S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000037

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/24/2018
TAGS: MOPS PBTS PGOV PINR PINS PREL PTER IR IZ
SUBJECT: SAYYID AL SHUHADA ON BASRAH OPERATIONS, IRANIAN INFLUENCE,
AND ELECTIONS

REF: A. BASRAH 28

B. BASRAH 35

C. MNF-I SAS BRIEF 06 FEB 08

D. BASRAH 09

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CLASSIFIED BY: Howell H. Howard, Director, U.S. Regional Embassy
Office, Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d)



(S/NF) SUMMARY: Regional Embassy Officers met with Sayyid
al-Shuhada (SAS - aka Lord of the Martyrs) members April 22.
SAS leader Sayid Dagher al-Musawi told us that the GOI was
likely to continue its tribal initiative in Basrah, owing the
tribes a debt for helping during Operation Charge of the
Knights. SAS welcomed the U.S. military's assistance also, but
opposed a larger force that the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) might call
an "occupation." Dagher admitted that Iran, despite possibly
pressuring JAM into a ceasefire, supplied JAM with lethal aid to
fight the U.S. in Iraq. Looking ahead, the next elections would
show that the GOI's crackdown on JAM would pay dividends for the
ISCI-allied parties. SAS also demanded an explanation for the
Coalition's detention of their newspaper editor. END SUMMARY.

SAS ON GOI TRIBAL INITIATIVE
--------------
(S/NF) SAS Secretary General and Council of Representatives
(CoR) member Sayid Dagher al-Musawi; Political Director and
Provincial Council member Qasim al-Fayad; and Dr. Nasser Abd
al-Sajad visited us on April 21. Heading the CoR's Tribal
Affairs Committee, Dagher confirmed that both the Political and
Tribal Committees established by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki
to oversee a GOI tribal initiative have been disbanded (Ref A).
Dagher excused their demise as "preparatory" for the formation
of thirteen Tribal Support Committees (TSC) in Basrah's most
populous districts with 10-12 tribes represented on each TSC
(Ref B).

TSC's would continue to report to Minister of Justice
Safa al-Safi and the tribal advisors of the Implementation
Follow-UP National Committee for Reconciliation.

(S/NF) Dagher also told us that only six tribal battalions would
be formed for Gurnah, Zubayr, Shatt al-Arab, Albu al-Khaseeb,
al-Madaynah, and al-Haritha. However, only the Shatt al-Arab
battalion was formed. Dagher insisted that the sheikhs have not
yet submitted names for the other battalions, but other contacts
have told us otherwise. Dagher hinted that the TSCs were not
fully representative of all the tribes, blaming the limited
number of seats on a TSC. Dagher opined that the GOI, owing a
debt to the tribes for saving Basrah when the police failed,
would continue to support a tribal scheme and that empowering
the tribes did not frighten the political parties because the
tribes had no political ambitions. When we pointed out the
tribes' political influence in Anbar after the "Awakening",
Dagher retorted that Anbar was dominated by only one tribe
(al-Dulaymi), whereas no single tribe in Basrah could rise above
the competition with the others.

(S/NF)Comment: Dagher's ties to Iran combined with his support
for the continuation of this initiative raises questions about
the possibility of Iranian interference (Ref C). Reporting
indicates that Iran began initiating a dialogue with Iraq's
tribes to possibly pre-empt a Coalition-led tribal strategy in
southern Iraq after witnessing success of the Anbar Awakening.
End Comment.

WE WANT YOUR MONEY, BUT KEEP THE TROOPS HOME
--------------
(S/NF) Dagher admitted that U.S. air support and humanitarian
aid were helpful during Operation Charge of the Knights (CoK),
adding that a limited U.S. military presence would be welcomed
in the future. However, a large U.S. force would give JAM a
pretext to fight the "occupation" and it was important that
operations here maintain an Iraqi face to them. He also
encouraged the U.S. to play a role in "significant
infrastructure" projects.

IRAN'S ROLE
--------------
(S/NF) We noted that Iran might have played a positive role in
pressuring Moqtada al-Sadr to order a ceasefire in early April,
but Dagher avoided praising Iran directly. Instead, he said
that SAS welcomed help regardless of the source, rejected
foreign interference in Iraq, and claimed that the press

BASRAH 00000037 002 OF 002


exaggerates Iranian influence. Later, he admitted that Iran,
despite helping to broker a ceasefire, supplied JAM with lethal
aid using it as a proxy against America. SAS, he said, rejected
using Iraq as an arena for the U.S. and Iran to fight, and he
hoped that Baghdad could influence all parties at the next
tripartite meeting to stop. We reminded SAS that it was not the
U.S., but the Iranians who were sending lethal aid across the
border.

BALANCE OF POWER
--------------
(S/NF) Dagher smugly told us that the results of the next
election would confirm how the balance of political power had
shifted in Basrah resulting from the GOI's crackdown on JAM.
Sadrist rivals, he said, would not perform well in the
elections, while the "House of Five" (ISCI/Badr/Thar
Allah/SAS/Sayid al-Mihrab) had demonstrated that they "stood
beside the GOI to enforce the rule of law and provide services
resulting in the people's trust." He opined that the only way
the Sadrists stood a chance was to cooperate with Fadhila in an
alliance. Surprisingly, given the ideological ties between
Fadhila and the Sadrists, he stressed that any cooperation was
purely tactical and not strategic. Dagher also agreed that the
GOI had sidelined the provincial government when it came to
running Basrah since Maliki's arrival March 23.

WHERE IS RASHID MAJID AL-SARRAJI?
--------------
(S/NF) Before concluding, Dagher demanded to know why Rashid
Majid al-Sarraji (OBJ NINO - ref C & D), the editor of SAS's
"Al-Fatah" newspaper, was detained by the Coalition on January

16. Dagher argued that by detaining Rashid without charging him
with a crime violated his human rights, was illegal, and "the
Coalition was acting no better than Saddam's regime." Speaking
to our translator on the way out, Dagher threatened to
discontinue our engagement unless we provided some explanation
for Rashid's detention.

COMMENT
--------------
(S/NF) Unlike other SAS interlocutors we have met, Dagher is a
polished politician. He chooses his words carefully and is
capable of answering questions while omitting relevant details.
His disdain for the Coalition was also clear, despite his
requests for USG assistance in reconstructing Basrah. We do not
doubt that he will disengage with us if we cannot provide some
explanation for Rashid's detention.
HHOWARD