realize that one of the positive
side effects of the GOI's descent on Basrah is the now closer
cooperation between the Governor and the PC this operation has
helped made possible.


7. (C/REL MCFI) The Hyyaniyah cleanup project is a good example
of how U.S. military rapid response can achieve a short-term
effect that sets an example for the long term. CMOCs are also
planned for Talil/Nasiriyah (for the other three southern
provinces), Baghdad and Mosul. CoK impelled the rapid formation
of the CMOC in Basrah, where it will remain indefinitely. End
Comment.

HOWARD