CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS III: BASRAH UPDATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000033 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/18/2018 TAGS: PGOV PINS ECON IZ SUBJECT: CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS III: BASRAH UPDATE REF: A) Baghdad 1151 B) Basrah 32 C) Basrah 31 BASRAH 00000033 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Howell Howard, Director REO basrah, REO Basrah, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (S//REL MCFI) SUMMARY: Charge of the Knights (COK) II, clearing of Basrah City's Qibla district, winds down as COK III, clearing of the strongest JAM stronghold Hyyaniyah, is about to begin. JAM, possibly with IRGC help, may make COK III its major fight. Sadrists are reportedly behind several attacks against Al-Sistani representatives. In a week MG Mohammed Jawad Hawadi will replace MG Mohan as BOC commander while Air Force MG Adil Kamal Daham will replace General Jalil as police chief. MG Mohammed plans to give Adil a free hand for three months to reform the police, reducing the numbers to a smaller basic policing presence with a non-local QRF force. Television is the main news source for Basrawis. CMOC teams will ground truth a media report that Sadrists are the main humanitarian assistance providers. Food prices are still up as Basrawis hoard for the anticipated Hyyaniyah battle. MOJ Safa al-Safi has become more receptive to PRT and PC input in spending of the GOI's $100 million targeted for Basrah. The PC has a comprehensive development strategy for Basrah's next three years. The technocrat Umm Qasr Deputy Director reports that the port has improved markedly after the IA took over security. END SUMMARY. CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS III -------------- ¶2. (C//REL MCFI) The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) operation (Charge of the Knights II COK II) to isolate, then search Basrah's Qibla neighborhood for wanted criminals and illegal weapons is beginning to wind down, though some house-to-house searches continue (Refs A & B). Qibla remains quiet, but it remains to be seen whether Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) intend to reassert their influence when the ISF presence there declines. ¶3. (S//REL MCFI) Previous reporting (Ref B) indicated that follow-on ISF operations (Op Charge of the Knights III) might focus on Qurnah to the North of Basrah, but planning is underway to confront JAM in their traditional stronghold of Hyyaniyah next. (Deputy Corps Commander MG Flynn has been trying to hold General Mohan back from clearing Hyyaniyah until the IA was truly ready.) Iraqi Army (IA) 14th Division Commander, MG Mohammed Jawad Hawadi, told us April 16 that the plan changed because GOI leaders decided to clear Basrah City first and then work outwards. ISF units continue to isolate Hyyaniyah. With the GOI keeping many of the details from MND-SE and MNCI, the timing of the operation is yet to be confirmed, but we understand it is scheduled to begin the morning of April 19. ¶4. (S//REL MCFI) Reports indicate that JAM intends a robust defense of Hyyaniyah, deploying IED screens and organizing militants for an attack. MND-SE assesses that most JAM leaders remain outside of Basrah, will attempt to re-infiltrate once the ISF's operational posture has stabilized, and then initiate a long, sustained campaign against the ISF. A single source report indicated that Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRCG) members recently arrived in Hyyaniyah to advise and assist JAM members for the upcoming fight. Atmospherics indicate that Basrawis continue to support CF and ISF efforts to eliminate the militias, improve security, and raise the standard of life. SISTANI REPRESENTATIVES TARGETED -------------- ¶5. (U) On April 15, unknown assailants targeted three representatives of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the spiritual leader of the Islamic Supreme Council in IRAQ and Badr Organization. In the Basrah neighborhood of Khor al-Zubair, gunmen ambushed Sheikh Ali al-Fadli's vehicle seriously injuring him and a guard, and killing his driver. Also in Basrah, gunmen seriously wounded Sheikh Ali al-Khafaji as he finished evening prayers at a mosque. In Wassit Province, Habib Salman al-Khatib escaped injury when he was fired at the same day. Comment: Observers in Basrah assume that the Sadrist trend is responsible for targeting the Sistani representatives as a reprisal for the April 11 assassination of Riyadh al-Nouri, the brother-in-law of Muqtada al-Sadr. End Comment. ISF CHANGE OF COMMAND -------------- ¶6. (C//REL MCFI) As previously reported (see Ref B),Basrah's top ISF leaders will change within a week and we now know who their replacements will be. Basrah Operations Commander, LTG Mohan Hafith Fahad, has been reassigned to be an advisor to the MinDef. MG Mohammed Jawad Hawadi, will replace Mohan. MG Abdel Aziz al-Thalami, who came to Basrah in Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's entourage on March 23 and was assumed to be Mohan's replacement, will assume command of 14th DIV. ¶7. (C//REL MCFI) Police Chief MG Jalil Khalaf Shuwayl has also been reassigned and told us he anticipates an appointment as the Chief of Staff for Land Forces in the MoD. Air Force MG Adil Kamal Daham, who we hear is the deputy commander of the National Police in Kharq, will replace him. A disgruntled Jalil told us BASRAH 00000033 002.2 OF 003 April 16 that he attributed his transfer to an unwarranted whisper campaign against him by Maliki advisors (Septel). Comment: The GOI has publicly tried to spin the reassignments as promotions, but even the local press has reported their tenure as failures. End Comment. NEW BOC COMMANDER ON REORGANIZING IRAQI POLICE -------------- - ¶8. (C/REL MCFI) General Mohammed Jawad (Septel) told us on April 16 (Septel) that he had just discussed a mutual vision for the Iraqi Police (IP) in the province with the new Chief of Police, MG Adil Dahhan (who is now in Basrah). Mohammed wants the IP to be "weakened" until it is a force capable of only doing basic police work. Mohammed envisioned a police force minimally staffed in the police stations, with others doing criminal investigations and traffic patrols. A QRF force would deal with civil disturbances; the QRF forces for