HYYANIYAH HEARTS AND MINDS WITH CMOC

C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000038 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/27/2018 TAGS: PGOV PINS PHUM IZ SUBJECT: HYYANIYAH HEARTS AND MINDS WITH CMOC REF: A) BASRAH 35 AND PREVIOUS (B) BASRAH 31 CLASSIFIED BY: Howell Howard, Director, REO Basrah, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (d) ¶1. (C/REL MCFI) SUMMARY: MNCI's Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) has planned a weeklong rejuvenation of Basrah City's poor and JAM-infested Hyyaniyah. On April 29, Iraqi Army and Coalition Forces will secure the area, to be followed by Iraqi teams to deliver services and repairs. The CMOC organized the operation so as to train provincial and security planners to replicate restoring services in the wake of militia departure. Acting MOJ Safa al-Safi has not been involved. CMOC is showing how U.S. military rapid response can set the stage for the longer term. CMOCs are also planned for Talil, Baghdad and Mosul. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C/REL MCFI) MNCI's Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), embedded with MND-SE for several weeks during the GOI's Charge of the Knights (CoK)(Ref A),has planned a combined rejuvenation project for the low-income, militia-ridden Hyyaniyah district of Basrah City. CMOC planners, with the approval of the provincial government, have developed a weeklong operation to improve Hyyaniyah with a Coalition-supported Iraqi face. After days of planning, CMOC on April 28 will hold a meeting with the Deputy Governor and his technical directors, Provincial Council, Ministry Directors General, Iraqi Security Forces and Coalition Forces to get final approval for the operation. A press conference will follow. ¶3. (C/REL MCFI) Hyyaniyah was the last district of Basrah City to be cleared in block by block operations that ended a few days ago. IA and Coalition Forces (CF) encountered little resistance, recovering significant weapons caches but finding few militiamen. While it is likely that many Jaysh al Mahdi leaders and fighters have temporarily (they hope) fled to Iran or other neighbors, and significant stores of weapons probably remain hidden, for the time being Hyyaniyah is quiet, with the population reportedly content that IA and CF have cleaned up the town. Still, Hyyaniyah remains poor with even poorer delivery of services. ¶4. (C/REL MCFI) Beginning April 29, Iraqi Army (IA) and Coalition Forces (CF) will enter and secure the district, manning checkpoints. Combined IA and CF (UK and U.S.) forces will stand by with air cover, surveillance, quick reaction and rescue forces. Governate service providers will follow immediately with teams to collect garbage, service electrical infrastructure, and repair water systems. Health providers will accompany to assess health and humanitarian needs. UK and U.S. CF will include MiTT teams to advise and organize air support, IQATF to assess population wants and needs, and Civil Affairs officers to help with execution of service delivery. ¶5. (C/REL MCFI) The CMOC played a key role in offering to the Governor and Provincial Council its organization of the operation. While the PRT has had success in training the PC and governate staff for infrastructure project management, the CMOC's military, operational approach has been invaluable in showing the provincial government how to mobilize resources. For example, CMOC has helped to plan with governate officials the deployment of the garbage trucks; i.e., with x number of garbage trucks in the city, how many can be spared for this one week operation? Where to deploy them during the operation? Where are the dumpsites and how long will the round trip take? ¶6. (C/REL MCFI) COMMENT: Acting Minister of Justice, Safa al-Safi, Prime Minister Maliki's point man for jump-starting post-CoK service delivery in Basrah (Ref B),has not been involved in this operation. With his generally negative outlook on CF (including grudging thanks but essential displeasure at CF-funded cleanup efforts that have already occurred elsewhere in Basrah) and his insistence on an Iraqi face for reconstruction, Safi may well not like being cut out of this operation. But even he should realize that one of the positive side effects of the GOI's descent on Basrah is the now closer cooperation between the Governor and the PC this operation has helped made possible. ¶7. (C/REL MCFI) The Hyyaniyah cleanup project is a good example of how U.S. military rapid response can achieve a short-term effect that sets an example for the long term. CMOCs are also planned for Talil/Nasiriyah (for the other three southern provinces),Baghdad and Mosul. CoK impelled the rapid formation of the CMOC in Basrah, where it will remain indefinitely. End Comment. HOWARD