different cities in the province would be switched so that they did not develop ties with local militias. Mohammed said he step back and give Adil a free hand three months to fix the police. BASRA MEDIA -------------- ¶9. (U) Basra media have grown rapidly since 2003. MND-SE surveyed media preferences of Basra residents recently. Television emerged as the leading medium (92%) followed by newspaper (37%),Internet (27%) and radio (12%). Media outlets are highly partisan. Two TV stations are dominant. Al Iraqiya TV is operated by the GOI and its audience is Shia. Al Sharqiya TV is Sunni and independently owned. The MND-SE survey noted when respondents were asked about newspapers, frequently the response was "kilam jara `id" (newspapers lack credibility). Comment: Media efforts to communicate USG military and reconstruction efforts should there concentrate on television. We have not yet received an assessment of the pamphlet-dropping campaign for weapons turn-in. End Comment. HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS -------------- ¶10. (U) The MNCI's Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), recently headquartered at MND-SE is acting as a clearing-house for humanitarian efforts in Basra, in cooperation with the PRT and UN. The CMOC and Basra Province PRT met with the technical advisor to the Governor on April 16 to identify responsibility for battle damage. According to CMOC and MND-SE J-9 representatives, the advisor was not clear whether the GOI or Coalition funding should pay for damaged structures. An agreement was reached to prioritize the projects and to develop a way ahead. ¶11. (U) On April 15 USA Today cited a Refugees International report that the Sadrist movement is the main provider of social services in Basrah. USAID's OFDA found this report not based on solid evidence, noting that many other religious and community-based groups are providing social services in the absence of adequate central government programs. Comment: The Iraqi government should do more to establish itself as a service provider for Basrawis in need. The CMOC agreed to Regional Embassy Office (REO) Basrah's request that CMOC teams accompany the Iraqi Army on humanitarian missions to asses Sadrist involvement in assistance. ¶12. (U) Food prices are now tracked by CMOC. In their latest report, eggs have increased 30% and tomatoes 100% since March ¶19. Reports suggest people are hoarding food in anticipation of markets closing because of conflict in the city and this is driving prices up. Update on GOI's $100 million for Basrah (Ref C) -------------- -- ¶13. (C/REL MCFI) According to a PRT employee who works directly with the Provincial Council (PC),the Provincial Reconstruction Development Committee (PRDC) provided, at Acting MOJ Safa al-Safi's request, a suggested list of projects (not included in the PRDC's Basrah 2008 budget plan) for all sectors. Safi is still working on allocations but indicated that $10 million would to the electricity generation sector. The PRDC is going to meet Safi on April 21. Safi is working more or less on his own, with none of the planned arrivals of deputy ministers that will round out his DECISION committee. ¶14. (C/REL MCFI) Safi expressed interest at implementing projects at the sub-provincial level, and was interested in the information that the PC provided him on QRF projects that the PRT is executing at the sub-provincial level. The PC also briefed a receptive Safi to the past and future training activities that the PRT has organized to build capacity for project management. Our PC contact reported Safi saying that he had not expected to find such a positive role that the British-led PRT had played. Safi has asked for a meeting with the PRT's governance expert. Comment: Safi appears to be BASRAH 00000033 003.2 OF 003 warming up to input from the Coalition on how to organize his $100 million project. With the key deputy ministers still in Baghdad, and his realization that reconstruction work by PRT, J9 and PC merit study, we suspect Safi's goal to finalize a spending plan by the end of the month may slip. ¶15. (U) REO met with representatives of the Basrah Provincial Council regarding its three-year development strategy. The strategy may be the most comprehensive plan in any Province that is created and endorsed by provincial stakeholders. It outlines over 2000 projects covering seven provincial districts and 16 service sectors. While the Provincial Council estimates that the strategy will cost approximately $2.25 billion, the central government has only committed to fund 45 percent of the estimated costs. The Council believes the difference can be addressed by combining resources from foreign governments, NGOs, and possibly profits from its oil sector. In addition to funding issues, the Council acknowledged its need for outside technical expertise and support. Similar to its recommendation regarding additional funding sources, the Council believes foreign donors can better meet their objectives in the region by pooling their technical resources and expertise together under the Council's Basrah-led strategy. Port of Umm Qasr Update -------------- ¶16. (C//REL MCFI) REO Officers met April 17 (Septel) with Captain Hussein Mohammed Abdullah, Assistant Director General (A-DG) for Management at the Port of Umm Qasr (PUQ). Hussein confirmed that the GOI sacked the PUQ Acting DG for Technical Affairs Safa Abud al-Hussein, who with militia influence had been appointed to his position a little less than a year ago. Hussein advised that the replacement, former A-DG for Management Hamid al-Husseini, is technically competent. Hussein was sanguine about port prospects. He said the security situation had improved markedly with the Iraqi Army (IA) having displaced the JAM-saturated Facilities Protection Service (FPS). ¶17. (C//REL MCFI) Hussein also confirmed that the GOI Council of Ministers approved commercialization plans for the PUQ that broadly follow a proposal advanced by the Embassy's Office of the Transportation Attachi (OTA). He said he was heading up a committee of port technocrats that would select a reputable, international consultant to help the GCPI write tender documents to bring in a management company for the north port and a long-term concessionaire for the south port. The committee would be meeting to discuss the matter next week. HOWARD